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ABSTRACT   
 
This study is concerned with school-children’s communication, behavioural, and emotional 
development, in which the first concern has been to focus on their laughter. Although 
commonly thought of as an integral component of childhood, children’s laughter seldom 
receives the attention it deserves. The significance of laughter’s correlation with children’s 
social connectivity remains largely undiscovered. Existing literature seems preoccupied either 
with examples of its use as a barometer of pupil contentment or the exploits of self-styled 
classroom clowns. Little account has been taken of laughter’s exclusive orientation, and the 
strain this may create in schools with an avowedly inclusive ethos.  
 
Teachers and pupils who agreed to take part in this study were recruited from two primary 
schools. The units under focus were manageably small, although between them the combined 
participant population numbered in their hundreds. Together, they formed the substantive part 
of a pair of ethnographic case-studies. Data obtained from a series of playground/classroom 
observations and informal interviews were framed around Robert Putnam’s theory of social 
capital, and its own inclusive-exclusive (bridging and bonding) dynamic.  
 
Findings indicate that our diminishing stocks of social capital may be directly correlated with 
our decline in laughter production. They also confirm the view that it is unhelpful to consider 
inclusive and exclusive entities in isolation. Exclusive laughter appears to be a fundamental 
condition of inclusive schooling, with pupils and their teachers apparently natural exponents 
of a form of behaviour that may be described as inclusive-exclusive.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1999 I began (and subsequently failed to complete) a PhD in Art History. My thesis 
focused on the iconography of Judas Iscariot (1300 – 1600). It examined the signs and 
symbols used by artists of the period that helped audiences decipher the Apostle’s depiction. 
As the study developed, I became particularly interested in the way Judas was presented both 
as a central and as a peripheral figure. Although he had a pivotal role in the Passion narrative, 
and despite holding an important position within the Apostleship (being the group’s 
treasurer), certain painters and sculptors seemed wary about depicting the arch-sinner. In 
many cases his presence had to be reconfigured for reasons of propriety. Some artists 
responded by putting their knowledge of spatial settings, group dynamics, and the rendering 
of perspective to innovative use, deploying a range of pioneering visual effects and schemas. 
It was common, for example, for painters to portray Judas only in profile. Treating him 
strictly in two dimensions created an impression that while he was in the picture he was not 
of it: he was seen and unseen, included yet excluded. All manner of illusionary techniques 
were employed to ensure that spectators’ moral and aesthetic sensibilities were not offended 
by his compelling and disconcerting presence. For, among the pious at least, Judas’s image 
was capable of being experienced as an imaginatively real figure, and capable of provoking a 
profoundly visceral response.  
 
I never got so far into my research that I managed anything other than just a brief survey of 
the range of emotions that renderings of Judas could provoke in the late Medieval/early 
Renaissance viewer. That his image was capable of instilling fear and awe is beyond dispute, 
but it could just as easily trigger the discriminating laughter of mockery and ridicule. His 
emblematic Jewish-ness, his dark skin, saturnine looks, his distinguishing black beard, and 
his Semitic hooked nose, would clearly have been intended to elicit derision and risibility 
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among prejudicial Christian beholders. It is quite possible therefore that an unconscious but 
lingering desire to find out much more about such themes may have nurtured a growing 
interest in laughter, and may have also inspired me to approach it from a slightly different 
perspective. For although iconography and ethnography are qualitatively distinct 
methodologies, both make use of symbols and signs, be they social or cultural, as vehicles to 
mediate meaning (Panofsky, 1972; Geertz, 1973).   
 
It may have also renewed my interest in examining people’s viewing habits, noting in 
particular how little they have changed over the centuries. People continue to regard society’s 
outliers, strangers, and those who just happen to be ‘different’ in a manner indistinguishable 
from their early predecessors. Bigotry and discrimination, stereotyping and categorising, 
inclusion and exclusion, remain active and pressing issues of concern. The attempt by artists 
to have Judas in the picture - but not of it - could in effect describe some of the modern 
attitudes shown towards children of all abilities. Their right to be included in today’s broad 
social and educational picture still requires it seems widespread approval. Despite the very 
best efforts of concerned bodies like the movement for educational inclusion, this goal 
remains some distance from being realised.   
 
Inclusion and Exclusion: Terms and Conditions 
If it was ever necessary to produce a condition report on the movement for educational 
inclusion, a sort of ‘heads-up’ on its past actions and its current standing, then something like 
‘a bright start followed by a gradual loss of momentum’ might be telling it plainly. Taking its 
successes and failures into account, it could be said that among its broad coalition of activists 
and sympathisers many have become complacent, fatigued or simply resigned to the fact that 
the inclusion project has nowhere else to go. Hopes of achieving its primary objective 
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continue to prove elusive. Confusion and in-fighting have a tendency to unsettle the ranks, 
with much of the disagreements on elementary matters, principally the unsuccessful attempts 
to reach an agreed understanding of what inclusion actually is and how it can be recognised 
(Allan, 2010). But such a gloomy and discouraging assessment may not be entirely deserved. 
Insinuations about inclusion’s continued viability and suggestions of diminishing group 
morale only encourages a largely inaccurate view of a project that has shown an uncommon 
ability to react and adapt in order to meet new conditions and challenges.  
 
As is often the way with even the most estimable causes and movements, creative and vibrant 
phases are invariably punctuated by dull, inactive interludes. But these leans spells can 
sometimes prove to be expedient. They have, for example, enabled the inclusion project to 
pass through further historical moments, achieving ever more turning-points in its strategic 
and creative evolution. Far from having reached an impasse, it may instead be cautiously 
exploring all possible pathways, while simultaneously re-defining its internal structure and 
external outlook. For example, the movement appears to place considerable virtue in 
reconfiguring its default vocabulary. In the past, this has been the prelude to heralding a 
significant change in focus and direction. If the first ‘moment’ was notable for initiating a 
lexical shift from ‘integration’ to ‘inclusion’, the second moment occurred when focus was 
once again re-aligned, this time from ‘inclusion’ to ‘inclusivity’ (Berlach & Chambers, 
2011). The degree of difference here appears to be slight but may in time prove to have major 
consequences. Greater concentration on the cognate term ‘inclusivity’ acknowledges the 
diverse range of pupils that currently fall within the movement’s remit. Enlarging the human 
agenda means extending it well beyond - but not disregarding - those with physical and/or 
learning disabilities (Hall et al, 2004).  
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When using the term ‘inclusive’ it is often customary to reference it in relation to its polar 
opposite. Binary discrimination and classification is an important feature of our cognitive 
system (Crane, 2004). Braced in this way, inclusive and exclusive appear as antagonistic 
orientations. Thus, of the two, inclusive is presumed to be the more natural and preferred 
state, with inclusive communities, practices, behaviours and philosophies seen usually as 
having greater merit and being more socially and morally desirable. As Clough notes, 
however, such presumptions should be treated with caution (1999). In society generally, and 
within the system of education in particular, exclusive principles and inclusive intentions 
enjoy far more interaction, both in physical space and in individual consciousness (1999). At 
times, their level of interaction is so well established, so densely enmeshed, it is not always 
easy to distinguish between them. Corbett, for example, likens their arrangement to the cross-
hatched weave in a piece of fabric (1997).  
 
But in any school setting there will also be expectations and institutional pressures for that 
distinction to be made clearer. A dualistic way of thinking remains the norm; particular 
activities are conceived only as competing alternatives (e.g. good and bad behaviour) so that 
only one of them, typically the prosocial one, is championed and defended as correct.  
Indeed, “good’ and ‘bad’ are among the first words and concepts learned by children’ 
(Baumeister et al, 2001, p.323) and their distinction, even in the earliest years, tends to be 
treated as absolute. Pupils’ manifestations of prejudice, for example, warrant early 
identification, and will typically provoke immediate classification as an example of 
exclusive, unacceptable behaviour. Peremptorily, this will set in train a school’s specific 
disciplinary procedures. Prompt and systematic action, too, will minimise incidents of 
exclusive practices, as when a child’s full participation in the social and curricular aspects of 
their schooling is subject to some form of restriction. Teachers have a responsibility to 
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identify children who may find it difficult to interact with their peers and/or with adults. 
Again, an ability to make some decisive analyses will be expected to ensure that the requisite 
inclusive mechanisms can be engaged. A school’s organisational reputation depends to a 
great extent on the speed and efficiency of its responses to these and similar scenarios.   
 
Laughter 
That laughter can be the cause of - and the solution to - many of these situations is one of the 
defining features of this paradoxical phenomenon. Laughter can be inclusive and exclusive at 
the same time (Dupréel, 1928). It can work to bring people together and also to set them 
apart. Events which occurred at a primary school in Bolton, Lancashire, illustrate how 
laughter’s contradictory feature can operate. The sound of the pupils’ laughter at play-time 
was interpreted by their headteacher as a particularly good indication of their well-being and 
level of contentment, although for the occupants of residential properties located nearby the 
noise was disagreeably excessive, prompting them to take legal action against the school for 
perpetrating a noise nuisance (Daily Telegraph, 2009). While laughter presents a range of 
problems for school authorities, it provides a useful reference point to show how simple 
binary thinking about education’s inclusive-exclusive dichotomy is not always helpful. How, 
for example, is it possible to promote only cohesive and inclusive forms of laughter in school 
when some aspects of teasing, for instance, blur the inclusive-exclusive boundary? For the 
child-teaser, their sometimes hurtful and offensive remarks and actions are evidence of 
untapped skill and ingenuity, according to Willis (1976). More usually, teasing is taken as 
exclusive behaviour and therefore as potentially harmful, having a close association with 
bullying. And yet for the child-victim, ‘being teased is part of learning the rules of belonging’ 
(Partington, 2006, p.145). Ways of responding to name-calling, mockery, ridicule, taunts, etc, 
constitute an important part of a child’s process of socialisation (Keltner, et al, 1998).  
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The Research Question 
For the task of the ethnographer, over and above exploring and investigating, describing 
people’s lives, and maintaining field relations, is to ‘reduce the puzzlement’ (Geertz, 1973, 
p.16). Paying heed to this directive should ensure that sensible, insightful answers can be 
provided to the following question: 
 What can children’s laughter tell us about inclusive schooling?  
  
Previous research conducted (for a Masters degree) at a ‘fully inclusive’ primary school 
concluded that a range of anti-inclusive practices and behaviours were embedded within its 
inclusive framework (Nugent, 2008). The findings, however, which amounted to a 
declaration that no school has the right to describe itself as ‘fully inclusive’ if there is 
evidence of exclusive practices and behaviour, failed to appreciate the delicate interplay 
between the inclusive-exclusive pairing, seeing only the differences instead. Being altogether 
too deferential to the view that their alignment is distinct and fixed, with one category tending 
to preclude its supposed opposite, was a significant contribution to the misinterpretation of 
the research data. In hindsight, it was of no surprise that the outcomes were strongly disputed 
by the school’s headteacher. But this experience, chastening though it proved, was proof 
enough that it was vital to achieve a more expansive understanding of their dynamic 
relationship. If the two points were not merely independent, isolated phenomena but mutually 
constituted, it would necessitate a more critically-minded approach of not only the concept of 
inclusive-exclusive but of existing literature, and to challenge rather than simply condone the 
oppositional way of thinking that much of it has hitherto encouraged.   
 
Although dichotomies of many descriptions have been the subject of analysis from the time 
of Antiquity, and despite the enduring usefulness of Wright Mills’ oppositional approach in 
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helping to stimulate the social scientist’s research imagination (1967/2000), the inclusive-
exclusive form has not on the whole received much attention. Certainly, nothing that has 
passed before has ever attempted to triangulate them using laughter. Within the field of 
education, Allan (2010) makes a critical note of the exclusive nature of much inclusive 
research, and Nind et al (2004) recognise that inclusive and exclusive processes are an 
everyday occurrence in schools, perhaps even amounting to a fact of life. Elsewhere, a 
selection of different disciplinary perspectives helps to stimulate the inclusive-exclusive 
issue. Although some feel that attempts at binary deconstruction can at times be over-applied 
(e.g. Searle, 1983) for the most part there seems to be a general/broad appreciation of its 
value, and evidently some agreement that differences between inclusive and exclusive are not 
always clear cut, despite not all of the parties using familiar terminology. For example, 
Bauman (1995) argues that phagic (inclusivist) and emic (exclusivist) practices or ‘strategies’ 
are characteristic of all societies, and both conditions are necessary for a society’s successful 
upkeep (p.180). These are ‘indispensable mechanisms of social spacing’ and are not intended 
to function individually, but in tandem. More than that, he wonders if an ‘inclusive 
community’ might actually be a ‘contradiction in terms’ (2000, p.172).  
 
Gestalt/Frame Analysis 
In extending the way our thought processes, our perceptions, are put into order, Gregory 
Bateson (2000), whose work was a major influence on  Goffman’s analysis of organisational  
frames, also considers the inclusive-exclusive theme, but from a psychological viewpoint. He 
claims that in order to simplify the way we make sense of events, the way information is 
categorised and subsequently interpreted, a type of mind-set that corresponds closely to the 
organisational boundary of a picture frame is constructed. The frame is highly selective, for it 
demarcates what information or material should be contained inside its boundaries, 
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distinguishing between what should remain inside (enhanced) from what remains outside 
(inhibited). Such a process, he argues, manages to be both inclusive and exclusive (2000).  
 
Social Capital 
The preceding range of impressions and interpretations secure more shape and substance 
when organised around Robert Putnam’s body of work on social capital and in particular his 
theory of bonding (exclusive) and bridging (inclusive) network connections (2000). Social 
capital places great stress on the importance of relationships, in either their strong or weak 
forms, and how social profit can accrue from the reciprocities and levels of trust generated 
through them. Putnam maintains that establishing bridging (inclusive) relations, which extend 
outward beyond our zones of familiarity, are a greater social priority than adding to the 
superfluity of bonding ties, which tend to be strong but are often rigidly homogeneous and 
inward looking (2000). Putnam’s notion, however, needs to be examined and applied very 
carefully. A healthy and effective community requires a blend of different types of social 
capital (Halpern, 2005). It may be inferred therefore that too much inclusive (bridging) social 
capital can be as bad as having too little. Putnam’s bias towards bridging social capital can be 
questioned on at least two levels. Since our experience of social capital begins with bonding 
forms (bridging social capital is only produced once bonding is established), and since it is 
this form we are most familiar with, and have the greatest experience of, generating bonding 
(exclusive) social capital is our natural, instinctive inclination. Furthermore, since the 
distinction between bonding and bridging is ‘almost entirely context dependent’ (Schuller, 
2007, p.15) it is almost impossible to tell them apart; moreover ‘the relationship between 
these two forms…may be complementary or conflictual, or both’ (2007, p.16). It is therefore 
relevant to ask, at what point is it decided that bonding becomes too exclusionary? (Schuller, 
2007).  
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A similar predicament has been ongoing in laughter studies. The superiority model of 
laughter, which accounts for all exclusive forms of the phenomenon, prescribes that we laugh 
out of ‘some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmities of others’ (Hobbes. 
1650/1994, p.54). It declares an explicit message of triumph, and has been the most 
influential account of why we are moved to laughter since the time of Plato (Morreall, 1983). 
But despite its prominence amongst the laughter theories, and despite claims that it is the only 
reason why we laugh (Gruner, 2000), this has not prevented some head-teachers from 
attempting to limit the superiority model’s influence by restricting school-based humour and 
laughter to just its affiliative, pro-social types. While such actions appear well-intentioned, 
they may in fact prove to be badly judged. For if we have any sympathy with the notion that a 
typical community needs to have interpersonal relationships that express shared and 
contested values, positive as well as negative social effects (Schuller, 2007), we might 
wonder at the wisdom and feasibility in encouraging inclusive-only practices and behaviour. 
For that matter, we might wonder whether developing inclusive-only philosophies, or even 
building inclusive-only educational movements, have any merit at all. The reductive thinking 
of head-teachers often rests on the assumption that people only laugh because they find 
something amusing. It is also assumed that when children laugh at racist or sexist humour, for 
example, they are in effect endorsing those discriminatory attitudes.  
 
Exclusivity Reconsidered 
Actually, there may be any number of different attitudes directing a child’s laughter. There 
may be a longing to remain part of a group, or a wish not to show ignorance in the presence 
of one’s peers, or indeed a desire simply to copy others. If laughter ever succeeds in 
graduating from its marginal position located within the affective domain of teaching and 
learning (regarded mainly as an efficient instrument with which to improve pupils’ 
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motivation and concentration), and is allowed to adopt a more expansive, influential role, 
perhaps even qualifying as a performativity benchmark (Johnson, 2005), school authorities 
must realise that exclusive laughter is a sine qua non of inclusive schooling. Although there is 
a tendency for the terms inclusive and exclusive to be used with evaluative force, implying 
that the former is somehow better than the latter, it will be argued at this juncture that each 
orientation is of fundamental importance. In fact, if the patterns of our interpersonal 
associations – our bridging and bonding capabilities – indicate anything at all, it is that the 
exclusive concept merits far greater distinction, inasmuch that without exclusive forms of 
social capital there can be no fertile ground upon which inclusive social capital can possibly 
develop.   
 
When searching for evidence of inclusive schooling there is little doubt that a range of both 
inclusive and exclusive examples will be met. This is how it should be. The presence of 
exclusive practices and behaviour need not diminish the inclusive philosophy that a school 
may have been at great pains to build and promote. It merely identifies it as a fit and proper, 
fully functioning institution, one whose fitness might be deserved all the more by it openly 
declaring tenure of both dimensions. ‘Inclusive’, like the term ‘democracy’, bears a weighty, 
almost canonical significance. And yet the great democracies of the modern era seldom ever 
lose their democratic status even though they may routinely demonstrate a tyrannical capacity 
when effecting actions more usually associated with dictatorships. Plato claimed that variety 
and disorder were characteristics proper to any democracy (2003). We should not, therefore, 
be fooled into believing that every group, or member of a group, operating within a 
democracy functions solely for the common good. As Putnam says, ‘democracy does not 
require that citizens be selfless saints’ (2000, p.349).  
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Perhaps such a moderate view now obtains because ‘democracy’, up until the 19c, was an 
overwhelmingly unfavourable term, routinely associated with radicalism and revolt 
(Williams, 1976). Even today, the core components of the purest, most envied democratic 
system include ‘innumerable… distortions’, producing reduced concepts of constitutional 
protocols such as ‘election’, ‘representation’, and ‘mandate’ (1976, p.97). Few people would 
readily accept the idea that democracy today really does involve all categories of people and 
does indeed meet the needs of all groups in society. But perhaps it is unreasonable to expect 
that democracy should be more inclusive, and that inclusive should be more democratic. 
These contradictory themes are a fundamental aspect of social life, and a prominent feature 
within the education system. Although inclusive remains an important social and cultural 
aspiration, and inclusive teaching and learning remains the best hope for preserving our 
children’s educational future, such assertions will only come to fruition once the interactive 
relationship with its definitional opposite is held up to scrutiny. A basic limitation in existing 
research is its theoretical one-sidedness which all too often neglects the interactive nature of 
this twin-membered system. 
 
The Educational Context 
This study not only makes a new case for the inclusive-exclusive relationship, thereby  
providing a new perspective on inclusive education, it also helps establish the case for 
laughter, still a peripheral topic within educational research (Vlieghe, et al, 2009). That it has 
troubled some of the greatest minds of past ages, from Cicero and Aristotle to Freud and 
Bergson, is an indication that laughter actually does matter, and an argument against the 
tendency to see it as a fleeting affectation with only superficial value. There remains, 
however, a lingering doubt as to its worthiness as a serious topic of study (Billig, 2005), not 
to mention its application in school settings, where its suitability has long been questioned 
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despite efforts to highlight its pedagogic significance (Vlieghe et al, 2009). Many of these 
misgivings are the result of laughter’s contribution to the strain in relations between the 
polarities of playful and serious. Even though there have been some tentative associations 
with curricula issues (usually in pre-school settings), play has long been regarded as 
incompatible with formal learning. It seems that the common conjunction of laughter and 
play precludes either condition from being taken seriously. And it is precisely the seriousness 
with which we confront education in this country that renders it bordering on a national 
obsession (Conroy & Davis, 2002). Just how teaching and learning can be made more 
accessible, more meaningful to an ever-growing population of disinterested and disconnected 
learners, remains an ongoing cause for concern. But as more and more schools are electing to 
relinquish pupils’ break-time there is evidence this has created more opportunities for playful 
classroom instruction.  
 
Teachers have been encouraged to make more creative and novel engagements with their 
learners (Craft, 2000). Indeed, a feature of my fieldwork has been the number of classroom 
activities encountered that may have originated in the playground. In most cases it proved to 
be a productive if unusual union. Clearly there are limits to what can be taught during a 
particular lesson’s ‘play’ phase. Humour might be one of many useful applications a teacher 
may deploy when helping children remember their times-tables, for example. It might not, 
however, be an appropriate method to use when instructing a child how to swim. 
Nonetheless, among the primary school classrooms observed many had cultivated a 
noticeably informal atmosphere, where the serious and non-serious educational domains 
functioned co-operatively in a concerted interchanging process. 
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The Dialectic of Opposites 
This to-ing and fro-ing between dimensions shows, as with the inclusive-exclusive 
distinction, that the serious-play opposition is highly fugitive. These are not fixed categories. 
Moreover, the status of these categories may be subject to challenge (Mulkay, 1988). While 
the serious mode remains the dominant discourse system by which social acts are 
coordinated, Mulkay wonders how the subordinate humorous mode would function if the 
positions were reversed. Wickberg (1998) goes further, believing we may have reached that 
point already. ‘There seems to be very little left to support the notion of ‘the serious’ as an 
objective entity’, he claims (p.217). This, he argues, is due to the level of humour’s 
penetration into that hitherto impenetrable realm of the serious, to the extent that we cannot 
take anything seriously anymore. The jokes that appeared so soon after the death of Lady 
Diana and after the attacks on 9/11 seem to confirm this view (Conroy, 2004). But however 
close or distant these oppositions are perceived to be, we still need to become better 
acquainted with the main features of dichotomous thinking since in many peoples’ perceptual 
systems it remains the path of least resistance. Billig advises, for example, that in order to 
explain funniness we need to make sense of seriousness (2005). Guided by his wise counsel, 
and applying it more generally, makes it possible to examine these oppositions more evenly, 
without favour. If, in so doing, examples are uncovered where the various polarities are held 
in check, or show a tendency to converge, become integrated or are transposed, we may, 
despite the significance of the findings, have reached an important methodological juncture. 
By avoiding the single-lens perspective that has characterised a great deal of previous 
discussions on inclusion, a route opens up affording a two-dimensional approach, one that 
incorporates ‘exclusive’ while also examining its ‘inclusive’ counterpart. It thereby makes 
their relationship available for scrutiny in order to determine not only what it means for 
inclusive education, but to determine what inclusive education actually means.  
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Categories Eschewed 
At the heart of this new thinking on inclusive education lies a concern with the profusion of 
schemes in which objects, institutions, but mainly people, are routinely arranged  in specific 
units, groups, and classes, since it is believed they have certain properties and characteristics 
in common. Aristotle’s doctrine of categories, a treatise designed to organise fragmentary 
‘things’ into families and types might not have been the first - but may have been the most 
influential - attempt to construct an index of classification (Ryle, 1937/8). Durkheim & 
Mauss explained that it was due to society’s embrace of human classes and groupings that 
humans developed a corresponding urge to group and class other things (1903/1963). The 
need to arrange the world around us, rendering it more manageable, bringing social reality 
into comprehensible form, is at times an unconscious activity. Nonetheless, the way we 
classify objects and people usually determines who or what gets included and excluded. In 
schools no less than in society, programmes of separation are employed for a range of largely 
administrative reasons.  
 
But the hallmark of categorisation, in education at least, is concerned with the perception of 
relative standing. When sorting, ordering, and classifying, we can engage in some very 
subjective, but also some highly sophisticated, forms of comparison. The practice of 
comparing pupils, for example, is the abiding feature of our contemporary and highly 
competitive education system which, perhaps inadvertently, is responsible for creating a wide 
range of homogeneous pupil-networks and communities. Much of this endeavour is focused 
on a child’s ability, which can activate such codifying processes as setting and streaming, 
which has been regarded as an educational boon for certain pupils.  Festinger (1954) has 
argued that humans possess psychical drives that actually demand their abilities be compared 
and evaluated. Children need to know, in effect, their own capacities and limitations. But 
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equally there is the risk that it can sometimes lead to performance measuring, to personalised 
labelling and to disreputable stereo-typing. At one time, the practice of categorising within 
education was heavily criticised (e.g. Tomlinson, 1982). More recently, however, there are 
indications that moods and policies have softened (Alexander, 2010).  
    
A familiar technique, widely engaged in order to try and discover laughter’s distinctive 
nature, has been to allot it a formal berth in some form of classification schema. It has, for 
example, been customary to categorise intellectual theories of laughter into three major types 
(Billig, 2005). From the late 18c, the superiority theory, the incongruity theory, and the 
theory of relief/release, have formed the spearhead of such explanatory systems. Aristotle 
(2009), preferring distinctions of a more personal kind, employed a taxonomy which 
approximated to an early continuum of social types. His laughter classification amounted to a 
list of those people whose mirth was excessive (the vulgar buffoon), those of a ready wit (the 
well-bred gentleman), and those who were indifferent to humour (the cynic, the melancholic). 
But what remained constant across these different epochs - and remains popular today - is the 
view that until an item, person or entity has been accorded a categorical status they or it could 
not be objectified, recognised, or understood.  
 
An interest in the way that tribal societies were structured, how ‘primitive’ people classified 
their everyday worlds, from belief systems to kinship systems, was the point at which their 
particular schemes of life could be compared and contrasted to the reigning European/ 
American paradigm. ‘In the 19c…the imposition of a preconceived Western developmental 
framework made the job of the ethnographer much simpler; the task became in effect that of a 
classifier of cultural traits’ (Vidich & Lyman, 2003, p.65). This enthusiasm for classifying 
has continued undimmed. The anthropologist George Murdock (1949) began constructing a 
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cross-cultural trait index in the 1930s. His work, of considerable size even then, was taken on 
by Yale University a decade later. Today, under the auspices of the Human Relations Area 
Files (HRAF), it produces a handbook of categories based on all existing ethnographic 
literature. Many researchers are keen to access its immense database since it contains all 
manner of cultural, social, religious, and political details about local populations the world 
over. But despite its apparent usefulness, there are claims it encourages ‘disembodied’ 
ethnography (Vidich & Lyman, 2003, p.65). Social scientists are thus encouraged to access 
information about contemporary tribes and societies without having to leave their home or 
office, without having to conduct any observations or interviews. Unsurprisingly, the 
database has proved to be of considerable interest to the American military. Indeed, there are 
claims that Pentagon-led incursions in far off lands are rarely ever attempted before studying 
in careful detail the relevant sections in this monstrous document (Price, 2012).   
 
The slowly evolving body of laughter categories, being decidedly modest in number, are 
unlikely to provoke the kind of controversy or debates found in other fields of enquiry. But in 
the absence of an all-encompassing laughter theory, they are very likely to remain the cause 
of continuing confusion and uncertainty. The human capacity to categorise may be said to 
breed two singular types of categorical thinking. Individuals whose view of social reality 
tends to divide human and physical worlds into fixed categories may be behaving 
consistently within societal expectations, doing precisely what is expected in an effort to 
organise their everyday experiences. But those who over-indulge in the habit of separating 
the world into distinct chunks can encourage thinking practices that risk obscuring the 
boundary at which conventional cognitive analysis meets unyielding dogmatism. Categorical 
thinking is a way of preserving the very insular and inflexible nature of our perceptions and 
understandings of the world around us. It is a way of organising reality that has very little 
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tolerance for - or allowance of - categories that overlap. In fact, the justification for bearing a 
pronouncedly rigid, categorical mind-set has been explained by another single-minded 
devotee of laughter’s superiority theory. Buckley (2005) was moved to admit that in his case 
it was borne out of a desire to avoid trendy perspectives that tend to be constructed around 
the notion of ‘modern fuzziness’ (p.xiv).  
 
Fuzziness Embraced 
But the fuzzy approach, eschewed by Buckley and by others, is the strategy that is adopted 
without reservation here. There are some distinct advantages in being fuzzy-minded. A 
child’s view of the world, for instance, is not compartmentalised as is the world of grown-
ups; children remain to a large degree oblivious to the distinctions we make and do not 
always find it easy fitting their experiences into our complex range of categories and 
compartments (Zerubavel, 1993). To process reality within such hazy, child-like boundaries 
can help develop a greater appreciation of a child’s take on the world. Showing any level of 
sensitivity to, or empathy with, one’s research participants can make for a more discerning 
interpretation of their behaviours and interactions. In certain respects, a child’s school 
environment provides the ideal setting where a fluent, less rigid, sense of reality is most 
likely to operate.  
 
Compared at least to their counterparts in the secondary sector, primary schools are not 
overly fussed, for example, about time-tabling. During the period of data collection, it was 
noted that some English classes merged seamlessly with maths lessons, and vice versa, with 
little to indicate where one began and the other ended, apart - occasionally - from the clap of 
a teacher’s hands. Concerns about compartmentalising the primary curriculum has become an 
important issue, and is a theme highlighted in the Cambridge Primary Review which 
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proposes an altogether more flexible point of access to infant and junior education 
(Alexander, 2010). Not only does it recommend ending the core/non-core curriculum 
distinction, but the instrumental Key Stage framework is highlighted as a particular barrier to 
sustaining the momentum, the continuity, of children’s learning. As one concerned and 
frustrated correspondent to the Review declared (regarding his objection to the practice of 
classifying children), ‘there is now an argument in favour of blurring the edges and seeing the 
primary phase as one continuum…’ (quoted in Alexander, 2010, p.369).  
 
Talk of ‘blurred edges’ and ‘fuzziness’ can be understood, on one level, as outward 
expressions of uncertainty and mystification. Or they may be considered as highly perceptive 
views of reality, views that are necessarily cautious given that many entities and phenomena 
are anomalous, nuanced, or riven with ambiguity. This applies to laughter just as much as it 
does to certain features of teaching and learning. Laughter’s specification details do not lend 
themselves so easily to the organising principles of classes and categories. There is, for 
instance, little agreement as to its physiological, social, and psychological status. Part of the 
difficulty in finding laughter’s essence is that it is not at all clear how it should be 
categorised, even among the corpus of human passions, feelings and sentiments (Morreall, 
1983). Daring to presume that laughter has any connection with these affective constituents is 
a considerable risk. Some will confidently classify it as an emotion (e.g. Stengel, 2012), 
while others insist that laughter and emotion are incompatible (Bergson, 1911/2005). 
Disagreements at such a fundamental level may be frustrating and confusing, but are the 
inevitable product of a continuous fascination with taxonomies, with information systems that 
are assumed to offer complete descriptions and explanations of all the elements and 
happenings in the universe.   
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Since philosophical ontology has sought the definitive and exhaustive classification of all 
entities in all dimensions, laughter’s categorical standing remains heavily contested. This is 
so simply because there is no agreement as to what laughter actually is. It is possible, as 
Lefcourt (2001) has suggested, that humour and laughter, although immemorial components 
of what it is to be human, are still in their infancy, at least in terms of our phenomenological 
understandings (of it). Despite the steady accumulation of insights and analyses from 
classical philosophers to post-modern investigators, ‘there is much to be added’ (Lefcourt, 
2001, p.165). And, it might be argued, a great deal to be taken away. The repeated attempts to 
consign laughter a specific category or a range of competing categories reflects the 
dominating procedures of the science of pure being and the system of pure segregation. The 
deeply-rooted relationship between the field of ontology and the practice of categorisation 
may have been the standard means by which knowledge-bases were constructed, but they 
have encouraged an indulgent habit of thinking in discrete and clearly defined ways 
(Lovejoy, 1961). While one can accept that classification is a fundamental part of everyday 
life, one must also realise that creating categories is an entirely artificial process (Zerubavel, 
1993). Accordingly, and in keeping with a generally cautious approach to categorising and 
labelling, in this project laughter’s existing categories of superiority, incongruity, and 
relief/release will not be ignored completely, but neither will they be allowed to dominate 
proceedings. 
 
Category formation may constitute a necessary evil. The ease and frequency with which we 
employ categories throughout our daily lives is an indication of their usefulness, or perhaps 
the size of our reliance upon them. They are elemental mechanisms in many communities’ 
infrastructure, a feature of the well-ordered society and of efficient human organisation. As a 
way of rendering the world manageable, some categories are more useful than others. But 
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instead of making life easier there are those that can become a barrier to the way society 
functions, disturbing the way individuals co-ordinate their behaviour, and threatening the 
very nature and foundation of cooperative interaction. When we encounter categories of an 
invidious nature they can be exposed and held up to ridicule, as featured in the work of 
Thorstein Veblen (e.g. 2001). Or we can adopt something like Aristotle’s approach who, 
when attempting to separate qualities from relations and separate substances from kinds, he 
perhaps intentionally created a collection of types that were altogether rough and imprecise 
(Ryle, 1937/8). There is, arguably, much to commend such a system. A system of 
classification that, counter-intuitively, is expansive rather than restrictive, that instead of 
seeing types and classes such as inclusive and exclusive or seriousness and play as 
dichotomous, and perfunctorily organising them into single categories, to consider them 
rather as part of a broader, inter-related grouping, a sort of ‘mixed family’. In a primary 
school environment it just might be the one thing to ensure that categories as we currently 
understand them do not become inscribed and reified, and that the psychopathology of 
stereotyping and pigeon-holing no longer remains a burden for certain pupils.  
 
The Schools Presented 
Using two schools, The Cross and The Crescent, for the focus of enquiry raised the 
possibility (only briefly entertained) of developing a corpus of mainly comparative data. 
Despite ethnography being inherently a comparative practice (Wolcott, 1995), such an 
approach risks emphasising only differences. But apart from some largely superficial 
variance in terms of pupils’ ethnicity, the design and age of their respective school buildings, 
the type and dimensions of each play area, and the overall environmental settings, the two 
schools were notable chiefly for their significant similarities. In real terms, the teaching and 
learning and the organisational structures in place (Ofsted notwithstanding) saw only minor 
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distinctions. Importantly, both schools shared an inclusive culture and outlook. More than 
anything, however, the goodwill generated by pupils and staff, along with their mutual 
enthusiasm for this project, placed them in perfect alignment. In fact, of all the schools that 
were contacted with a view to taking part in and supporting this research (n=50), The Cross 
and The Crescent were the only ones to show any interest. Demonstrating, therefore, how one 
school’s laughter output measured up against the other’s seemed a pretty poor way to repay 
such kindness and hospitality. Casting the research net as wide as possible so that parallel 
naturalistic data can be gathered and examined in a manner that treats the two schools as 
fairly representative examples within primary education may be the biggest help yet in 
unravelling some of the complexities that continue to beset the mainstream sector.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review has been organised around a series of time-frames. Five foundational 
decades in the history of inclusive and exclusive education cover the period from 1970 to the 
present day. The inclusive-exclusive relationship has been examined using the prism of social 
capital as a way to comprehend and to explain school children’s laughter. The sequential 
arrangement of the review is only significant in that it highlights some of the important 
vertical lines of progression. The main emphasis has been to show the horizontal range of 
trends and tendencies, the shifts and continuities, from across a broad spectrum of discourses, 
domains, and disciplines. In attempting to establish the roots, and indeed locate some of the 
routes, of education that both includes and excludes, the conceptual umbrella of inclusive-
exclusive has been stretched very carefully in order to accommodate as many actual, 
potential, as well as tangential themes and ideas that might provide new insights and new 
meanings into the inclusive-exclusive pairing. New evidence has been located among a range 
of cognate terms employed down the years, which have included public-private, altruistic-
egoistic, outsider-insider, consensual-conflictual, subject-object, bridging-bonding, and 
concealing-revealing. These pairings, for so long considered as major oppositions, as isolates, 
will be treated here as mutually enriching. 
 
1970s 
In 1973 Margaret Thatcher and Mark Granovetter set in place two new initiatives that would 
help to redefine the way we think about, and potentially construct, heterogeneous societies. 
Granovetter’s influential paper, ‘The Strength of Weak Ties’ (1973), proposed that the flow 
of information and ideas linking people together was at its most productive when occurring 
between loose, socially distant acquaintances  and not, as intuition would have it,  among 
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close friends or family members. His idea proved to be a major influence on social capital 
theories that were to flourish nearly a generation later.  
 
Mrs. Thatcher, in her capacity as Secretary of State for Education, appointed Mary Warnock 
as the independent Chair of a committee to review educational provision for children with 
disabilities. It was the government’s response to concerns that had preoccupied policy makers 
and members of the public keen to ensure that out-of-reach individuals and dislocated social 
groups could be reconnected to society’s mainstream. What became known as the Warnock 
Report (DfES, 1978) led eventually to widespread use of the term, practice of, and belief in, 
educational inclusion.  
 
Appearing between these two pioneering moments Paul Willis (1976) focused on a group of 
male secondary school pupils for whom laughter was a fundamental and forthright 
declaration of their anti-school philosophy. Documenting their transition from the education 
system to the economic system, Willis showed how the antagonistic behaviour of one group 
in the counter-culture of the school, known as ‘the lads’, amounted to a form of training, an 
apprenticeship for a working life-time spent in the all-male culture of the industrial shop-
floor.   
 
Integration and Segregation 
The Warnock Report (1978) was a unique document inasmuch that it was the first committee 
of inquiry in the modern era that had as its focus the education of children with disabilities. In 
keeping with progressive pedagogic trends in Scandinavian countries and North America, and 
responding to home-based campaigning by a variety of professional, voluntary, and pressure 
groups, the idea of integrated provision was offered as a positive alternative to the policies 
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and practices of segregation. It marked a move away from the conventionally rigid categories 
of ‘handicap’ and other inappropriate labels towards encouraging a new discourse of 
disability, one with the introduction of terms such as ‘special needs’ and ‘learning 
difficulties’. The report declared that children of all abilities should be educated in a common 
setting, ‘so far as possible’ (p.100 section.7.3). It also introduced the practice of statementing 
for children with complex needs. Importantly, the report distinguished between three main 
forms of integration, which were not discrete but overlapping categories. Firstly, locational 
integration is practiced where special units/classes are set up in ordinary schools. Social 
integration involves children attending a special class/unit ‘where they can eat, play and 
consort with other children’ (p.101 s.7.8). Finally, functional integration is achieved where 
the locational and social association of children with special needs with their typical peers 
leads to joint participation in classroom activities and programmes (1978). 
 
The ambiguous interpretations of integration in the Warnock report was reflected in the many 
loopholes which the subsequent Education Act (DfES, 1981) provided. It enabled the policy 
and practice of segregation to continue unhindered (Jackson, 2005). At the outset, the report 
struggled to rationalise who or what was to be included and excluded. It chose not to take into 
consideration the social factors which may contribute to disability (DfES, 1978). 
Furthermore, recommendations of the committee would not apply to children deemed to be 
‘highly gifted’ (p.4) or those from ethnic minority backgrounds. The bulk of the evidence 
submitted to the committee ‘clearly favoured the retention of special schools as part of a 
broader spectrum of provision’ (Wilson cited by Barton & Landman, 1993, p.45).  
 
Many years later, the role played by the secretariat of the DfES, in helping to shape the 
direction and content of the Warnock Report, was revealed. In 2005 a reflective Lady 
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Warnock stated that the secretariat took responsibility for writing the initial papers that 
formed the foundation of the committee’s work. This office also decided what research 
needed to be done, chose the schools that the committee members would visit, and also 
provided the key questions that were to be asked. Jackson (2005) was not alone in wondering 
about the independence of this ‘government financed committee’ (p.2). Furthermore, the 
committee commissioned significantly less research than any previous committee appointed 
to examine the educational system. It is believed Mrs Thatcher’s influence weighed heavily 
upon this particular section of the report. During her period as Education Secretary she had 
made known her disdain for  academic research which she saw as costly, time-consuming and 
ineffectual (Jackson, 2005).  
 
Despite the ambiguity and the arguments, the loopholes and caveats, it should be 
acknowledged that the Warnock Report (1978) laid the foundation for far-reaching reforms of 
school-based education. Not least, it provided opportunities for pupils of all abilities to 
interact with each other, formally and informally, socially and educationally. It also redefined 
their experiences of relating and connecting to adults in school settings. Educational policy 
was steadily transforming the traditional, common-sense view of the local school, from a 
largely homogenised institution filled with like-minded children to a place where a child 
could encounter everyday behaviour from a socially diverse range of people. In this respect, 
the Warnock Report can be considered an important part of a progressive trend in education 
that was first glimpsed in the policy focus on Primary education covered by the Plowden 
Report (DfES, 1967). This landmark review considered, among many other issues, the 
educational welfare of all children in society, including children of immigrants, children form 
socially deprived backgrounds, and those described as ‘handicapped’. Aiming to develop 
more egalitarian structures within modern schooling, the Warnock Committee picked up and 
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then expanded on the very general offerings covered in Plowden, in particular recognising the 
importance of social interchange between children with disabilities and their typical peers. 
The framework document indicated that such a degree of association in schools ‘should begin 
at as early an age as possible’ (p.101, s.7.8.). Encouraging the formation of relationships 
between children normally situated outside their social circle was deemed to be an effective 
stimulant to a child’s social and cognitive development.  
 
Strong and Weak Ties 
In his research on network connections, Granovetter (1973) distinguishes between two kinds 
of social ties. Strong (exclusive) ties, such as those between family and close friends, are 
time-intensive, emotional, intimate and reciprocal. Weak (inclusive) ties between casual 
acquaintances tend to be fleeting, instrumental and impersonal. Weak ties may not appear to 
contribute much to one’s level of connectedness, but Granovetter argues that, counter-
intuitively, these ties are of considerable value. They function as bridges between socially 
homogeneous groups whose members ordinarily do not interact with one another. In contrast, 
strong ties tend to produce groups that are inward looking and bond similar people to each 
other. When searching for job opportunities, for example, the weak ties of acquaintances can 
prove invaluable since they may provide more serendipitous connections within the broader 
jobs grapevine. But the strong tie, with its densely-knit social structure, is conceived as 
having little practical value. It is likely to provide only redundant information since it can be 
anticipated to circulate in similar, if not the same, social circles. Although the strong tie may 
encourage local cohesion, it lacks the expansive channels that weak ties can provide in order 
to encourage access to wider opportunities and to obtain a greater range of resources 
(Granovetter, 1973).  
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Centre and Margin 
From a macro assessment of the dimensions of strong and weak ties, Granovetter also offered 
a micro analysis. Believing that as children get older they develop stronger bonding ties, 
consolidating links to those who are similar to themselves (1973), he set about attempting to 
define the key properties and structures of peer group relations. This, he felt, could explain, 
for example, conferrals of power and status. He offers some idea of a group’s internal 
structure by his understanding of ‘transitivity’ (1973, p.1376), a term used to describe a 
passing-into condition, a sort of inclusive-exclusive (integration-segregation) state that people 
frequently experience when interacting with firm friends and mere acquaintances. The 
principle behind the term is that the stronger the tie between two pupils, like Gita and Ayesha 
for example, the larger the overlap in their relationship circles. If Gita likes Ayesha, and 
Ayesha also likes Pria, there is a strong likelihood that Gita will also like Pria. This 
calculation is based on the notion that the pupils will intuitively endeavour to reduce any 
possible friction or uncertainty in their social and emotional domains. Naturally the girls’ 
friendship-group contains strong and weak elements, but the degree of one’s likeability is 
subsumed in order to preserve the equilibrium of the group’s internal structure. 
 
Granovetter argues that the kind of information an individual has access to, and the choices 
that they make within a group, are affected by the position they hold, i.e. their proximal and 
hierarchical placement. Typically, individuals will either be located at the centre, giving 
every appearance of being highly integrated or they will occupy positions on the margins. Yet 
it is the influence that those on the margins (‘Pria’ in the example above) who, ordinarily one 
would describe as the weak tie in the group (being a mere acquaintance of Gita) can, in real 
terms, provide the group with all-important bonding, integrative capacities. Against 
expectation, the weak ties afford the group and its internal/external network with a dedicated 
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sense of stability and balance. A group’s relational structure needs, more than anything else, 
to be stable. Weak ties within a group not only exist but thrive since they bear, in many cases, 
responsibility for the group’s prosperity. Due to their pivotal role they can act as bridges, 
connecting individuals to each other inside a group as well as connect individuals between 
groups.   
 
Among the many highlights in ‘Learning to Labour’ (1976) Paul Willis’s social explanation 
for school-based laughter often gets overlooked. Much of the praise for his highly original 
treatment of male working-class culture centres on his fascinating insight into the day-to-day 
administration of an informal group of pupils, self-styled as ‘the lads’. His book more than 
holds its own against the weightier but no less important psychology-dominated humour and 
laughter research that prevailed during this period. Chapman & Foot’s landmark edited 
collection of psychology papers (1976) and Ziv’s early examination of humour and laughter’s 
influence on the psychological climate of a school classroom (1979) remain stimulating 
examples. Despite Willis’s study not having a specific laughter focus, its continued 
importance to inquiries concerned with aspects of communication and behaviour is that it 
brings to light how schools are often the places to develop and shape the particular ambience 
of children’s humour (Willis, 1976). He shows also how the strength of the ties that bind the 
particular boy’s group together is reinforced by laughter, a bonding agent, he notes, of 
formidable potency.  
 
‘The lads’’ laughter is a signature of the group’s resistance to school authority. Applied with 
ruthless efficiency and complete disregard for their targets, it disparages peers, teachers and 
fellow group members alike. Laughter herein is taken to be a product of its social context. It 
confirms the shift in laughter-thinking prompted by anthropologists like Mary Douglas, 
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whose hypothesis gave prominence to a relatively new structuralist perspective. She 
suggested that forms of laughter rarely lie in the utterances alone, but tend to be expressive of 
the social situations in which they occur (1999). This view is largely supported by Willis as 
he shows, for example, when ‘the lads’ leave school and enter the local factories to continue 
the class-patterning that makes up the industrial workforce. The masculine laughter remains 
something of a constant here, except that it is peremptorily adapted for the benefit of a now 
largely adult and therefore more discerning audience. Willis indicates that school life is pretty 
much a dress-rehearsal for a life spent beyond the educational frontier (1976). It was a theme 
addressed simultaneously in America where Bowles and Gintis employed the term 
‘correspondence principle’ (1976, p.131). 
 
Creative and Destructive 
In such unforgiving environments - be it the school or the factory - the ability to make others 
laugh confers a within-group status upon certain group members. Those considered ‘quick’ 
(Willis, 1976, p.32), meaning quick-witted, can earn for themselves a special position within 
the group’s hierarchy. Deftly managed displays of repartee or derisive remarking, intended to 
hurt and/or persecute, are evidence for Willis of a specific capacity - an underlying level of 
intelligence - that routinely eludes the attention of teachers. Since there was (and continues to 
be) no specific application for it in the national curriculum, classroom laughter of ‘the lads’’ 
variety is commonly associated with bad behaviour or, at the very least, judged to be a sign of 
idleness or inattention. But the creative skills involved in mounting withering acts of 
disparagement, the way that a victim’s weaknesses can be targeted with such precision, earns 
for Willis his grudging admiration.  
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Today, it might be imagined that a change in educators’ attitudes would be inclined to offer 
more hope for the quick-witted young minds described by Willis. Teachers with a 
commitment to developing a deeper understanding of what motivates and engages their 
pupils might see in their often aggressive, foul-mouthed outpourings some potential - an 
appreciation perhaps - of the range of unconventional faculties with which many children are 
endowed. Among the ever growing literature championing the cause of introducing greater 
creativity and innovation in education (e.g. Craft, 2000), laughter and humour are rarely ever 
considered. This oversight is because the focus is invariably trained on the ways teachers can 
bring greater creativity to their methods of instruction. Very little is ever said about 
developing the existing humour/laughter skills in pupils. Despite the creative act of the 
humorist sharing the same pattern of creative activity as the scientist (Fry & Allen, 1976), 
despite the Sage and the Jester representing spheres of creativity that effectively ‘shade into 
each other’(Koestler, 1964, p.27), laughter has not been accorded the status in education 
some people believe it deserves (e.g. Vlieghe et al, 2009; Stengel, 2012). If there were more 
opportunities for creative humour in contemporary classrooms, and in pedagogic theory, a 
child’s flair for manipulating language, remembering sequences, and bearing an instinct for 
judicious timing, may stand more of a chance of being identified and harnessed by teachers 
who themselves are better prepared and better positioned to help channel those singular 
talents towards more constructive and rewarding ends.   
 
Insider and Outsider 
Having professed a measure of esteem for the behaviour of some of his research participants 
as they waylaid friend and foe alike with belittling derision, Willis may have committed an 
ethical indiscretion. It is claimed that the relationship he made with the main cohort of his 
study seriously undermined the validity of his qualitative findings (Walker, 1986). His 
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theoretical position led him into methodological errors, the most damaging of which being 
accusations of over-rapport with ‘the lads’ (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). Similar 
allegations have been directed at the Warnock committee, too. The committee could not, for 
example, justify any claim to be independent if it was instigated and financed by the 
government of the day (Jackson, 2005). By the same token, Granovetter has been accused of 
showing undue favouritism towards ‘weak ties’, virtually ignoring the effectiveness of their 
strong-tie counterparts (Gans, 1974). Routes into employment in this period, for example, 
typically followed family lines for many working-class pupils, a point highlighted at length 
by Willis (1976). Granovetter later conceded that there is undeniably a basic need for strong 
ties, admitting, for one thing, they are easier to access and can be obtained at little cost 
(1983). Strong ties constitute a basis of trust that provides emotional comfort, physical 
support and solidarity when needed. This was indeed the case for ‘the lads’, for whom it 
proved an overarching convenience both inside and outside school.  
 
But the strong ties of the researcher, the academic and indeed the chairperson, can often hold 
them hostage to the methodological and political demands expected when there is a need to 
maintain diplomacy, a respectful distance, and a safe level of abstraction. The nature of this 
inclusive-exclusive orientation has continued to dog, in particular, the work of ethnographers.  
A growing concern about their physical and methodological positioning when conducting 
fieldwork reflects a general nervousness about the occupation of ‘safe’ spaces and thresholds. 
While Willis is accused of identifying too much with one shade of his research cohort, 
Warnock, too, faced a very similar dichotomy. How could she remain far enough away from 
her political sponsors in the ruling government to at least create the impression of 
impartiality, and yet remain close enough to them so that her committee would not be 
compromised by failing to access all the available resources and expertise the education 
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secretariat would be so keen to provide? Regarding such matters, the perceived wisdom for 
researchers (and perhaps also for the committee chairperson) is to be a ‘simultaneous insider-
outsider’ (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p.89). 
 
It is not always easy to adopt such a scrupulously balanced position, however. Mary Warnock 
was an outsider to begin with, who eventually became an insider. This particular trajectory 
was to her advantage. She felt no need therefore to adopt a position mid-way between 
familiarity and strangeness. An ambiguous, liminal position would not only have weakened 
the tenor of her ideological standing but damaged the carefully cultivated arrangement of her 
public profile. At the time of her Chair appointment in 1974 Warnock described herself as an 
‘ignoramus’ on education matters (2005, p.1). And yet, ever since that time, she has, in no 
small part, presented herself as a high-functioning autodidact. The suggestion that one has 
experienced some kind of intellectual awakening is a strategy frequently employed by the 
skilled rhetorician. Presenting oneself as an outsider who subsequently becomes a 
knowledgeable insider seeks to persuade audiences that their message carries greater 
conviction because of an assumed movement from darkness into light, rather like that of a 
sinner who suddenly treads the path of righteousness. It also effects a belief that theirs is an 
impartial message for having been, at the outset, the product of an open mind, uninformed 
and therefore uncontaminated by any preconceptions.  
 
Hammersley & Atkinson’s (2007) insider-outsider typology, as with weak-strong social ties, 
is depicted in such a way that attempts to keep the dominance of any one particular element 
in check. The hyphen between each pairing shows not their division, as is often assumed, but 
their relation. Today, for example, the strength of both types of social tie would be deemed, 
in many contexts, vitally important since each one has a significant influence on the operation 
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and structure of group and inter-group networks. This is a reflection, perhaps, of changing 
epistemological and methodological conditions. The current research climate, for example, 
appears to eschew universal truths in favour of multiple realities. Mixed-method approaches 
are now the vogue where once the single-model paradigms were regarded as incompatible. 
This is particularly noticeable in Willis’s account. Societies were more polarised in the 
1970’s. Deepening social cleavage and greater awareness of class stratification ensured that 
competing ‘either/or’ options remained a constant motif. Willis was able to show how ‘the 
lads’ valorised and vigorously exploited their strong ties. They saw little situational 
advantage in going beyond their own exclusive, tightly-knit, high-density social circle. He 
could defend to a degree over-rapport as a way of gaining privileged access to, and achieving 
some credibility within, this close-knit community. It proved, for instance, to be a highly 
successful means by which to encourage trust and cooperation between the researcher and the 
research participants. However, in so doing, Willis risked becoming a spokesperson for ‘the 
lads’ rather than their critical analyst. The group’s sexist and racist humour together with 
their threats of violence was never directly challenged by him, leaving some to conclude that 
their behaviour had been unduly romanticised (e.g. Walker, 1986). 
 
The emergence of post-positivist sensibilities provided new ways of approaching some old 
social and educational problems. Established realities were being steadily transformed if not 
distorted. The alignment of pressing polity issues such as integration and segregation could 
just as easily be yoked together to show their affinity as pulled apart to emphasise their 
difference. It was an age when common-sense categories and boundaries could no longer be 
trusted. It was a time of interpenetrating, promiscuous fusion. Fuzziness and fluidity were 
gaining a cultural and scientific foothold (e.g. Labov, 1973; Lakoff, 1973). Amid all this 
upheaval, however, the concept of fuzziness could be applied judiciously. There were those 
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who felt it entitled them to adopt positions between certain policy programmes. For the 
Warnock Committee at least, a commitment to integration did not necessarily mean 
abandoning segregationist practices and principles. A form of conceptual integration may 
have been realised as a result of their intervention but, in the face of some fierce resistance 
from politicians, practitioners and parents, it fell well short of any ideological obligations to 
end separate schooling.      
 
It was a time when qualitative research was entering its blurred genre phase (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2003). And when things weren’t getting a little blurry, they were turning upside-
down. Traditional frames of reference were subject to contrary and contradictory renderings.  
Granovetter (1973) managed to up-end traditional thinking on contrasting pairs with his 
reappraisal of the weak-strong continuum. ‘The lads’ in Willis’s study effected a plane of 
behaviour more in keeping with an absurd counterworld than an expression of a counter-
culture, with their grotesque and hilarious inversions of school norms (Bergson, incidentally, 
argued that the spirit of ‘topsyturvydom’ is an important attribute of laughter, and holds a 
central place in any society’s understanding of the phenomenon (1911/2005, p.46).  The 
suspicion that Willis may have crossed an ethical line when conducting his research could be 
conceived by some as a timely attempt to overturn some of ethnography’s most hallowed 
methodological canons. Whether he had in effect achieved some sort of spontaneous 
integration with the group of lads or it amounted to no more than strategic ingratiation, he 
nonetheless wrestled with this methodological difficulty since the ethics of qualitative 
research were becoming a concern both generally and personally. In a moment of reflection 
and foresight Willis conceded there may indeed one day be a need ‘to invert aspects of the 
PO [participant-observer] paradigm’ (1976, p.194).  
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1980s 
It was not until the 1980s that debates and practices surrounding integration and its newer 
‘inclusive’ variant became more widespread. They gained in intensity when all but a handful 
of the recommendations detailed in the Warnock Report (1978) were incorporated into the 
Education (Special Education) Act, 1981. Sally Tomlinson’s ‘A Sociology of Special 
Education’ was published in the following year. It provides an early assessment of the 
immediate post-Warnock period. Although integration had been granted its long-awaited 
legal status, Tomlinson was dismayed to find that the practice of segregation was given tacit 
allowance to continue. She also presents a forthright case for sociology to have a more 
influential role in special education matters.  
 
Insofar as social networks were concerned, it looked as if the inclusive-exclusive trail had, for 
the time being, gone cold. It did, however, reappear, although in a different guise, in the field 
of ethical philosophy and social theory. Diego Gambetta’s (1988) edited volume explores the 
phenomenon of trust as a precondition for and a product of cooperative relations. Gambetta 
presents a thought-provoking analysis of trust in closed, exclusive communities (e.g. the 
Mafia). But it is Bernard Williams’s (1988) contribution, and in particular his social 
application of ‘thick’ trust, that is most relevant. Using game theory, he reveals how parties 
may be motivated towards cooperation depending on the level of intimacy that exists between 
them; whether, for example, the parties happen to be dense and exclusive.  
 
Peter Woods (1984) provides an interesting glimpse into the hitherto unexplored and highly 
exclusive region of the school staffroom. He discovers that laughter operates pretty much for 
teachers in the same way as it does for learners. An inclusive-exclusive dynamic is much in 
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evidence here, complimenting many of the themes and issues covered in Willis’s (1976) 
earlier pupil’s eye-view of one school’s counter-culture. 
 
Surprisingly, Tomlinson’s warrant for greater inclusion had no specific educational reference.  
Her bold, inclusive declaration was made only in the name of sociology. She presents a 
persuasive argument for her own discipline to take its rightful place alongside other interested 
disciplines so that the debate on special needs education becomes more inclusive. No matter 
how disappointed sociologists may have felt at being without representation on the Warnock 
Committee, she claims their omission may in fact have been an auspicious moment in that it 
delivered to them a timely wake-up call. She acknowledges the slow responses made by 
social scientists in developing an interest in special education. But even though the presence 
of psychology, in particular, had been deeply embedded within this sector of education, she 
maintains that, on its own, it is unable to provide all the answers to pressing disability and 
segregation issues. She insists sociology has a valuable role to play despite a belief that, as a 
discipline, it is a bit of a trouble maker, inclined to look critically, negatively, at social 
phenomena. More worrying is the view that ultimately it is deemed not to be relevant, i.e., 
that while it can offer interpretations it cannot provide tools for action (1982).  
 
Discipline-related exclusion and isolation notwithstanding, Tomlinson believes the effects 
that integration has had thus far, particularly the debates it has generated, has allowed for a 
broader social, political and educational engagement than was possible before the 1981 Act 
was implemented. It will, however, result in there being more, not less, professional expertise 
around, and therefore an increase in the use of ‘professional mystiques’ (1982, p.181). The 
Warnock recommendations and government approaches do go some way, she says, towards 
accommodating egalitarian critics of segregation; what counts as ‘special need’, however, is 
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kept as vague as possible in order to accommodate segregation where and when it is deemed 
necessary. The state education system has perfected the use of the ‘safety-valve’ (1982, p.67), 
she argues, this being a means by which pressure on the ‘normal’ school can be relieved, 
thereby establishing the special needs school as a functioning but unofficial filtering system.   
 
Having assumed the vanguard role for so long (and perhaps with some justification) 
psychology may have resented sociology’s sudden show of interest in special education. The 
special needs system up to this point appeared to be perfectly integrated. The field of 
psychology had produced a workable system of classification or labelling, an arguably 
necessary evil, which did at least ensure that some of the meagre resources available for 
distribution were apportioned where needed. It had also introduced some of the more positive 
aspects of educational assessment. Not unexpectedly, the educational psychologist’s work 
load was anticipated to increase as a result of the Warnock report (1978). Yet, these were the 
people that Tomlinson accused of having ‘vested interests’ (1982, p.11-12). Talk of this 
nature evokes Gambetta’s work on organised crime. Indeed, Tomlinson detects a special 
needs conspiracy of sorts, not least from the ‘hostility’ shown towards sociology by rival and 
feuding disciplines (1982, p.1). She also notes the endemic ‘secrecy’ within the special needs 
sector (p.8) and the abiding ‘power struggles’ (p.25) between those vying to sustain their 
monopoly privileges. The way that children’s views are ‘almost totally unrecorded’ (p.106), 
and that of their parents, many left without a voice and inadequately consulted, amounts to a 
form of ‘omerta’, a system of silence. Tomlinson hints that if sociology did become an 
actively concerned partner and indeed ruffled a few educational feathers, it might not be such 
a bad thing. Cooperation is all well and good, but as Gambetta says, a ‘dose of competition is 
notoriously beneficial in improving performance’ (1988, p.214). It can, quite often, lead to an 
improvement in services and an increase in resources.  
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Altruistic and Egotistic 
In ‘Formal Structures and Social Reality’ (1988) Bernard Williams’ intensely concentrated 
essay considers the general conditions under which trust becomes relevant for cooperation. 
All social interactions depend on elements of trust. It is conceived as ‘the lubricant of society’ 
(Elster, 2007, p.344). Without it our friendships would become affairs of fleeting 
convenience. Yet, trust remains a precious and fragile resource. Cooperating options, 
Williams says, will be informed largely according to altruistic or egoistic motives. Although 
these dispositions constitute the very bedrock of trust, it is not always easy to determine 
whether a party is entering into a venture for selfish or purely benevolent reasons. Essentially, 
some form of assurance is required. It is therefore recommended that a search for patterns of 
cooperative behaviour be conducted. This will help to ascertain if a person’s or party’s 
reputation is distinguished by long established routines of trust (1988). Ignoring such a 
commitment merely increases the level of relational risk. If a party is deemed trustworthy 
from having, in effect, a good trust history, it is likely that it obtains for them a ‘macro-
motivation’ (1988, p.10). This is due, perhaps, to an inherent, embedded moral sensibility. 
Such intrinsic value, however, has to be shared, i.e. it must be communicated. But as 
Williams asks, how can we know for certain? We may never have complete and accurate 
knowledge of the motives of others (1988).  
 
In considering the issue of motives for cooperating, Williams adjusts the extent of the 
altruistic-egoistic parameter. He states that parties are often motivated to cooperate once the 
costs involved have been taken into consideration. If they are too high then this will 
discourage motivation. But costs can refer not only to egoistic influences. A party may reject 
efforts to cooperate because of possible sufferance to third parties, such as harm to friends 
and family. But Williams calculates that cooperation is above all else a symmetrical 
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relationship (1988). Thus, an element of what he refers to as ‘dependency’ (p.7), whereby a 
non-symmetrical relationship obtains, amounts to coercion not cooperation. Coercion as a 
means to enforce cooperation is an inadequate alternative to trust since it promotes power and 
resentment. So, there are different kinds of motives to cooperate, but entering into successful 
cooperative relations depend entirely on one essential qualification, that they are restricted to 
persons whose disposition and character are individually known to one another. They must 
rely on what Williams refers to as ‘thick trust’ (1988, p.8). This form of trust is generated 
from intense, repeated interactions between those of localised familiarity, such as close 
friends and kinship groups. Here, communication is normally strong, i.e. face-to-face. Having 
intimate knowledge of each other’s interests is more likely to foster a cooperative outcome. 
Williams, with a sense of regret, points this up as a damning verdict on the state of society 
and the general nature of human behaviour (1988).   
 
However, Williams’s pessimism may be premature. Axelrod (1984) was able to show how 
cooperation can emerge spontaneously, without the presence of trust, and even where 
communication has been reduced to a minimum. He used a famous example that occurred on 
the battlefield among troops facing each other in the trenches during the First World War. 
The ‘live and let live’ phenomenon which occurred at Christmas in 1914 demonstrated that 
affiliation is not always necessary for the development of cooperation (1984, p.21). As 
Gambetta says, it is not so much that trust is not involved here, as that it would not seem to be 
a precondition to achieve cooperation (1988). But it is Williams’s reliance upon game theory 
that is more problematic. It can be argued that social life is not a game situation and its 
complexities cannot be adequately characterised according to a system based on rational 
choice. A logical, mathematical application to social interactions will not be able to describe 
the complexity and sometimes irrationality that lies behind human decision-making. In daily 
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social interactions the concept of cooperation has many conditional features and is constantly 
modified by experience and by learning. It is, therefore, a dynamically, ever-changing 
process. Williams actually appreciates its limitations. He acknowledges that conditions in 
‘real life’ (1988, p.4) are unlikely to correspond to analytical ‘games’ predicated on actors’ 
absolute rationality in their choices, or based on those always seeking to maximize their 
gains.  
 
Public and Private 
Peter Woods (1984) takes a sociological look at the life of a school staffroom, using its most 
prominent feature, laughter, as his lens. Laughter constitutes a form of social ‘lubricant’ 
(Martineau, 1972, p.103). Whether this accolade is more deserving of trust than laughter, the 
point here is of a sense that the machinery of human interaction should be kept functioning 
smoothly, an indication perhaps that human society is a highly complicated and overly 
delicate instrument susceptible to friction and break down. The school staffroom, not 
unexpectedly, sees its fare share of both types of malfunction. Woods chooses to focus on the 
teacher’s ‘private sphere’ (p.190) because it is here that his or her ‘private self’ (p.190), 
understood at that time to be severely under-researched, will offset the weight of evidence 
amassed elsewhere, of the heavily documented accounts of their ‘public self’ (p.190) 
displayed typically in the classroom or on the playground. Nonetheless, the two poles are 
contiguous and interconnected, and it is through laughter that teachers are able to synchronise 
them (1984). The staffroom is the key area in the school, the teachers’ collective private area, 
and its privacy is well protected and respected (1984). It is off-limits to pupils, and even the 
headteacher must knock before entering. It is a haven with an exclusive status, being a 
concentration of ultra-tight affiliations. The stresses and strains that are a regular feature of 
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the teacher’s workload engender a spirit of collegial support and cooperation. Here, ‘laughter 
is an enormous aid to solidarity’ (Woods, 1984, p.193).  
 
At times the staffroom is characterised by its ‘euphoric atmosphere’ (1984, p.191). Woods 
describes it as ‘the laughter arena’ (p.191) although laughter does not always function as a 
Freudian tension release or safety valve. Sometimes laughter, like trust, occurs 
spontaneously, amounting to a ‘natural growth event’ (p.196). The impression of the teaching 
staff is that they are inclined to behave pretty much like their pupils. Many of them ‘are as 
much on the lookout for laughs as the kids’ (p.191). There is a fatalistic grin-and-bear-it 
outlook among some staff members, summed-up by a ‘you have to make a laugh of it’ 
attitude (p.191). It is a place of ruses and subterfuges every bit as irreverent as pupils’ antics 
found in the classroom or on the playground. The common foe is the ‘institutional framework 
of the school’ (p.194) particularly those figures with senior authority. Some of the teasing is 
very precisely applied. The staffroom is illuminated by the main laughter-makers, two named 
teachers, whose virtuoso performances easily translates to the pupils, carried there by 
colleagues who, leaving the staffroom, proceed to their classrooms often in buoyant mood 
(1984).  
 
Much of Woods’ theoretical approach draws on Erving Goffman’s ideas on ‘region 
behaviour’ (1969, p.109) and ‘impression management’ (p.203). These techniques and 
actions give shape to a dramaturgical perspective which presents social life as a series of 
performances played out on an imaginary stage. They provide guidance to Woods in his 
mission to consider if teachers are more likely to ‘be themselves’ when situated backstage in 
a staffroom. However, to distinguish between what passes for natural behaviour and what is a 
calculated enactment presents a fundamental interpretive challenge. It also presents one of the 
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main arguments against the dramaturgical method. The rational model of communicative 
action, in contrast, places the highest value on an open society, a society that guarantees 
access to all citizens (Habermas, 1986). The primary concepts of truth, validity and 
understanding, according to Habermas, can only emerge from a social system when and 
where communication is served by public, free and unconstrained dialogue (1986). The way 
we relate to our everyday world, the way we can achieve mutual understanding through 
language, must be constructed on a foundation of communicative rationality.  
 
Cognitive-based processes such as beliefs and intentions, which are coherently objective 
states, generate spontaneously expressive behaviour (1986). In contrast, for the dramaturgical 
model, language is not so highly prized; appearance alone is valued and purely subjective 
experiences obtain (1986). Performances that are emotively-based and laden with internalised 
desires and feelings are fixed by manipulations of a ‘latently strategic’ nature (1986, p.93). 
Nonetheless, Woods indicates that a school staffroom fulfils many useful functions. Its 
exclusive setting allows teachers to act irrationally and to engage in what may appear to be 
non-purposeful behaviour, providing them with the opportunity to let off steam, to regress 
with relative impunity, to become child-like. Above all, it provides them with the opportunity 
to re-energise. Some of this emotional coping is achieved through the use of humour and 
laughter, these being forms of communication that might as it happens have little input or 
influence in the public realm of ideal speech and rational deliberation envisioned by 
Habermas.  
 
Searching into the deep structures of our language, Habermas’s goal is to try and find a 
communication model entirely free from social and ideological domination (1986). 
Accordingly, he regards the public-private difference as a necessary condition if society is 
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ever to be understood and improved. Tomlinson notes how those with vested interests in 
special education deliberately sought to confuse the public and the private spheres (1982). By 
making special needs a specifically private issue helped maintain its relentlessly efficient 
programme of categorisation and assessment. For many families, a private trouble rarely ever 
became a public issue. What was understood to be ‘their’ problem duly became ‘their’ fault 
(the ‘within-child’ model of disability developed according to this kind of deterministic 
thinking). Keeping matters contained within the private sphere also meant less interference 
for the experts. With fewer distractions they could press ahead with their behaviour-related 
processes, even if it meant excluding children or their families from sharing information and 
proper consultations. Instead of dwelling on the distinction, however, Tomlinson focused on 
the close relationship between private and public. Her intention was to help connect those 
with personal/private troubles to the underlying wider social structures with the help of a 
broader range of agencies. This in turn informed her wider and often repeated appeal for 
greater openness within the sector (1982).  
 
Discussing the public-private binary, Williams (1988) placed a party’s decision to cooperate 
on any given matter at the heart of his argument. This rested largely on altruistic-egoistic 
parameters: making a preference essentially depended on motivations that were either 
inclusive and selfless or exclusive and selfish. However, this ‘either-or’ approach may, to 
some extent, over-simplify the issue. Williams concludes that outside of an intimate 
friendship, one likely to generate ‘thick trust’ (1988, p.8), no single type can do the trick of 
giving rational people a motive to become trustworthy in the way a trusted co-operator 
should. If anything is to be a solution to the problem of how society-wide trust-involving 
cooperation is to be motivated, it will, he considers, be a judicious mixture of both altruistic 
and egoistic processes (1988). However, resolving the public-private tension so neatly does 
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not hide the fact that the boundaries between public and private are always liable to shift. 
Nowhere is this better highlighted than when considering the possible fate of the school 
staffroom. Woods, for example, may never have imagined there would come a time when the 
building of a new school did not include a separate space specially dedicated to teachers.  
 
But the dawn of the staff/pupil lounge (Hastings, 2004) does exactly that, and seems to 
obscure further the public-private distinction. Due, for the most part, to the research efforts of 
ethnographers like Woods, the exclusive world of the staffroom has, to use Tomlinson’s term, 
been ‘demystified’ (1982, p.7). Woods may not have predicted the onset of the communal 
lounge area, but he and other researchers must share some of the responsibility for their 
inception, having between them provided a particularly rich and at times graphically 
unflattering account of teachers’ lives back stage. Given the possible demise of the so-called 
‘laughter arena’ (Woods, 1984, p.191) we are entitled to ask: what will happen to the laughter 
of the staffroom? Will it continue unabated in the new mixed-facility suite? Perhaps it will be 
directed instead towards the classroom where pupils will become the main beneficiaries. Or 
will teachers be inclined to hold it in check? The fundamental worry is that it will become 
internalised, suppressed, and therefore remain unused and lost forever.  
 
The possible consequences for school children, for their opportunities to develop meaningful 
relationships and to interact in both formal and informal settings, may rest to a large degree 
on their teachers’ mood management while in the staffroom. Woods (1984) gave an 
indication as to the level and the range of influence held by teachers over their pupils. From 
his position, he was able to ascertain that teachers’ risible staffroom behaviour, the daily 
performances and interactions with their colleagues, stood every chance of being taken into 
the classroom and passed on to their pupils. This could help to create the kind of environment 
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conducive to encouraging not only reciprocal laughter from children. The relationship 
between teachers and pupils can be very strong, made stronger still by the suggestion that 
teachers are no different in many respects to their pupils when it comes to laughing matters. 
They employ similar laughter tactics; they laugh at similar things. The philosophy 
underpinning this reflected amiability inspired Williams (1988) to undertake his analysis of 
the strategies and preferences used by parties in everyday interactions. In seeking to 
determine what motivates people to cooperate, he asserts that the element of trust is a crucial 
feature among the social norms. Here, perhaps, unwittingly, he offers the optimum conditions 
for which affiliative laughter can serve as a trust-building device. Among the comic norms 
shared laughter can successfully create a valuable social bond, be it a transitory or a more 
durable attachment. But Williams also provides the first sighting of the specifically 
‘exclusive’ dimensions regarding his formulation of ‘thick trust’ (1988, p.8), opening the 
door to a term that would much later help trigger a foundational change in the way we think 
about personal relationships and social connectivity.  
 
Tomlinson, meanwhile, was fighting valiantly to find a way that would allow children of all 
abilities to learn together. Attempts to effect her interactionist position proved something of a 
challenge in an era notable for provoking a culture of individualism, revitalised on account of 
the long, uninterrupted streak of Conservative government dominion which opened and 
closed the turbulent decade. Its ministerial leader, in questioning the very existence of 
‘society’ (Keay, 1987), appeared to valorise the cult of individuality over collectivity, 
although failing to appreciate that in a strict sociological sense neither dimension was in 
effect oppositional. Research traditions, too, were experiencing realignment. Many of the 
distinctions between qualitative and quantitative methods were beginning to break down 
(Bryman, 1988). Not unrelatedly, the so-called ‘crisis of representation’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 
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2003, p.3) ruptured the landscape of qualitative research during this period. Researchers were 
finding new ways to reconstruct and represent the voices and experiences of their ‘subjects’.  
The burgeoning popularity of a pronouncedly inclusive scholarship, participatory and 
collaborative, was based around egalitarian principles of reciprocity and trust, and operated 
within a non-hierarchical relationship according to a spirit of shared governance.   
 
1990s 
The issue of integration had already been placed high on the social and political agenda by 
the time of Julia Kristeva’s philosophical and psychoanalytical contribution. In ‘Strangers to 
Ourselves’ (1991) much of her discussion traces the condition of the modern outsider, 
commencing with an analysis of the outsider’s historical origins. She notes change and 
continuance in the ways those populations that lay outside the mainstream have been treated 
and valued by various European societies. Her account focuses on the experiences and fate of 
refugees and economic migrants, but there is a great deal which is relevant to not only 
‘foreign’ but to indigenous outsiders. Of additional interest is the publicity she gives to what 
may turn out to be the earliest known instance of social capital: this being the world of 
connectivity according to the Antique circles of affiliation concept, the ‘concentric spheres’ 
which bind us to mankind (1991, p.57).  
 
Daniel Wickberg’s ‘The Senses of Humor’ (1998) compliments Kristeva’s central theme, 
noting that people deemed to be lacking a sense of humour can find themselves excluded 
from certain in-groups and removed from their attendant social benefits. Charting its very 
brief history from 1840 to the mid-twentieth century, Wickberg takes a keen interest in the 
sense of humour’s transition in early Antiquity from an objective, physical phenomenon to a 
modern subjective, mental attribute. He examines further how this change, this narrowing of 
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the distance between subject and object, was the point at which the distinction between 
‘laughing at’ and ‘laughing with’ behaviour became more pronounced. He concludes with a 
brief appreciation of the impact that the concept had – and continues to have – on the 
education process.  
 
Community building and its relationship to community development form the substance of 
Gittell’s and Vidal’s (1998) evaluative study. Their appraisal of a development programme, 
to ascertain whether linking local residents to the local corporate sector could lead to the 
creation of community-based coalitions, provides the first reference to social capital’s twin 
dimensions of ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’. The authors’ theoretical framework suggests that 
bonding and bridging networks established within three sample underdeveloped and under-
invested communities, may be measurable, thus signalling their potential relevance in 
creating cross-sector relationships capable of nourishing social capital.  
 
Separation and Union 
The purpose of Kristeva’s intervention is to enlighten those yet to be persuaded by the 
arguments presented in favour of social integration. Tracing the historical development of the 
strange and unfamiliar, her account moves through the great ages of Western culture, 
culminating in her provocative yet highly original thesis that these two exclusionary 
tendencies are located within each of us. Among her natural sympathies a cosmopolitan 
consciousness emerges. Of the philosophers engaged, she is heartened by Kant’s 
‘internationalist spirit’ (1991, p.170) and finds in his principle of ‘unsocial sociability’ (1991, 
p. 170) a pertinent description of the constant, interconnecting tensions that form the 
heartbeat of many contemporary societies. These seemingly competitive elements which 
describe the ‘notion of separation combined with union’, (original italics, 1991, p.171) are a 
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fundamental requirement for the preservation of society’s well-being. The argument, 
essentially, is that we should be careful about effacing exclusionary elements or eliminating 
antagonisms, for these seemingly negative conditions are critically situated so as to ensure we 
do not slip into zones of comfort, of complacency, and thus assume an imagined 
invulnerability.  
 
From the early philosophers, too, Kristeva draws some inspiration, and it is these classical 
sages who are employed to make most sense of the inclusive-exclusive orientation. The dual 
formulation becomes fully synchronised when the exclusive outsider is understood to be at all 
times part of our own inclusive circle. An interesting and useful example is provided. The 
notion of social oikeiosis or ‘conciliation’ (Kristeva, 1991, p.57) explains how these 
disjunctions are re-framed and made equivalent. According to ancient Stoic doctrine, each 
person is surrounded by a series of concentric circles. The circle nearest to us is occupied by 
our loved ones and family members. The basic principle relies on each person extending the 
way they are disposed towards people who are closest to them to everyone, including those 
situated at the outermost circle. Our task, as citizens of the world, is to draw the circles 
towards the centre so that in tightening them ‘we succeed in absorbing all men…into 
ourselves’ (Kristeva, 1991, p.57).  
 
Kristeva could be accused of preaching a naïve and overly utopian ethic of ‘brotherly love’. 
While it is commendable that she should believe in man’s natural goodness, one of her 
biggest intellectual influences, ironically, took the opposing view. Freud’s attitude to 
expressions of cosmopolitanism was uncompromising. The command to love thy neighbour, 
he says, goes against human nature (2002). Human beings are not gentle creatures in need of 
love. On the contrary, ‘they can count a powerful share of aggression among their instinctive 
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credentials’ (2002, p.48). It is the existence of this tendency to aggression, which is detected 
in ourselves and presumed to occur in others, that will always place a limit on the level of 
affiliation with our neighbours (2002). The stranger/outsider, upon closer inspection, is not 
someone that can ever be truly loved – not in the way we would love our closest family 
members. In fact, if anything, they deserve our hatred (2002).  
 
Freud’s intuition here is that within Kant’s idea of ‘unsocial sociability’ resides his own id-
ego theory of personality. These competing, disparate forces within the psychological 
structure are of decisive importance for the functioning of the social system (2002). Social 
cohesion depends on an individual’s ability to temper inclinations toward discord by the 
intervention of their inner regulatory system. Freud is prepared to concede that a given 
community can indeed be successfully bound together by brotherly love, but only if there are 
significant subjects within that community, a common foe, who can become targets for that 
pent-up aggression (2002). This follows the principle that one’s aggressive drives must obtain 
an outlet so that the urge to hostility maintains a correspondence with the drive to maintain 
group solidarity. But aggression, as Freud is aware, can take many forms. As societies 
became more sophisticated, disagreeable behaviour that was once publicly tolerated gradually 
became subject to greater forms of control due to the implementation of social codes and 
prohibitions. There remain, however, alternative methods by which hostility and aggression 
can be demonstrated. The appliance of humour, a disparaging aside or satirical remark, may 
prove to be a relatively low-cost but high-yielding means by which the enemy/outsider can be 
made inferior, obnoxious, or risible (Freud, 1905/2001).   
 
 
 
50 
 
Subjective and Objective 
The events that encouraged the first appearance of the term ‘sense of humour’ were convened 
in the nineteenth century, but conceived in the preceding century. The term was unknown 
before 1840, but Wickberg relates how, after a series of cultural changes which took effect 
during the time of the Enlightenment, the concept slowly began to take hold in the national 
consciousness (1998). In the first place, humour and laughter grew closer in association. The 
meaning of the word ‘humour’ changed from its designation in medical pathology as one of 
the 4 essential bodily fluids that make up one’s temperament, to being a designation for the 
odd and quirky temperament itself. As Wickberg points out, the social acceptability of 
humour was facilitated in large part by the development of several new perspectives on 
laughter. Both humour and laughter moved gradually from an objective to a subjective 
meaning. The prevailing view held that laughter was triggered by the object laughed at, 
conforming to classic superiority theory, i.e. that we laugh in order to ridicule.  
 
But by the eighteenth century, the relating of an object’s risibility to the subjective evaluation 
of the individual person laughing became the norm, and gradually evolved as a subjective and 
largely sympathetic passion, encouraging a ‘laughing with’ not ‘laughing at’ attitude. It was 
during this period that the incongruity theory (laughter results from experiencing the 
unexpected) began to prosper. It was a time when matters of morality, sensibility, and 
aesthetics directly affected speculations about laughter. In short, laughter had become more 
conservative. The transition from objective to subjective was repeated in the proliferation of 
intuitive faculties of judgement that gave rise to the middle-class ‘culture of sensibility’, with 
the flourishing of discriminatory internal senses, e.g. sense of beauty, sense of morality, etc. 
Originally, the word ‘sense’ described a benign and generalised level of ‘awareness’ and 
‘perception’, but then evolved into a far more discerning ability. The sense of humour which 
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developed from this became another way by which people were subject to codification and 
appraisal. It provided a new means of estimating how ‘the self’ compared to ‘the other’. 
Women were among the first to experience its discriminating nature. A view popularised 
during the late-nineteenth century was that of all the sections of Victorian society it was 
females who had an unnatural disposition to humorlessness.  
 
100 years after its inception, Wickberg records that the sense of humour concept had become 
an essential part of the cultural mainstream (1998). It has permeated all aspects of human 
society, bearing a stake in just about every key domain, from religion and politics to 
education. Education policy, hitherto, had subscribed largely to following traditional and 
regimented pedagogic values. The strict disciplining classroom and stern-faced teachers 
operated according to highly functional models of rote learning and didactic teaching 
methods. Laughter had no place in such a formal, teacher-centred environment; nothing was 
allowed to impede order in the classroom or to jeopardise teacher control and discipline. But 
educational reformers of the 1930s and 1940s thought that by juxtaposing the old style 
education with a new brighter, innovative, and happier form of teaching and learning, 
laughter could be accommodated, if not rehabilitated, in the classroom. In America, where 
most of Wickberg’s later focus is trained, the progressive educational movement which 
sought to take laughter to the classroom had two ambitions: to utilise humour as a 
pedagogical tool that would contribute to achieving educational goals, and to educate and 
develop the pupils’ sense of humour, seen now as a desirable human characteristic. The 
senses of humour of both teachers and pupils were brought into play in educational processes, 
and this was seen as indicative of the personal growth that progressive educators desired. As 
a conclusion, Wickberg suggests that even though the serious and the humorous remain 
specific features in the language and thought of modern America, ‘…American culture has 
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discovered that the serious is not a fixed category. At any moment it can be transformed into 
the humorous’ (p.217).  
 
Much of Wickberg’s analysis hinges on his treatment of prevailing dualisms. There are, 
notably, the serious-humorous and the physical-psychical, but the organising motif of his 
study resides in the dynamic and somewhat confusing object-subject relationship. The 
narrowing of the distance between object and subject (accredited to the c.17 dramatist Ben 
Jonson with the arrival of comedy as a literary form) gave rise to a new and sympathetic 
notion of laughing ‘with’ rather than laughing ‘at’ (p.34). But it is difficult to tell the extent to 
which this new notion was practically employed. Given that superiority and incongruity 
forms of laughter continue to confuse and be mistaken for either one (as a glance at any 
contemporary school playground will testify), it is hard to appreciate how much of an up-take 
there was for this new laughing expression, especially when there is little or no evidence of 
resulting ambiguity.  
 
Wickberg views objectivity and subjectivity as a contrasting pair. ‘We speak of people as 
being objective or subjective’, he says matter-of-factly (p.5). In terms of laughter, this 
manifests itself as subjective = superiority laughter (it makes me feel superior), while 
objective = laughing at a mistake or some deformity in others. But this opposition is not 
altogether convincing. It has been adjudged an ‘imaginary opposition’ (Wilden, 1987, p.125). 
From a communication studies perspective, Wilden argues that subjectivity, for example, is 
not strictly that. It is not strictly relative to the individual since our supposedly unique 
personal opinions are derived from non-original, third-party sources, such as the media, our 
family, and our friends. Genuine subjectivity, he argues, is a ‘self-and-other relationship’, 
(p.125). Much of what we understand to be ‘subjective’ or ‘objective’ is, ontologically, 
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collective (italics added), i.e. derived from those subjects and objects with whom we 
communicate on a daily basis, whether we are aware of it or not (1987). Castoriadis (1997) 
makes a similar point. Following Wilden’s notion of the collective nature of the subjective-
objective relationship, he likens it to a form of ‘solidarity’, and describes both dimensions in 
terms of their ‘perpetual intertwining’ (p.343).  
 
This can be a most useful way to think about the inclusive-exclusive dimensions that connect 
children’s laughter to mainstream education and to social capital. Not so much ‘either/or’ 
distinctions but ‘both/and’ relations. Wickberg seems to have little patience with those 
periods where the practices of ‘laughing at’ and ‘laughing with’, for example, ‘appear fuzzy 
and indistinct’ (p.34). Understandably, he is keen to show the moments when tastes in 
humour began to change, the progression from superiority laughter, which dominated in the 
medieval period, to the emergence in the eighteenth century of incongruity as the second 
major source of laughter. While it is clear that the growing popularity of comic drama and the 
rise of literary criticism helped incongruity humour/laughter become a growing 
communicative currency in the popular imagination, superiority forms of laughter, however, 
did not quietly slip away and decompose. The essential elements in laughter, on and off stage, 
among cultivated speakers and among the masses, were an appetite for the unexpected as 
well as an enthusiasm for malicious pleasure. In everyday usage, superiority and incongruity 
operated in tandem, functioning more like nuanced, overlapping essences. Even today, it can 
be difficult to tell which meaning of laughter is in operation. This notion of over-spill, in fact, 
tallies with certain laughter philosophers whose work continues to defy straightforward 
classification. Henri Bergson, for example, is sometimes described as a superiority theorist 
and sometimes as an incongruity theorist (La Fave et al, 1976).  
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It is even more difficult to find any agreement as to the extent of the sense of humour’s 
psychological, cultural, and social influence. Despite Wickberg’s claim that it has been 
successfully absorbed by all sectors of society, including education, there remains the 
possibility that children of primary school age do not possess anything as sophisticated as a 
sense of humour at all. We may, in fact, be confusing this term with more general humour 
abilities, like clowning. Most schools, we are told, will have the proverbial ‘class clown’ 
(McLaren, 1993, p.160). Indeed, children with Down syndrome are reported to be perhaps 
too willing rather too often to adopt this role (Reddy et al, 2001), and yet at least one study 
has show that children with Autism rarely ever assume such a position (St. James & Tager-
Flusberg, 1994). A. S. Neill eschews this notion of a prevailing ‘sense of humour’ by 
suggesting that children only have the more innocent-sounding and presumably less 
developed, ‘sense of fun’ (1915/1986, p.26). Expressing this view at a time when the sense of 
humour concept was still quite young, but long before he established his pedagogic 
innovations at Summerhill, Neill unknowingly highlights a methodological tension in 
Wickberg’s study. Save for a brief mention in the section dealing with a sense of humour and 
education, children do not feature in this work. In writing the history of an idea, a sensibility, 
Wickberg has effaced any reference to ‘individuals, or particular figures or groups of people’ 
(1998, p.222). This raises the question whether Wickberg assumes that children have the 
same sense of humour as adults, and that differences in age, sex, and those with higher/lower 
ranges of abilities will have no influence on one’s sense of humour development. Or, as Neill 
was perhaps alluding to, children may be too young to develop anything as cognitively 
technical and so discriminating as a sense of humour. A ‘sense of fun’ has a slightly purer 
ring to it. 
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Consensus and Conflicting 
Gittell & Vidal (1998) monitored a community-based project aimed at bringing people 
together which followed a ‘consensus organising’ model (p.2). At the time, this was a new 
and ambitious approach to community development practice in America. The authors wished 
to see if indigenous leadership and forms of self-managing from within low-income 
neighbourhoods could be encouraged through the development of mutually beneficial 
relationships between community-based groups and locally-based private investors (1998). 
The principle behind the study was to examine the efficiency of Community Development 
Corporations (CDCs) in helping to transform neglected real estate into affordable housing. 
Bonding capital was employed to develop strong ties of trust and cooperation among the 
neighbourhood residents. A much stronger emphasis was placed on instigating bridging 
capital in order to create weak ties and working relationships to those with resources, power 
and influence in the private sector. Three pilot sites, high in populations of colour, were the 
focus of Gittell & Vidal’s 5-year action research evaluation project.  
 
The inclusive ‘consensus’ approach to community-wide organising contrasts with the 
exclusive and more traditional ‘conflictual’ model. This type tends to operate around overtly 
political initiatives of more radicalised voices, of community activists and pressure groups 
whose intention principally, although not exclusively, is to overcome structured inequality 
and oppression (1998). Historically, many of these organisations were synonymous with the 
popular social movements that grew out of the civil rights era. While Gittell & Vidal felt that 
the conflictual school of community organising could accrue some short-term community 
benefits, it would in the long-term be more likely to damage investment opportunities, limit 
access to outside resources, and jeopardise the opportunity for cross-sector groups to work in 
future collaborations (1998). However, as the authors ruefully admit, the consensus model 
56 
 
was itself beset by shortcomings, and they acknowledged that the task of bridging across 
class and racial cleavages proved, ultimately, to be a bridge too far. At the project’s 
conclusion no new properties or coalitions had been constructed. Despite an overly optimistic 
and perhaps face-saving summary of the project, the merits of a consensus model in helping 
to form partnership initiatives capable of creating social capital in low-income communities 
was not, in this particular example, proved.     
 
Conflictual organising models place no value on the weak ties of bridging social capital. 
Advocates of this approach have described these ties that were so persuasively advocated by 
Granovetter (1973) as a way of selling out to corporate interests (Gittell &Vidal, 1998). 
Community organising in America has a long and distinguished history in using 
confrontational methods to highlight, for example, racial and socio-economic discrimination, 
much of which continues to be associated with ongoing struggles for social and political 
power. The specific focus of traditional, conflictual, organising has been on galvanising 
stocks of bonding capital. Strengthening internal ties among people and organisations who 
share similar values and interests has long been considered the most effective means by 
which the powerless and exploited members of society can help to effect change (1998). 
Much of this exclusively-minded thinking has been determined by years of bitter experience. 
Many people, quite naturally, are mistrustful of those they do not know. They tend to suspect 
that any well-meaning intentions from outsiders serve only as a cloak for the vested interests 
of charitable do-gooders and/or opportunists eager to take financial advantage of any bridging 
networks. Those who favour the conflictual method believe not so much in working the 
system but in changing it. They believe equally that projects and programmes must be carried 
out not for the community but rather by the community. Their resentment of initiatives 
deemed to have been ‘parachuted in’ (1998, p.157) is well placed since the creation of many 
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Community Development Corporations were not the product of grassroots action at 
community level, but were instead created by well-meaning humanitarians from without. 
Their defensive rationale and positioning, then, is to some extent understandable.   
 
It would, nevertheless, be a mistake to simply dismiss bridging capital altogether. Much, 
however, depends on the reasons behind parties’ decisions to become part of any bridging 
system. From Gittell & Vidal’s study it is clear that some well-placed bridging activity from 
the consensus organisers towards those conflictual-minded community groups and 
organisations firmly established in the 3 sample sites would have been a propitious and 
courteous first step. The failures of those who attempted to implement the consensus model 
were not only centred on their unrealistic expectations, but on their swaggering, rather self-
righteous attitude. One of the people actively involved in a conflictual organising project, and 
deeply affected by the consensus groups’ intervention, was Garland Yates. He produced a 
withering denunciation of the consensus method, and also of Gittell and Vidal’s study. His 
verdict on the latter was unflinching (and arguably more accurate than the authors’), 
dismissing the results from their evaluation as ‘dismal’ (1998, p.31). He highlights the fact 
that grassroots organising networks that were in place long before the consensus people 
arrived had achieved, in their own way and in their own time, good cross-community sector 
networks. Local people already had in place links to the private sector, he claims, this despite 
many of them being burned through bad experiences on previous occasions. Yates claims that 
Gittel & Vidal’s message about consensus organising is potentially dangerous. He warns that 
it is likely to find a receptive audience among funders who, despite pronouncements about 
wanting to improve conditions for the poor, are really motivated by institutional self-interest. 
Investors, he argues, must allow communities to choose their own issues and their own 
organising approach. Anything else is simply manipulative (1998). In fact, anything else is 
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simply condescending. For those social movements bearing an exclusive focus, who rely on 
disruptive tactics and forceful, concentrated lobbying, actually increase their chances of 
achieving their goals (Giugni, 1998). In some instances contention can, it seems, advance a 
community’s agenda further forward, and far quicker, than consensus.  
  
Thick and Thin Trust 
The principle of trust is noticeable by its presence - and also by its absence - in those 
relationships joining the native to the stranger, the teacher to the pupil, and the consensus 
organisers to their conflictual counterparts. The influence of this degree of reasoning when 
engaged as a value, deployed as a resource, or even when unrepresented, dominates the social 
system. The community residents who expressed little trust towards  potential investors in the 
private sector were matched by the consensus group’s ideological misgivings over their 
community-based rivals, regarding them as ‘scary’ and ‘uncontrollable’ (Yates, 1998, p.31). 
They pledged to avoid working alongside them before descending unceremoniously en mass 
on their turf. The effort to become fully engaged citizens says a great deal about the levels of 
belief we hold in others and the means by which such efforts are applied. It had much to do 
with competition in the latter example, as predicted by Williams (1988), who claimed it can 
at times be particularly useful, although in the American example it proved confusing. In the 
former, however, it was suspicion and not competition that proved to be the fundamental 
motive for community members’ unwillingness to build bridging relationships. Achieving an 
acceptable level of trustworthiness became difficult within those communities.  
 
Getting to this level of cooperation presents few problems for those with sufficient stocks of 
bonding capital. But for many members of grassroots communities the bonding stage is 
where it begins and ends (Gittell & Vidal, 1998). They simply have no incentives to take 
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advantage of bridging capital. Self-contentment, cynicism or bad prior experiences may 
account for such reluctance. But whatever the reasons, their reliance upon ‘thick trust’ 
(Williams, 1988, p.8) defies the best efforts to champion the potentialities of weak, bridging 
ties (e.g. Granovetter, 1978). People are, quite understandably, easily drawn to ‘thick trust’. 
In unorganised and under-invested communities across the United States they have, 
historically and often successfully, bonded together around issues of social and political 
injustice (Yates, 1998). Freud, therefore, would be expected to appreciate the motives behind 
the conflictual community organiser’s martial manifesto. ‘Contention is indispensable’, he 
declares (2002, p.49). Furthermore, contention can actually work, as Yates has pointed out. 
Years of aggressive campaigning and agitating against city hall and the banking giants has 
not lessened either institution’s eagerness to get involved in community initiatives, 
particularly when both are threatened with negative publicity and public boycotts (1998).  
 
Ultimately, it may seem like an impossible task to change people’s social capital priorities. 
But if the illustration of Stoic oikeiosis, the circles of affiliation, achieves only one thing, it is 
in providing a particularly useful mental picture to see why, of the two forms of social 
capital, bonding capital is so routinely favoured. The distance from the outer circle to the 
inner circle is so daunting it seems unlikely and impractical that people so far removed can 
ever be in a position to help one another. Freud, rather graphically, describes its scope as 
‘oceanic’ (2002, p.4). Drawing the circles of affiliation together so that the circle’s 
inhabitants merge into one, as Kristeva described (1991), certainly resolves this problem, for 
the inner and outer boundaries no longer exist. Except that this amounts only to conceptual 
integration, and not the kind of integration to be of any immediate, practical benefit to 
society. The solution, then, must be that if we want to create more trust in communities so 
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that members are capable and desirous of cutting across lines of social and racial cleavage, 
we need, figuratively speaking, to start laughing with people we don’t already know. 
 
Admittedly, such a plan of action is fraught with difficulties. Even laughing with people we 
already know is not without its problems. Sometimes pupils’ trust in their peers can be 
entirely misplaced. Trust in their teachers, too, can be based on flimsy, often irrelevant 
values. The intuitively appealing equation, so marvellously Maslovian, that a teacher + a 
good sense of humour = a good teacher, will invariably be the sum and solution for many 
pupils. Maslow (1970) believed that a person with a good sense of humour was invariably a 
good person. Those conferred with such strength of mind, of self-control, that they do not 
laugh at superior or disparaging humour are clearly to be admired. Although Maslow’s 
equation has a certain appeal to it - it contains much that many schools would find morally 
instructive - it presents complications in other respects. For one thing, it invites the prospect 
that those who laugh at superior or disparaging humour are necessarily bad people.  
 
Children, in fact, may laugh at discriminatory humour that may be racist or sexist for any 
number of different reasons. It may, for example, be prudent and practical for them to do so. 
Issues regarding a need to maintain positions within a school’s in-group, or to ensure they are 
not teased or suffer physical abuse by not laughing, may be the principle motivation into 
laughing tactically. The key point here is that if children feel it necessary to express their 
laughter in a contrived manner (whether they do this all the time or just occasionally) it could 
affect any claim made that they have or lack a humorous personality. If the definition of a 
sense of humour is the capacity to find certain things amusing, does it mean genuinely 
amusing or strategically so? It can be very difficult to determine whether a pupil or a 
colleague is laughing spontaneously or voluntarily. Wickberg’s (1998) literature is not 
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particularly helpful on this matter. We may be justified, therefore, in arguing for what 
amounts to an inclusive-exclusive sense of humour, one that is not a fixed personality trait 
since many children may be moved to laughter simply because it is expected of them or 
because it is convenient.   
 
The crisis of representation, according to Denzin and Lincoln (2003), was coupled with the 
crisis of legitimation. These crises threatened qualitative researchers’ ability to extract 
meaning from their data, thereby jeopardising the significance of any findings. It forced a re-
appraisal of key concepts such as validity, reliability and objectivity. A concern with the 
validity and dignity of ‘the other’ proved a distinctive feature of postmodern thought in the 
late 20th century. The view that certain groups and populations had been overlooked by the 
grand narratives of Marxism and Freudianism, for example, was a source of irritation to those 
who felt that important themes affecting issues of difference and alterity had not been 
adequately addressed. Some researchers determinedly set about producing radical, 
democratic transformations in the public/social sphere. Emancipatory agendas aimed at 
interrogating differences, such as those affecting race and ethnicity, emerged. 
 
Gittell & Vidal (1998) showed how these two issues coalesce around their study of social 
capital creation within community-based organisations. However, despite a commitment to 
activist-oriented principles and a genuine desire to help disadvantaged black communities, it 
was no guarantee that their anticipated outcomes would be realised. New modalities of 
otherness also conferred greater freedom of expression upon participant’s voices, like those 
of children and of women. Kristeva’s experiences as an outsider, for instance, were the 
source of power behind her reasoning that in order to overcome exclusion of ‘the other’ we 
must learn to live with others without erasing their sense of difference or ostracising them. 
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We do this, she claims, by recognising the foreigner, ‘the other’, within ourselves. Of 
considerable interest is the way that the foreigner can be equated to Granovetter’s notion of a 
‘mere acquaintance’, the ‘weak tie’ in his bridging relational theory (1973). Herein, the 
economic migrant, who is characteristically industrious and entrepreneurial, is the kind of 
person worth knowing, according to Kristeva (1991), even if it is only in passing. Conversely, 
it has been difficult to assess Wickberg’s workings on personhood or any social actors, since 
the human element in his sense of humour study has been ‘subordinated to the current of 
historical ideas’ (1998, p.4). We are then no nearer to finding out if children with or without 
linguistic, communicative, and cognitive competencies actually have a sense of humour, 
share the same sense of humour, or have different senses of humour.   
 
2000 
The beginning of the new millennium was marked by the publication of three noteworthy 
documents, each one unveiled as though it was a manifesto for a coming golden age. The 
‘Index for Inclusion’ by Booth & Ainscow (2000), a practical, hands-on resource, was 
designed to give guidance to schools as they made the transition from an integrated 
educational framework to an inclusive one. It addresses the challenges of developing not only 
more inclusive practices, but the need to support schools’ self-evaluation. Its business-like 
spring-bound folder-format anticipates much use in collaborative action-planning and in staff 
development programmes. Its four sections provide guidance on how the materials are to be 
used. Descriptions of the processes involved in how to employ the content are provided, so 
too is advice on creating inclusive cultures, policies and practices. The final part includes an 
array of questionnaires and summary sheets.  
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Robert Provine’s (2000) ‘Laughter: A Scientific Investigation’, the fruit of a 10-year project 
to effect an understanding of laughter, aims to bring some order and discipline to the field of 
communication/laughter studies. His book is a riposte to the speculation of philosophers who, 
with their appeals to reason and logic, together with the shoddy methodologies of social 
scientists, he claims, have persistently brought the topic into disrepute (2000). As a 
biologically oriented researcher and an advocate of solid scholarship, he takes for his study a 
scientific-led ethological and neuroscience approach, based on strict observation and 
controlled experimentation. Intriguingly, he claims to have cracked the laughter code, a 
suggestion that he has identified laughter’s elusive acoustic signature. Of more significance, 
perhaps, Provine’s book is one of the few to include a ‘pathological’ (p.154) survey of 
disabilities, impairments, and syndromes in which laughter is a conspicuent attribute. 
 
In his pioneering ‘Bowling Alone’ (2000) Robert Putnam charts the shifting dimensions of 
social capital and its fluctuating fortunes across modern America, from a high point of 
community engagement at the beginning of the last century to large-scale civic 
disconnectedness by the century’s close. Putnam begins by describing the level of corruption 
among social relationships, and then considers the cause of this atrophy together with its 
social, economic and political consequences. In conclusion, he looks back longingly in search 
of a time of highest happiness and well-being in the hope of finding some signs from history 
that may inform and help replenish stocks of social capital for America’s future.  
 
Bridging and Bonding 
Social capital amounts to the ‘connections among individuals – social networks and the 
norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them’ (Putnam, 2000, p.19). These 
connections can be put to use in different ways and for different purposes. According to 
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Putnam (2000), the two most important network types are those that bridge (inclusive) and 
those that bond (exclusive). What is new and so interesting in ‘Bowling Alone’ is the way 
that bridging and bonding forms have been reconfigured. They are treated here far differently 
to the way they operated in Gittell & Vidal’s (1998) community organising account. Putnam 
has refined them. He points out that they should not be considered as distinct entities, not as 
‘either-or’ categories into which social networks can be neatly divided (2000, p.23). The 
suggestion now is that inclusive-exclusive relationships can overlap; they are in effect a 
network of fluid links. This may come as some relief to those who did not find it so easy to 
tell them apart in the first place. For, what may appear as ‘bridging’ capital to some may be 
viewed as ‘bonding’ to others. Much depends on the particular context in which they are 
expected to function. Despite the notion that the two dimensions are capable of some ‘spill 
over’, Putnam enthuses over the prospect of connecting with people unlike ourselves, the 
connections that establish networks which take us beyond our familiar social circles. Of the 
two orientations outlined, he clearly favours bridging social capital. When Putnam 
distinguishes between them by suggesting that the bonding form is useful only for ‘getting 
by’ whereas the bridging version is crucial for ‘getting ahead’ (2000, p.23), it is clear that in 
order for America to start rebuilding its fragmented communities bridging social capital 
offers the best hope. In fact, so pronounced is Putnam’s passion for the inclusive form he has 
been accused of fermenting a ‘bridging bias’ (Patulny & Svendsen, 2007, p.37). 
 
A propensity for the bridging model is most apparent when he considers the topic of 
education. The links between social capital and education have both a strong and a relatively 
long history. Putnam is careful to remind his readers that the term ‘social capital’ first came 
to public attention thanks to a paper written by a reforming rural American educator at the 
beginning of the last century. Thereafter, he sets about trying to establish a link between 
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education and just about every possible type of civic and social engagement. Education is 
usually one of the most important predictors of many forms of social participation. Given that 
schools encourage regular face-to-face interaction and instil a cooperative and collaborative 
ethos, they present the right kind of environment for the development of social capital. A 
good academic record and good rates of attainment determine how connected to society a 
child will be when they later move forward into adulthood. In this respect, Putnam 
emphasises the importance of specifically bridging family-school relations. He applies 
particular focus on the role of parents and the amount of influence they can have on their 
children’s academic well-being. By introducing two further related strands of social capital, 
of formal and informal (2000), Putnam believes that the authority of the latter, being 
parents’/adults’ casual associations with friends on a regular basis, within any community, is 
deemed to be a stronger predictor of pupil achievement than in the level of formal social 
capital, such as when a pupil’s parents attend official school-related meetings, etc. 
Consequently, when adults/parents are moved to make regular connections with one another 
this perfunctory interaction is likely to have only a positive effect on the education 
performance of their children (2000).    
 
Despite the rhetoric of its importance as a predictor of social capital, the issue of education in 
Putnam’s book accounts for one of the very shortest chapters. This is probably due to his 
reliance on mainly quantitative data. Life-style surveys and a glut of other statistical indices 
make up the bulk of his evidence (it was not until the publication of ‘Better Together’ in 2004 
that he managed to incorporate any qualitative data into his research). It would explain why, 
for example, he has very little to say about the origins and the influence of pupil-pupil and 
teacher-pupil relationships. They are not mentioned because affective interactions of this 
nature rarely show up on any of the measuring tools Putnam put to use. It is a process that 
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calls to mind Wickberg’s (1998) aseptic approach to the sense of humour trait, one devoid of 
instrumentality and bereft of any human stakes. Putnam’s methodological approach allows a 
focus on school-community links to take preference over within-school issues. He seems 
absorbed with the condition and influence of pupils’ parents, noting how their social capital 
‘confers benefits on their off-spring’ (2000, p.299). Much of this is achieved through 
community engagement. Communities whose adults trust one another, who join organisations 
and socialise with friends, will find that their children tend to flourish academically. 
Communities with healthy civic attitudes provide healthy, well-adjusted children (Putnam, 
2000). However, he virtually ignores the idea that schools themselves have huge potential as 
sites for the production of social capital among learners, and neglects the active role they play 
in generating their own connections and networks (Smyth & MacBride et al, 2012).  
 
Social capital is routinely engaged, for instance, every time children help each other with 
their homework, or whenever a teacher chooses to organise a group learning task. Bonding 
forms, it may be argued, proliferate in typical school conditions. But what of Putnam’s much 
vaunted bridging forms? What chances are there for any child to connect with pupils unlike 
themselves? From his all too brief focus on and encounter with education, it is difficult to tell 
if the trends show a tendency for schools to favour homogeneity, where individual pupils’ 
identities are flattened out, or there is a flourishing of heterogeneous school communities 
where diversity is the standard (Allan et al, 2012). There are many positive signs that schools 
will eagerly foster a strong sense of intra-community links, but this bonding/exclusive social 
capital need not come at the expense of attempts to commit community members to a 
bridging/inclusive outlook (Campbell, 2006).  
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Many mainstream schools will very likely provide its learners with every opportunity to 
bridge and to bond. A school that might have a homogenised complement of pupils 
assembled around a single faith, for example, and outwardly present itself as a strongly 
bonded institution, will nonetheless provide ample bridging features and opportunities within 
the composition of the pupil cohort. Many of them will perforce differ according to 
traditional variables such as age, sex, and social class, but also along dimensions such as 
ethnicity and learning disability. But even though education remains an important source of 
social capital, and despite Putnam’s estimation of it as a vital predictor of social capital, what 
precisely happens to children during their school tenure is neither clearly explained, 
understood, or given the attention it deserves, since he fails to place those important causal 
mechanisms under full, inclusive scrutiny.    
 
There is no reference to ‘integration’ in the ‘Index for Inclusion’ (Booth & Ainscow, 2000). 
The document that was designed with the purpose of creating more inclusive cultures, that 
itself owed much to the influential Salamanca Statement (Unesco, 1994), makes no mention 
of its educational predecessor. It’s as though the beginning of a new century was deemed an 
auspicious moment to close the door on one old, out-dated system and open a new one to 
allow a more radical all-embracing opportunity to make education more democratic. Ever 
since it was championed by the Warnock Committee (1987) many of those with a 
professional and emotional stake in children’s education found integration both an unsettling 
term and a troubling practice. In common classroom parlance it was often assumed to mean 
that children with disabilities would find it difficult to maintain their unique social identities, 
having little or no opportunity to celebrate their individual selves (Smyth & MacBride, 2012). 
Furthermore, children with some experience of being integrated were made to feel as though 
they should be grateful for a school’s benevolence instead of simply expecting that their 
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fully-rounded education should be provided as a matter of right. Similarly, the Index treats 
the concept of ‘special educational needs’ with the same disdain shown to ‘integration’. Since 
the term amounts to labelling people, it becomes just another way of segregating and 
excluding them (Tomlinson, 1982). It was replaced by the non-specific ‘barriers to learning 
and participation’ (2000, p.13.).  
 
The process of replacing old terms with new ones is not simply just another way of stating or 
describing an issue, but is part of the new reforming spirit aimed at initiating a whole new 
approach to school-based education. ‘Inclusion’, at this point, has a much broader compass 
than its forerunner; it attempts to meet the increasing diversity of school populations. Not 
only is it concerned with children who had been previously categorised as requiring special 
education, but it applies to all pupils and adults vulnerable to exclusionary measures and 
sensibilities. It deals with improving school conditions for members of staff (Booth & 
Ainscow, 2000). It is also about maintaining links between schools and their local 
communities, such as embracing, demonstrating and encouraging multicultural attitudes. The 
underlying principle behind inclusive education is that it is but one, albeit important, aspect 
of the drive to construct a more inclusive society (2000). A social model of learning disability 
informs this dedication. Shifting the focus of attention onto the environmental, structural and 
attitudinal barriers within institutions and society is seen as a move away from medical, and 
ostensibly deficit, thinking. It is society rather than the individual which has to be changed 
(Allan, 2010).  
 
The Index for Inclusion may have been influenced by the inclusive momentum brought about 
by the statement issued at Salamanca (1994), but the processes, beliefs and values inscribed 
within it owe substantially more to the key ideas associated with one of its contemporary 
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publications, Robert Putnam’s ‘Bowling Alone’ (2000). Both texts can be utilised as 
resources for reflection. Each one encourages a process of self-questioning, providing a 
heterogeneous purview. They offer a diagnostic facility, and an opportunity for users to aim 
for and realise a mixture of prescribed group/individual targets. Putnam (2000), for example, 
considers a large-scale approach to community renewal; Booth & Ainscow (2000) have less 
grandiose ambitions, although their aim is to see how small-scale school communities can 
contribute to and be included into the larger community network. For example, one of the 
main goals of the Index was to initiate a programme that would transform schools from self-
managing inward-looking institutions into educational centres that provide support to and 
receive support from the wider community. Perhaps the authors of the Index were unaware 
that what they were attempting to achieve depended to a great extent on establishing supplies 
of social capital (a term that lacked the currency it does today, although they may have been 
familiar with the basic principle of social connectivity). In their attempt to help school 
leaders, pupils, teachers, and parents to work together to create more democratic school 
environments, the Index authors were aiming to increase the scope and quality of schools’ 
relational networks (Carrington & Robinson, 2006). Achieving this feat entailed encouraging 
schools to look outwards and play a more central role in the development of the local 
community.   
 
Stranger and Friend 
Of the personnel described in the Index whose involvement in securing greater community 
ties is encouraged and valued, the effort of the ‘critical friend’ (Booth & Ainscow , 2000, 
p.19) is the most interesting. This ‘friend’ is something of a shadowy figure. He/she has an 
inclusive-exclusive portfolio, functioning at once as a member of the school’s self-evaluation 
team, a person known to the institution concerned, yet a figure who, importantly, also 
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remains an outsider, someone identified by the school’s stakeholders as possessing a neutral 
agenda. To use Kristeva’s (1991) circles of affiliation as a guide, the critical friend occupies a 
position somewhere in the middle of the map of concentric contours, close enough to be an 
acquaintance but far enough away so as not to compromise their objectivity. The rationale 
here approximates closely to Granovetter’s (1973) theory on strong and weak ties, inasmuch 
that a weak tie is more likely to be the provider of new hitherto unseen information, whereas 
a strong tie may feel obliged, out of politeness and a sense of loyalty, to provide only the 
information one wishes to see or hear. However, it is argued that impartiality is an unrealistic 
condition in such a relationship since the critical friend (whoever they may be and whatever 
their background) will bring to any school their own particular remit and focus (Swaffield & 
MacBeath, 2005). Nonetheless, the critical friend is still expected to provide a service that 
functions even in non-ideal situations as a vital link between the school and the wider 
community. Education psychologists, teachers from other schools, parents and school 
inspectors are felt to be among the most able candidates to assume this role. They offer an 
opportunity to view the school through a different lens, to provoke and also to challenge 
interactions between the various stakeholders wherever and whenever necessary.  
 
All of the value held by this figure lies in the creative potential that sits at the threshold of 
strangeness and familiarity. Being a mixture of ally and alien, the critical friend is the very 
model of social connectivity. Bestriding two separate domains, they are well placed to 
simultaneously bridge and bond between school and community in their capacity as a 
linking-consolidating point of reference. The influence of the liminal figure has been firmly 
established in other disciplines. An attitude of intimate detachment is commonly associated 
with anthropological investigations. Ethnographers have been recommended to assume a 
position intellectually poised between familiarity and strangeness (Powdermaker, 1966). Not 
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unrelatedly, a rule that goes back at least to Bergson (1911/2005) states that a comic effect is 
achieved only when the natural expression of an idea is transposed into another key. For 
Bergson, laughter is obtained when the familiar is confronted with the unfamiliar; the 
meeting of these two opposing currents triggers a creative laughable charge. A similar type of 
stimulus activates the critical friend to open up new ways of construing the myriad 
pedagogies and practices, dispositions and attitudes, from their interstitial position. By 
encouraging the widest scrutiny of everything that makes up the lifeworld of the school, the 
Index expects to include not only critical outsiders but traditional outsiders such as parents 
and carers, those members of the community with a history of having only a token 
involvement in their children’s education. Collaborations between school and local families 
constitute a potentially strong and important source of social capital, and carry every prospect 
of becoming a positive factor for educational improvement and reform (Carrington & 
Robinson, 2006).  
 
Some have claimed that the comprehensiveness of the Index is overwhelming (Vaughan, 
2002). While its thoroughness, on one level, is to be commended, and clearly it is a document 
brimming with good ideas and intentions, there are those who remain puzzled by the need for 
a root and branch examination at all. Some might argue that the adoption of new, inclusive 
ways of working should be an easy, natural, straightforward undertaking, given that to be 
inclusive is morally, instinctively, and ideologically the right course to follow. At an 
international education conference, for example, one that had become bogged down with 
British policy on inclusive schooling, an unnamed African delegate/teacher wondered why 
(in the West) the process had become so complicated when the only thing required was for 
community members to value and respect one another (in Carrington & Robinson, 2006). 
Although there will be inevitable concerns about the inclusion issue, and a suspicion that 
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some are indeed guilty of ‘over-thinking’ it, what lies at the heart of the Index is a recognition 
that the desire to effect institutional change offers no easy solutions. When it is felt necessary 
to re-educate mind-sets and habits away from the damaging practice of integrating children 
and to embrace instead a newer, more democratic system, the process will take time and 
effort before re-culturing can be achieved. Accordingly, the creation of more inclusive 
cultures begins with a long-term commitment to staff development (Booth & Ainscow, 
2000).  
 
Internal and External 
Conventional professional development had previously revolved around the familiar triad of 
workshops, conferences and courses. Teachers and support staff relied almost exclusively on 
external ‘experts’ who, while often possessing good knowledge of school systems in general, 
usually lacked any specific knowledge of the site where those personnel were actually 
employed. The Index for Inclusion made it clear that teachers should be allowed to develop 
their professionalism with external support but within the confines of their own schools. 
School reform was more likely to result when a professional community was supported in 
both sectors, from inside and outside the institution. It was not unreasonable to assume that 
schools could be made more effective once a more considered and nuanced view of the 
inside-outside relationship was taken. Indeed, among the many good things contained in the 
Index is a determination to move beyond the kind of canonical definitions that indicate a 
binary logic has taken root. When considering inclusion, for example, one must also take 
exclusion into account. Some of the team members responsible for organising the Index made 
this point very clear in an earlier document: ‘We link the notion of inclusion and exclusion 
together because the process of increasing the participation of students entails the reduction 
of pressures to exclusion’ (Booth & Ainscow, 1998, p.2). They highlighted situations 
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common in some schools where students, previously excluded and receiving special 
education, ‘are welcomed in through the front door while others are ushered out at the back’ 
(p.2). It amounted to the production of a strange gyratory system. Children were being 
worked in inclusive-exclusive rotation, circumstances the authors describe in their frustration, 
but with considerable restraint, as a ‘comedy’ (1998, p.2). 
  
Such a description allows the thought to surface that the dividing line between comedy and 
tragedy is not always clearly defined. Many instances of the comical are not properly 
dignified by that name, as is clear from Booth and Ainscow’s ironic use of the term. Despite 
a long tradition sanctifying a distinction between comedy and tragedy, in the lifeworld of a 
primary school, as in life generally, this pair of contraries may be just as likely to overlap or 
fuse together as be treated as separate entities. Exactly how these two poles often become 
entwined can be seen in Robert Provine’s ‘Laughter: A Scientific Investigation’ (2000). His 
text is the result of a 10-year enquiry to explain why laughter is an ‘unconscious response to 
social and linguistic cues’ (p.2) Initially, Provine began observing subjects in his laboratory, 
but found laughter too fragile, illusive and too varied a commodity to be considered under 
direct scientific analysis. He then embarked on a range of different approaches, which 
included eavesdropping on people’s conversations in public, scouring the personal columns 
of newspapers noting the quantity of adverts placed by women seeking men who could make 
them laugh, encouraging students to record their own laughter in a personal logbook (its time 
of occurrence and its circumstances in order to determine the sociality of laughing), 
observing an acting class (the members of which attempted - and failed - to produce 
‘genuine’ laughter on demand), a 52-item questionnaire on tickling, and a gadget called a 
‘laugh box’ which produces, at the push of a button, a burst of pre-recorded laughter which 
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tested whether in the listener the canned laughter in itself was enough to produce a 
contagious laughter response (2000). 
 
Genuine and Counterfeit 
With a background in developmental psychology, and a specialism in animal behaviour, 
Provine’s early studies were notable for his attempts to develop an understanding of the vocal 
facility in birds, working to the idea that the song-like nature of human laughter could have 
its counterpart in bird-song (2000). Although he does not embrace a wholly empiricist 
epistemological position, Provine does show unalloyed animosity towards the social sciences 
and philosophy, two disciplines he maintains that have clouded our understanding of the 
laughter phenomenon. For instance, Provine takes issue with Aristotle’s (1968) often 
repeated claim that risibility is the sole preserve of humans. Drawing many of his hypotheses 
about human laughter from comparisons with some of the vocal expressions produced by 
apes and chimpanzees, Provine points to studies conducted on these and other primates as 
proof of a misperception that laughter is exclusive to human beings. However, he qualifies 
the laughter of these animals by referring to them only as “laughlike” (p.75, italics added). 
Nonetheless, there are references to laughter’s social aspect, to its ‘social bonding function’ 
(p.47), for he notes that ‘solitary chimps, like solitary people, seldom laugh’ (p.92). 
Moreover, Provine’s book is one of the very few texts that make time to consider the laughter 
of people with a range of learning disabilities, including references to autism and Angelman’s 
syndrome (2000). That said, however, he seems to be on far safer ground when revealing 
some of the more humorous, anecdotal aspects to illuminate the world of laughter. Among 
the miscellany of entertaining and fascinating titbits, all of which appear to be garnered from 
secondary sources, is the tale of the epidemic which swept through a Tanzanian girl’s school 
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in 1962, rendering half of the pupil population incapacitated with laughter, and forcing 
education authorities to close the institution concerned for a period of two months (2000).  
 
Declaring that laughter can serve as a bond to bring people together or it can work as a 
weapon to ostracise (2000), Provine introduces the first of many themes that echo those 
featured in Putnam’s ‘Bowling Alone’ (2000). Referencing laughter’s ‘darker side’, as when 
it excludes outsiders (p.47), reproduces Putnam’s familiar quote about the ‘dark side’ of 
social capital (2000, p.350). It is because of these anti-social elements that two seemingly 
contrary dimensions of laughter and social capital eventually developed, laughing with 
(inclusive) and laughing at (exclusive), which approximate closely to Putnam’s notions of 
bridging and bonding. Provine devotes the final section of his book to identifying ways in 
which diminishing laughter levels can be restored. Obligingly, he offers ‘10 tips’ (p.209) to 
increase our laughing habit, which resembles the concluding chapter in ‘Bowling Alone’, 
where Putnam lays down six challenges to his readers that he hopes will help to kick-start the 
process of renewing their depleted stocks of social capital (2000).  
 
Whether our laughter is programmed or we simply choose when to laugh, it remains an 
important yet neglected question, one that has a bearing on everyday communication and 
behaviour. According to Provine, it is the question upon which ‘the validity of over two 
millennia of thinking about laughter hangs in the balance’ (2000, p.49). His consistent claim 
is that laughter is an unconscious, spontaneous impulse, and he rejects as a myth the view put 
forward by mainly philosophers and social scientists that laughter bears the tacit assumption 
of intentionality and conscious control (2000). Provine’s view feeds into specific opinions 
about spontaneity and laughter, but also an opinion about spontaneity in broader, general 
terms. There is, for example, a tendency for society to valorise the spontaneity of laughter, 
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the assumption being that because it is natural it ‘is the real McCoy’ (Smith, 2008, p.3). 
Moreover, whatever the type of laughter it may be, ‘it must always appear to be natural and 
spontaneous’ (cited in Mulkay, 1988, p.118, emphasis in the original), as if there is a social 
expectation for it to be so. Genuine, spontaneous laughter remains one of the cornerstones of 
our social and cultural system (Mulkay, 1988), and a reflexive means of expression continues 
to be the most popular view of the phenomenon.  
 
If they exercise the same discretion as their elders, children will show a stronger preference 
for spontaneous humour and humorous stories from real life than for material that has been 
deliberately manufactured (Lampert & Ervin-Tripp, 2007). Almost anyone can tell an 
amusing story or joke, but a child who can produce a funny comment, pull a face, or ‘burp’ 
on the spur of the moment is a much rarer individual, and one more likely to be admired by 
their peers (Morreall, 2009). Spontaneity has long been regarded as among the defining 
markers of one’s sense of identity. It is associated with liberty in works by Ovid and Virgil. 
Lenin was allegedly fearful of it (Lih, 2008), while Maslow placed spontaneity at the apex of 
his well-known ‘hierarchy of needs’ (1970). It points to a profoundly important theme in our 
culture, and constitutes an influential element in a child’s creative, emotional and learning 
development since it describes estimable qualities like speed, instinct, and mental energy 
(Moreno & Moreno, 1944). Spontaneous laughter, similarly, has gained much of its social 
and cultural prestige from its authentic, unpremeditated expression. But it has also gained 
considerably from its association with legitimising values such as ‘genuine’, as ‘civilised’ 
(Koestler, 1964) and as ‘true’ (Screech, 1999). These positively-loaded terms have helped to 
aggrandise its status, whereas controlled or voluntary laughter is known largely through its 
negative synonyms, such as ‘counterfeit’, ‘contrived’ and ‘fake’. Importantly, such sharply 
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defined categories presuppose that these laughter reference points always stand in isolation, 
that there is no correspondence between them. This, however, does not always follow. 
 
Those persuaded by a composite view of laughter argue that it does not lend itself so easily to 
rigid classification, as either a voluntary or an involuntary response. Instead, it falls between 
these two extremes (Portmann, 1998). Even though Provine’s scientific position convinces 
him that all laughter is involuntary, some sociologists, for example, maintain that involuntary 
laughter ‘occurs much less frequently than any other forms’ (Mulkay, 1988, p.118). Indeed, 
Provine appears to have overlooked or deliberately discounted the possibility of instances 
arising where people - and in particular young children - deliberately contrive their laughter 
in order to create the impression that it is an involuntary reaction. Strategic practices of this 
kind are covered by the description ‘controlled spontaneity’ (Mulkay, 1988, p.118), a 
conciliation which avoids the dangers of thinking according to pernicious dualisms, and 
admits that each dimension will necessarily overlap with its opposite, forming what Koestler 
refers to as a ‘marriage of incompatibles’ (1964, p.95). For all that, Provine’s cursory review 
of the philosophical literature on laughter leads him to conclude that this discipline’s analysis 
of it has been vitiated by the ‘rational person’ hypothesis (2000, p.18), a common sense but 
incorrect premise that the decision to laugh is motivated by a rational choice. Both research 
and common sense support the claim that laughter is not solely the product of a conscious 
choice. But equally they contradict the notion that laughter is only ever non-voluntary and 
irrational. To be fair to Provine, he never explicitly makes this second claim; it is enough that 
he rests satisfied with the first. Even so, for one whose primary expertise is in avian 
evolution, it might be said that a great deal of his work on laughter has been left up in the air. 
 
78 
 
Describing the tension between two of the main competing theories, of those who favour 
spontaneity against those championing contrivance, Provine presents a case for laughter as an 
instinctive, spontaneous reaction. The laughing instinct is programmed, not by exposure to 
social/cultural systems, but by our genes (2000). A genetic-environment rapprochement is not 
possible or wanted in Provine’s view. Accordingly, we somehow always manage to laugh at 
just the right times - even though we are not always aware of what we are doing (2000). The 
example of contagious laughter provides the strongest challenge to what he considers to be 
the shaky hypothesis that we are rational creatures in full control of our behaviour (2000). 
Provine’s adherence to the idea of laughter’s involuntary expression is justified and 
maintained from having observed a number of acting classes where aspiring thespians were 
invited by their drama teacher to laugh on cue. Unfortunately, their efforts merely ‘sounded 
forced and artificial’ (2000, p.49). With slightly more methodological rigour, he highlights 
some previous studies which note examples of laughter’s strategic use, as in the self-effacing 
forms by people of low social rank, exemplified by the caste system in India, and women in 
communities all over the world who, he claims, are habitual users of ‘self-humbling’ laughter 
(2000, p.49). But he chooses not to use these two very good examples as a way to explore the 
broader significance of tactical laughter. Had Provine taken the trouble to visit a school 
during the ‘urban safari’ phase of his fieldwork (2000, p.25), he would surely have noted, as 
did Willis (1976) and Woods (1984) before him, that many pupils and teachers have good 
cause to cultivate the habit of laughing instrumentally, either as an appeasement strategy or 
for purposes of ingratiation.  
 
If Provine’s scientific investigation ever manages to escape being labelled a ‘tragedy’, it is 
only because the term ‘tragicomedy’ might be a more suitable description. His book 
combines humorous and pathetic elements. Much that is pathetic is represented by the variety 
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of colourful research methods, namely his hit-and-miss attempts at gathering data (Martin, 
2003). Again, to be fair to him, Provine concedes that it is a ‘catch-as-catch-can 
interdisciplinary work in progress’ (2000, p.9), meaning that he had to make do with 
whatever methods were available to him. It is entirely reasonable, therefore, that during his 
10-year exploration Provine should have felt it necessary to employ a profusion of different 
research approaches. Going against his strictly scientific instincts, he nonetheless bridges the 
qualitative-quantitative divide with randomised frequency. Instead of depending on highly 
decontextualised laboratory research, Provine felt compelled to assume an anthropological 
spirit. In order to find examples of genuine, spontaneous laughter, he had to first defy the 
parochialism of inward-looking academic disciplines, including his own, and, as he readily 
admits, take to the sidewalk (2000).  
 
For all of its methodological shortcomings, Provine’s book remains a text of particular  
interest in that it reveals how important it can be to break free from the restrictive mental 
cages in which researchers often lock themselves. His unusual if not haphazard mixing of 
methods resonates, perhaps unconsciously, with the ways that children use, encounter, and 
think about laughter. Although he does not write specifically with children’s laughter in 
mind, there is something disarmingly childlike in Provine’s approach to his subject. From his 
use of toy props like the ‘laughter-box’, to his examination of playful tickling, and not 
forgetting all of the zoological-related monkey business, it’s as though he feels compelled to 
take a child’s perspective on laughter in order to try and understand laughter’s many 
complexities. Scientific and philosophical literature is filled with elementary and puerile 
accounts that frequently reduce laughter to an intrusion befitting young children, a vestige, 
for example, of crying in infancy (Morris, 1967). In ancient Greece the association between 
laughter and childhood was part of a life-affirming nexus of classical values (Halliwell, 
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2008). Laughter, claims Darwin, is primarily the expression of joy or happiness – as 
demonstrated by the incessant laughter of children at play (1872/1998). And laughter’s 
infantile roots were explored and expounded by both Bergson (1911/2005) and Freud 
(1905/2001). In their fluid social worlds, children are often oblivious to the outlines of 
categories and borders, having a disposition to take everything literally. They routinely 
experience such difficulties as appreciating tongue-in-cheek humour or irony (Zerubavel, 
1993), and a failure to think analytically sometimes prevents them from actually getting the 
joke (Provine, 2000). But lapses in analytical thinking are not the sole preserve of children.  
Despite enthusiastically reinforcing the outdated nature-nurture debate with his highly partial 
coverage of the unconscious-involuntary laughter opposition (which in itself is an outlying 
aspect of the intrinsic, biological origins of laughter versus the extrinsic social/environmental 
factors) Provine repeats – but makes no effort to reconcile – any of these inclusive-exclusive 
diminutives.  
 
2010 
 If Provine truly believed that future writers on laughter would heed his call and abandon 
attempts to philosophise about it, and instead get out of their armchairs and start observing it, 
he was in for disappointment. Barbara Stengel’s contemplative essay ‘After the Laughter’ 
(2012) raises a series of imaginary proposals using accounts of laughter that are mainly 
a series (sequence) of fictional school-based scenarios, but with some of the author’s personal 
education-related recollections included for good measure.  
 
In 2010 ‘The Cambridge Primary Review’, a volume edited by Robin Alexander, which 
included a host of contributing authors, published an in-depth assessment of the state of 
primary education in England. So that the document should be treated with the importance 
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the Review team believed it deserved, they stipulated that one of its subsidiary aims was to 
try and circumscribe the ‘discourse of derision’ (2010, p.22), this being a reference to the 
crude way that public opinion had often been manipulated, largely - but not exclusively - by 
the popular media (Ball, 1990). In recent times this practice has reached an unacceptable 
level in its mocking hostility, constructing a range of dichotomous polarities that perpetuate 
putative divisions between powers of volition, such as gravity and ridicule, sarcasm and 
sanctimony.  
 
In his ‘Theories of Social Capital’ (2010) Ben Fine has two distinct but related ambitions. In 
attempting to deliver a deconstruction of social capital he hopes to try and make some sense 
of its popularity among the social sciences. He tries to show why, in his view, social capital is 
a nonsensical concept. Furthermore, by virtue of the book’s sub-title ‘Researchers Behaving 
Badly’ he delivers what amounts to be a route-map of the various steps and skills needed to 
carry out a piece of research. He shows how good research should be conducted and offers, 
among other things, useful information on how to assemble an effective literature review. 
This intelligence is aimed squarely at the burgeoning researcher who is intending to use 
social capital as a means to explore some concept or other, a formula he describes as ‘social 
capital plus X’ (2010, p.5), with ‘X’ being a construct, condition, or phenomenon tagged 
randomly on to it - something like laughter, one imagines.    
 
Concealing and Revealing 
Stengel reminds us, among other things, that we laugh at what is comical and what is 
unfunny. She refers obliquely to the latter as the ‘difficult’ (2012, p.5), meaning conditions 
like fear, nervousness, shame, confusion, etc. These are the kinds of emotions which can give 
rise to laughter, and the kinds of emotions which sustain her principle interest. Aside from 
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wanting to know what it is that prompts this ‘difficult’ laughter, Stengel aims to explain 
‘what happens after the laughter’ has gone (p.2. original italics). In other words, how can the 
vacuum, the potentially positive space left in laughter’s wake, be exploited? She indicates 
that there are opportunities for teachers here, just as long as they are in a position to recognise 
and take advantage of that liminal region. In everyday circumstances laughter will be easily 
recognised by teachers, although the laughter’s meaning may at times be unclear (p.5). 
Superficially, it appears that laughter’s double nature is once again being referenced in the 
time-honoured sense of it being either laughing with or laughing at behaviour. But Stengel’s 
project offers something new. It is suggested there is a laughter form that simultaneously 
‘reveals and conceals’ (2012, p.3), providing teachers with an opportunity for some 
‘teachable moments’ (p.4). This type of laughter represents a pedagogic ‘opening’ (p.4) - just 
as long as the laughter signal is heeded and therefore revealed, and not ignored and thus  
concealed (2012). Herein, laughter becomes a novel, but crucial, first step in the process of 
helping teachers to respond to and diagnose their pupils’ needs.   
 
Drawing on the work of John Dewey as a way to explore laughter’s profound role in 
education, Stengel addresses a range of affective-related issues, not seeming to care very 
much that despite writing copiously on human emotions Dewey had comparatively little to 
say about laughter. Nonetheless, what he did say was worth saying, for he was one of the first 
to recognise that laughter can occur without any humour stimulus (1894). But it is in the 
broader realm of human emotions that Stengel makes use of one of Dewey’s important - but 
least known - concepts. Referred to by her as ‘blind discharge’ (2012, p.2) and by him as 
‘emotional seizure’ (1895, p.17), either term connotes a laughing action that is neither 
spontaneous nor voluntary, but one that announces a pupil’s breakdown, rupture or some 
form of interruption in their learning experience. Simply put, laughter can be expressed when 
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an individual experiences a cognitive and/or affective malfunction. Either way, the laughter 
produced operates as a behavioural marker, one that teachers are urged to recognise, to 
interpret correctly, for it could lead, according to her argument, to a breakthrough in learning 
(2012). On the face of it, the Stengel-Dewey coalition offers a startling new perspective on 
laughter’s long-standing inclusive-exclusive relationship. Behaviour that reveals as it 
conceals appears to be further evidence of laughter’s inclusive-exclusive patterning, a flexible 
juxtaposition that accommodates two habitually incompatible frames of reference.   
 
In order to try and make sense of this apparent inconsistency, it may be useful to follow 
Stengel’s lead and invoke an imaginary scenario whereby this new type of thinking could be 
applied. At a particular school, for example, the laughter of a particular child is out of kilter 
with the prevailing classroom mood. It may signal to the attentive teacher that it is the 
laughter of discontentment and unhappiness. It may suggest that the pupil concerned is 
encountering difficulties, either academically or emotionally. The teacher may be inclined to 
make a mental note of this distress signal, and then, at a time convenient to both parties, 
approach the pupil with a gentle but pointed question as to the status of their well-being. This 
is the kind of response Stengel would expect and appreciate any caring, on-the-ball teacher to 
make. Given laughter’s inherent duality (that we laugh because we are either happy or 
unhappy) the teacher has only a chance level of discovering some discrepancy that may be 
affecting the pupil’s classroom performance. Assuming there is indeed an issue, the laughter 
has done its job, and so too has (in the short term) the teacher. As for the pupil, the laughter 
has temporarily diverted their attention away from the difficulty in hand. In Stengel’s terms it 
has been concealed, and yet it has also been revealed if - and only if - the teacher is attuned 
to the laughter signal, who may be then prompted to uncover the source of the pupil’s 
discontent.   
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On a very basic level, Stengel’s speculation makes good sense. If some of our laughter 
behaviours are responses to some kind of difficulty, then laughter can indeed become a 
valuable signal - to those who are capable of interpreting it. But the central weakness in her 
hypothesis concerns this task of interpretation. It tends to take for granted the veracity of 
these signals; it assumes that the produced laughter is spontaneous and therefore genuine. But 
if Michael Mulkay is to be believed, most of the laughter people express is premeditated. He 
argues that in our social, conversational interactions at least, laughter is systematically and 
deliberately applied (1988). Despite this apparent shortcoming, there are other aspects to her 
theory that remain attractive and potentially useful. As Stengel makes clear, laughter can at 
times approximate to a cry for help. It is here that she leans heavily on Dewey’s analysis of 
emotionality. She points out, for example, that Dewey makes no distinction between laughter 
and crying (2012). For him, both emotions are closely situated physiologically and closely 
aligned theoretically. Laughter’s relief/release model, popularised during the late nineteenth-
century, stipulates that we may be moved to laughter and/or crying ‘because it marks the 
ending of a period of suspense or expectation’ (Dewey, 1894, p.558). It functions, in this 
sense, much like a syntactical full stop. In other words, due to its declarative, climactic 
essence, it is teleological, and should, all things considered, be behaviour difficult to miss. 
Nonetheless, Stengal urges teachers to be vigilant, cautioning that they ‘are well advised to 
pay close attention to laughter in all educational circumstances’ (2012, p.3). This might not 
seem to be an unreasonable expectation of teachers. Some, however, would argue that, 
practically speaking, yet more responsibilities places further burdens on their always 
demanding workload.  
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Perhaps Stengel is slightly insensitive in wishing to assign hard-pressed teachers yet more 
classroom duties. Gathering information by having to scrutinise the sound of pupils’ laughter, 
so that they can distinguish between the good natured form and its ‘difficult’ variant, requires 
a set of skills that has thus far eluded many behaviour and communication experts. In some 
ways it presents the same kind of problem encountered by playground supervisors when 
attempting to interpret pupils’ facial signals in order to determine whether a child’s grimace 
indicates aggressive behaviour or merely rough-and-tumble play. Within the first years of life 
children have already mastered the ability to manage many of their emotional states, with 
some showing proficiency in controlling a wide range of facial expressions (Ekman, 2009). 
Being naturally accomplished performers, with a flair for the arts of legerdemain and 
contrivance, children will have served, by the time of their Key-Stage education, an extensive 
apprenticeship in the form of their daily repertoire of pretend play. Their dedication to the 
world of make-believe and fantasy may be due in part to being exposed across the social and 
cultural media to an almost constant adult-oriented desire to excite their imagination. It is 
small wonder then that children have been described as ‘communication delinquents’ 
(Goffman, 1966, p.165), a suggestion that many of them have but a giddy idea about adult 
understandings of social interaction. Stengel’s failure both to appreciate that children spend a 
significant amount of their daily time engaged in pretence, and to even consider the 
possibility that children are not above fabricating their laughter, may not be the kind of 
attitude liberal-leaning educationalists had in mind when advocating in pupils more flexible, 
imaginative, and expressive thinking habits by constructing a more ‘democratic definition of 
creativity’ (Alexander, 2010, p.267). 
 
But being the principal figure behind ‘The Cambridge Primary Review’ (2010), Robin 
Alexander’s declared aim is to promote some serious and rational arguments on the condition 
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of, and future for, our children’s schooling. Not since the Plowden Report was published 40 
years earlier has there been such a comprehensive review of primary education. The 
document is aimed at a broad audience of stakeholders, from parents, pupils, and teachers to 
politicians and policy makers. It is voluminous in size; its scope (is) impressively vast. 
Educational arguments are firmly set in their historical and political contexts. But unlike 
official, government-backed inquiries the Review is careful to make conspicuous its non-
partisan credentials.  Somewhat self-consciously, it is at pains to point out that its findings 
were made possible thanks to the support and benevolence of a charitable trust. However, 
because of this, there is always the chance that the impact of its findings may be limited, 
making little real impact outside the world of education. Nonetheless, among its mix of 
visionary outlook and an adherence to tried and tested values and procedures, the most 
notable recommendations are that core and non-core curriculum subjects should be united. 
The Review also pledges a firm commitment to curricular flexibility, it challenges the 
ideology behind SATs - ‘it is not testing which raises standards but good teaching’ (2010, 
p.325) - and relatedly, but unsurprisingly, maintains an unreserved dedication to upholding 
the highest quality of teaching and learning (2010). 
 
These recommendations are based on empirical evidence underpinned by a rich and 
exhaustive methodology, blending a copious array of primary and secondary source material. 
The Review team invited opinions in the form of written submissions from a cross-section of 
society. Home-based and international academics, national and international organisations, as 
well as views from ordinary members of the public, formally and informally, were garnered 
whether their interests were from inside or outside education. They took community 
soundings, both regional and national. Travelling around the country they spent thousands of 
hours engaged with those involved in the day-to-day running of primary schools, as well as 
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those situated beyond the school gates, such as local and national employers, community and 
religious leaders, the police, etc. They commissioned surveys and sent out questionnaires to a 
wide range of interested agencies and individuals. Official data were engaged, with the very 
latest and also archive material from government sources like the DfES and Ofsted.   
 
Reverence and Ridicule 
As part of the Review team’s dissemination strategy, a series of interim reports were 
published, commencing in 2007, which highlighted some of the Report’s earliest findings. 
This was done primarily to stimulate public discussions and debate. Although the teaching 
community were generally supportive of these intervening accounts and early conclusions, 
the same could not be said for the national media. The press, in particular, penned a series of 
largely scornful and sensationalist headlines which were matched only in levels of hostility 
by rejoinders from those individuals occupying government/ministerial positions. Derision by 
their critics, however, was not answered in kind. By way of a more measured response, the 
Review team chose to incorporate some of this critique into the body of the final report, 
devoting to it an entire chapter. The significant part of this particular chapter was concerned 
with the citing of three patterns of discourse which, in recent years, they felt had frustrated 
the progress of educational thinking, policy and practice. Two of these features - the 
discourses of dichotomy and derision (2010) - prove not only to be highly topical but 
fundamentally important. There was a feeling that an affectation of dichotomies has engulfed 
the debate on education. The Review team considered the trend to reduce often complex 
debates on education matters to risible bipolar slogans as a deliberate attempt to stifle healthy 
discussion. While the Review accepts that there will inevitably be competing discourses, for 
example, from the evidence submitted by such a wide range of public opinion, it is set firmly 
against any involvement in corrosively adversarial formats. Yet the vein of dichotomous 
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discourse runs deep, and it continues to exert a powerful grip on the professional debates 
centred on primary education (2010). It encourages polarised positioning, seen often in the 
exclusive ‘versus’ preposition (i.e. formal versus informal, subjective versus objective, etc) a 
term that with some profit, it is argued, could be replaced by using the more inclusive ‘and’ 
(2010).  
 
The ‘discourse of derision’ (2010, p.22) describes the kind of disdainful, belittling 
communication associated with mainly right-wing elements in the media. It is typified by 
widespread scoffing and boorish rejoinders to just about any progressive agenda mooted for 
discussion concerning education generally and teachers in particular. But this distortion of the 
communication process is not restricted to the media alone. Politicians and commentators of 
every stripe often make use of it when they encounter opinions that clash with their own, 
choosing to impugn the credibility of a specific person, party or profession. Nor indeed are 
such registers ever far away from the school classroom or playground. The discourse of 
derision’s disciplinary function, together with its rebellious spirit (Billig, 2005), remain key 
features to which school children are routinely exposed and regularly gravitate. Mockery and 
ridicule are at times easier forms of discipline to meet out than many traditional types of 
school punishment. Carefully done (applied), they can be performed in an ‘ambivalent’ 
inclusive-exclusive manner (Bakhtin, 1984, p.13). A teacher’s mocking of a pupil, for 
example, may be enacted with a genuine display of warmth and concern (in the manner of 
many caring parent-children interactions) to ensure that the pupil’s error or misdemeanour is 
not overlooked, yet done in a way that does not exclude them from joining in with the 
laughter (Billig, 2005). Children’s use of derision can also admit to containing a streak of 
rebellion. Disobedience of this nature calls to mind Bakhtin’s (1984) idea that comic laughter 
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is at its most effective when established hierarchies are turned upside-down, when the 
pompous, the mighty, and the pretentious are disparaged.   
 
However, it is not always necessary to be part of the right-wing media militia or affiliated to 
the Westminster Establishment to find items in The Cambridge Primary Review worthy of 
derision. The issue of categorising children, for example, which was critiqued and itself 
subjected to some spirited contumely from Sally Tomlinson (1982), continues to trouble 
educational thinkers and practitioners. The policy of streaming and setting is, according to the 
Review, very likely to be a grouping method that accentuates children’s differences. Even the 
alternative, and arguably more sensitive, ‘mixed-ability teaching’ (Alexander, 2010, p.377) is 
thought to produce similar harmful effects. But despite such negative projections, the 
Review’s best recommendation is only that teachers should ‘categorise with caution’ (2010, 
p.378). The circumspection here signals that teachers remain attentive to the inherent dangers 
in this practice although, mysteriously, the Review is unwilling to campaign for its 
dissolution. Categorising, much like the reliance on dichotomies, is a way of organising 
reality that amounts to a form of segregation. In this instance, it functions, quite simply, by 
separating children from other children. If, as they claim, the Review team are set against the 
perpetuation of dichotomous thinking, it seems strange that they should be so ambiguous 
about the existing methods of classroom organisation, of classifying pupils, which many 
would argue is manifestly unequal.   
      
The Review team greeted their critic’s derision with sombre, straight-faced disapproval. 
Aside from including extracts of such negativity into the final report they advise their 
eventual readers that whatever they may think of its conclusions, ‘its findings are to be 
discussed, its arguments treated with due seriousness, its evidence given the careful study it 
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deserves’ (2010, p.1). Holding dear the values of sobriety and sanctimony the Review authors 
invited their readers to emulate such gravitas - on the understanding that anything less than a 
straight-faced response would show a lack of respect to such a serious topic. One 
predominant characteristic of modern scientific discourse is its generally serious and sedate 
tone. But, it can be argued, humour need not be inconsistent with academic writing. Some of 
the most revered texts in literary history have successfully blended seriousness with laughter 
and humour. The opening paragraph of ‘The German Ideology’, for example, contains ‘more 
biting wit’ than most philosophers produce in a lifetime, although Marx’s raillery did not 
undermine the rhetoric of his trenchant political message (Billig, 2005, p.242). Norbert Elias 
notes that Erasmus’s short treatise ‘De civilitate morum peurilium’ (On Civility in Boys) - a 
hugely popular educational text when it appeared in the early sixteenth-century - was 
delivered with great seriousness, yet at the same time with much mockery and irony (2000, 
p.47-48). And, according to Michael Screech (1999), the revered and sacred writings of the 
Bible are shot through from Genesis to Revelation with countless accounts of scornful, 
mocking laughter.  
 
It might be said that the Review team’s earnestness only serves to heighten the level of 
ridicule that might entice the mischievous tabloid copy-writer or politician. With the reader 
receiving instructions on how to respond to the Review’s final report, some might argue that 
it practically invites a scornful, derisory reaction. There is no denying that education is a 
vitally important system and process which affects millions of people and, if the government 
are to be believed, the fate of the nation depends on its efficient and skilful administration. 
But derision is not incompatible with constructive criticism - far from it. Admittedly, it can 
often have destructive consequences, yet it can also be shrewdly illuminating. In the hands of 
an accomplished and dedicated writer, ridicule may help to elaborate a text so that it may be 
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more easily consumed or possibly just provide it with a fresh perspective. Those who are so 
high-minded to valorise the weighty over the light-hearted may be in danger of constructing a 
dichotomy of the very type the report’s authors actively seek to circumscribe. But this should 
come as no surprise, for seriousness and risibility are not wholly incompatible conditions. 
Wickberg (1998) suggests that the modern opposition between the serious and the humorous 
originated in the nineteenth-century, at a time of growing contrasts that proliferated in 
industrial society, which included sharp divisions between sacred and profane (popular) 
culture, and between the world of work and leisure. But like the work/leisure distinction the 
humorous/serious opposition was highly unstable. As Wickberg points out, the worlds of 
politics, religion, and education have all tried and failed to maintain the humorous/serious 
distinction, for each of these traditionally ‘serious’ spheres are subject to regular incursions 
by humour and laughter (1998).    
 
Billig (2005) goes further and argues that ridicule lies at the ‘heart of social life’ (p.8) and at 
the ‘heart of humour’ (p.196). Parents routinely use derision as a way to educate their 
children, taking great delight in laughing at their faults and follies. It is considered a cost-
effective means of social discipline, and as the child gets older it can become a useful method 
in helping to maintain social order (2005). Education has, historically, been built on a 
language of derision. It remains a salient ingredient within most primary school settings, and 
for centuries has been treated as an important pedagogic device. Ever since Plato (contra 
Socrates) suggested that mocking laughter ought to be encouraged, teachers have been the 
declared object of their pupils’ diminishment. But teachers who are often the butt of unkind 
humour, who are often derided, can also deride. They can deliberately self-disparage, for 
example, make knowingly comical errors in order to reduce the teacher-pupil power 
differential. They habitually laugh at derogatory jokes and remarks made at the expense of 
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head teachers, the school system, pupils, and parents of pupils, while in the relative safety of 
the staffroom (Woods, 1984). The teacher in class who rolls her eyes each time a child 
provides her with an incorrect answer carefully enacts a performance strategy that relies on 
ridicule rather than harsh words or splenetic criticism. There are daily instances in the school 
playground where children – because they happen to be different in some form or aspect – 
may be subjected to the ridicule and scorn of their peers. Children can be praised, lauded, and 
envied as well as reviled and rebuked for their quick wit and insulting asides (Willis, 1976). 
In fact, each Year group will invariably contain at least one class clown who can, with equal 
degree, make a fool out of the teacher and add something of vital importance to the lesson 
(McLaren, 1993). And not forgetting the derisory laughter contained in just about every 
school library that holds copies of popular reading material by authors from Hans Christian 
Anderson to Jacqueline Wilson. Ridicule is a significant element in children’s education, 
being much more common than many people would care to acknowledge.    
 
There is ridicule a-plenty in Ben Fine’s ‘Theories of Social Capital’ (2010). His passionately 
and highly opinionated assessment of social capital leads him to make a forthright rejection 
of the concept as envisioned by Robert Putnam. In what amounts to a detailed compilation of 
social capital’s many and varied limitations, Fine’s work represents a compendium of the first 
10 years’ critique that followed the publication of ‘Bowling Alone’. Having previously 
examined the role of social capital in use by the World Bank (2003), Fine uses his 
background in economics to consider why key systems and features like capitalism are 
routinely ignored, relegated, or glossed over, concluding in his view that among the growing 
social capital literature ‘social capital is more interesting for what it excludes than for what it 
includes’ (2010, p.11). 
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‘It is the degradation of social science’, Fine proclaims (2010, p.2). No-one knows with any 
certainty what it is, he states. Its meaning is amorphous and ambiguous which, he argues, 
results in definitional chaos. Almost any form of social interaction has the capacity to be 
understood as social capital. ‘In short, social capital can be anything you like’ (2010, p.21). It 
is little wonder, he continues, that social capital has been embraced with such enthusiasm by 
governments the world over, hardly believing their luck that insufficient or non-existent 
investment in inner-city neighbourhoods could, for example, be blamed on the local 
population’s lack of community minded-ness. He believes the fascination with social capital 
simply got out of control. Much like laughter and its contagious effect, the social capital 
phenomenon spread like wildfire, infecting many people on an almost epidemic scale. Its 
applications have been ‘astonishingly diverse’ (p.2), its movement across disciplines 
‘extraordinarily impressive’ (p.2). It has been used as an explanatory factor in just about 
everything from domestic pets as a source of community-building networks to its ability to 
prevent deforestation (2010). ‘The point here is not to mock the notions that such subjects of 
study should be taken seriously’, he says (2010, p.23)… but he mocks them anyway. Fine 
notes all of these examples with a growing sense of incredulity, but also with a measure of 
malicious gloating. As with ‘The Cambridge Primary Review’ (2010) Fine makes a direct 
appeal to his readers, but here it is only to ask that his stamina for and commitment to his 
subject be passed on to them ‘through the medium of good humour’ (2010, p.10), as if to 
underline once again how laughter and seriousness can comfortably co-exist, without either 
condition dominating the other.   
 
Robert Putnam emerges as the cardinal target in Fine’s crusade against social capital. 
Following his analysis of American civic virtue in ‘Bowling Alone’ (2000), he is held to 
account for many intellectual and methodological transgressions. He is the party responsible 
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for re-awakening an interest in social capital - according it, Fine argues, an undeserved 
popularity (2010). His contribution in helping to distinguish between social capital’s negative 
face and its more appealing and well-publicised good side is, however, both original and 
significant. He introduced the twin dimensions of ‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’ (inclusive and 
exclusive), but as with social capital itself, claims Fine, it is riddled with ambiguity since 
there are no clear lines as to what precisely constitutes these two opposing forms.  
 
For example, there tends to be some stereotyping that bridging social capital is positive, and 
that bonding social capital is mainly negative. This typecasting is based on the argument that 
the former allows for a more general, broader form of reciprocity and trust development. But 
as Fine makes clear, the complex of tensions and conflicts within society ‘cannot be wished 
away by aggregating social divisions’ such as race, class, gender, and disability into bland 
and universal categories like bridging and bonding (2010, p.29). This is a clumsy, heavy-
handed routine; it would be akin to fitting square pegs into round holes. Putnam’s simplistic 
belief that ‘more bridging and less bonding is a recipe for curing all ills’ (2010, p.123), that 
bridging social capital is conceived as some kind of ‘magic bullet’ and that bonding social 
capital is the wrong kind, simply misses the point. It can be argued that in real terms both 
forms are important. The bridging and bonding distinction does not seem to be a very natural 
dichotomy (Durlauf, 2002). ‘One would expect various forms of social networks to 
simultaneously do both’ (2002, p.261). 
 
Although Putnam is singled out as the man at the wheel of the social capital bandwagon, it is 
those who have enthusiastically jumped on board that earn for themselves a special measure 
of Fine’s odium. Putnam’s contributions notwithstanding, a proportion of the blame for 
allowing social capital to get wildly out of control can be attributed to low-grade scholarship. 
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Fashion-conscious universities have allowed themselves to get caught up in all the hype and 
excitement, be it through a mixture of opportunism or plain gullibility. Either way, a long 
succession of worthless research projects have been bankrolled with generous research grants 
on the back of the social capital hysteria. In a voice reminiscent of Alexander (2010) Fine 
complains that it has led to the impoverishment of intellectual integrity. Accordingly, a 
supplementary concern to the main theme of Fine’s book provides him with an opportunity to 
offer some much needed guidance to future enquirers in the social sciences, so that they can 
avoid the errors that have befallen previous researchers who wittingly or unwittingly got 
drawn into the circus Fine refers to as ‘hack academia’ (2010, p.32). But as if a research topic 
investigating whether pet ownership scores highly on civic engagement scales did not have a 
built-in amusement factor to it already, Fine feels it necessary to remind his readers that 
although it can be hard work, research can be fun (2010). 
 
It could be argued that Putnam’s theory of social capital may have simply been the object of a 
deliberate and dedicated re-branding scheme, designed with the intention of making the idea 
of civic engagement more pressing on and palatable to a newer, wider audience. But Fine 
doesn’t think there was much wrong with social capital’s earliest incarnation. Despite 
misgivings about the concept in general, and the fact that in his view it has contributed to the 
degradation of social theory, the frequently overlooked interpretation of social capital offered 
by Bourdieu (1986), who at least placed an emphasis on its class dimensions and related 
concerns with social hierarchies and power elites, had much to commend it. Offering a 
deeper, narrower understanding of social capital should have ensured that similar variables 
such as race, gender and disability would not have been so easily passed over. This may help 
to explain Fine’s antipathy not only toward Putnam but also to so much spurious, self-
indulgent, hastily-assembled social capital-inspired research (2010). His critique of what he 
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claims are the many unworthy research projects which have proliferated in the wake of social 
capital’s popularity echoes the noises of reproval made by a one-time Secretary of State for 
Education who claimed, in a speech to an ESRC meeting, that the social science community 
was guilty of producing a surplus of irrelevant investigations (Blunkett, 2000). Like David 
Blunkett before him, Fine seems to care very little for the esoteric, naïve, or marginal 
research items conducted perhaps as part of a statutory research training programme, by 
virgin researchers unintentionally ambiguous and hesitant. Even though their work may stand 
little chance of informing social policy, such a derisive view of their efforts may well restrict 
or close down the possibility of surprising, novel and radical critique emerging in the future 
(Ball, 2001). 
 
Laughing with and Laughing at 
Mention of his ‘good humour’ (2010, p.10), which has clearly been self-enhancing, helping 
him through the stresses and strains in completing his critical social capital study, allows Fine 
to cast a nod toward humour’s long-established coping properties. But this humour reference 
itself is not without its problems. It, too, is ambiguous. For instance, does Fine mean ‘good’-
natured humour, that is, just a bit of banter, a substantive part of the give-and-take of 
academic life, which amounts to a form of professional repartee? Or does he mean ‘good’ as 
in good quality humour, a type with popular appeal? Or ‘good’ as in humour that is non-
harmful, non-tendentious, wholesome and clean? Or ‘good’ meaning clever and artful, the 
elitist wit of an intellectual who uses it to attack an opponent without resorting to physical 
violence? Whatever Fine meant by this very loose term does not hide the fact that acts of 
derision summon up behaviours that blur the distinction between adulthood and childhood. 
When, for example, he refers to Putnam as a ‘benchkin’ (2010, p.159), a term of his own 
coinage, it being an unflattering description of ‘an academic who attracts attention in spite of 
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the poverty of analysis and lack of validity’ (2010, p.159), he doesn’t end it there. He quickly 
follows up by caricaturing him as the ‘Ronald McDonald of social theory’ (2010, p.161), as 
though Putnam was a figurehead for the research community’s gluttonous appetite for 
attractively packaged refection that is deeply satisfying but ultimately bad for one’s health. 
Fine claims that this ‘scurrilous mocking is hard to avoid’ (p.159). And in a show of 
grotesque modesty he even takes some comfort from the fact that there are other critics who 
direct even more caustic humour at Putnam than he does (2010). 
 
It is no coincidence that Fine’s conduct here should resemble the kind of activity one would 
normally expect to find on the school playground. Puerile name-calling and other acts of 
derision amount to the most common form of laughter behaviour. They feature among the 
main components of laughter’s superiority theory, which is basically a theory of mockery 
(Billig, 2005), a theory which, for many people, provides the only credible explanation as to 
why we are moved to laughter at all (e.g. Gruner, 2000; Buckley, 2005). This classic laughing 
at attitude is not only an innate, spontaneous response to some humorous stimulus. Although 
it still comes suddenly, this laughter is deliberate (Wickberg, 1998). On the printed page it 
seems even more calculated and contrived, as if watching some risible interaction in slow 
motion. In fact, this slowing down analogy is particularly helpful for it can improve our 
understanding of these laughter interactions. Under closer analysis it becomes clearer to see 
that the concept of derision does as much to define laughter in terms of the person instigating 
the derisive act as it does in terms of the object being derided (Wickberg, 1998). Ridicule 
can, with equal force, be person-centred just as it can be object-centred. This laughter which 
can fire backwards, as it were, has been identified in a recent study where evidence indicated 
that some school children were ridiculing themselves for purposes of affiliation, to make 
others (school bullies) like them or to prevent them from being oppressed. In short, they were 
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using adaptive, tactical forms of humour for self-protection (Jones et al, 2012). Thus, when 
parents begin laughing at their children’s mishaps, foibles, and general naïveté, we may be 
witnessing the beginning of a circular laughter process that commences with children picking 
up laughter cues from adults, and then continues with adults reverting to laughter behaviour 
usually associated with their children.  
 
Signs of circularity, of repetition, were not apparent in the preceding review of literature. 
There was synthesis but no evidence of cycles. While the sweep and curve of the inclusive-
exclusive profile was followed and charted in the hope of finding ‘grey areas’ at the interface 
of these two extremities - areas where laughter can be perceived as one and the other - the 
conception and emphasis has been essentially ordered and sequential. Perhaps it is too soon 
to begin looking for repeatable trends and tendencies. The relatively short time perspective 
failed to notice any resurgence in special education’s psychological model, for example, or a 
re-emerging interest in the methods of logical positivism. For the time being at least, the 
distinguishing feature of the phenomena analysed has been their relentlessly progressive 
unfolding. Implementing a chronological review of the literature has helped to appreciate the 
evolutionary development of the inclusive-exclusive configuration. It showed how, in sixty 
years, its methodological treatment has been affected by the change in cultural patterns, in 
social policies, and innovations in scholarship. To that end, the rise and the demise of various 
intellectual traditions, of disciplinary models has, with each undulation, helped to re-arrange 
and bring improvements in our thinking and our practical habits about laughter, about 
inclusion and exclusion, and about teaching and learning. 
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METHODOLOGY 
The main difficulty faced by laughter investigators is knowing how, where, and when to 
locate data commonly regarded as ubiquitous. Try to grasp it, we are told, and it will 
disappear (Berger, 1997). It is, with equal effect, ordinary and conventional, mysterious and 
elusive. But in order to unravel its mystery an ethnographic approach has much going for it. 
Observations and interviews are very useful research tools from/upon which valid inferences 
can be made. On the face of it, however, these particular methods seem entirely unsuited 
since laughter is such a slippery phenomenon to scrutinise. It is not easy, for example, to 
distinguish laughter from crying, or to differentiate exclusive from inclusive laughter. A 
quantitative-based design may have helped here, and clearly has its attractions, but before one 
can begin to count or measure instances of laughter one must be able to discern those 
sometimes subtle differences in laughter behaviour. In fact our first perceptual instinct is to 
hear laughter, not to see it. Moreover, people generally find it a difficult topic to discuss since 
many are unable to remember why it was they laughed in the first place (Berger, 1997). 
Nonetheless, there is something about the ethnographic method that makes it a good fit with 
laughter. Re-tracing some of ethnography’s anthropological roots will help render this 
conjunction much clearer. 
  
Applying a research focus on two primary schools owes much to the widely held view that 
laughter is a key constituent of childhood. In the popular imagination, at least, they collect 
strong associations and together have a long history. When children attempt to build up their 
stocks of social capital in order to make those vital family, neighbourhood, and community 
connections, laughter will invariably help facilitate that process. Its value as a social lubricant 
cannot be underestimated. But because of laughter’s fugitive and fragile nature approaches to 
it must be cautious (Berger, 1997). All endeavours must be the product of careful planning. 
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Designs and strategies must therefore incorporate searches among school settings that will 
not only highlight the places where laughter’s presence is most frequent, but also when its 
manifestations are most likely to occur.  
 
Ethnography and Anthropology 
Of all the available research methodologies to choose from, ethnography is the one that 
seems to have an unexpected fit with subjects focused on humour and laughter. On the face 
of it, there is nothing particularly distinctive about the ethnographic outlook or its structure 
that should so obviously commend itself as an approach whose credentials have any 
sympathy with mirth or amusement. But, here and there and from time to time, there emerge 
instances of note that suggest ethnography and anthropology have made strenuous efforts to 
cement an association of sorts. These instances may be rather deep and profound, or 
somewhat speculative, fanciful or fleeting. Malinowski, for example, had hoped, facetiously 
perhaps, that anthropology would be able to not only inform us on tribal rites and customs, 
but ‘supply us with a finer sense of humour’ (1992, p.145). Some academics have gone out 
on a limb and dared to compare the world of comedy to the development of modern 
ethnography (e.g. Chambers, 1989). Others seem content to avail themselves of the 
ethnographic method in order to, in the aid of rhetoric, turn their field-notes into witty, 
sarcastic documents, distinguished by their use of parody (e.g. Goffman). And there are even 
those who profess to have an expertise in both anthropology and laughter (Piddington, 1933; 
1950). Each example and instance has proved to be an influence, to some degree. Moreover, 
there is something reassuring that in this particular branch of interpretive inquiry there is a 
methodology that not only can provide a solid foundation to the research enterprise, it also 
has some natural sympathies with its subject matter.  
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Anthropology’s first contact with laughter and humour is likely to have occurred with the 
exploration of ‘primitive’ joking rituals. Investigations pertaining to ritualistic behaviour 
affecting codes of honour and social status in non-Western cultures proved popular in the 
middle years of the last century, and featured prominently in the work of British 
functionalists like Radcliffe-Brown and Mary Douglas. In order to try and understand the 
different systems of family life and kinship and their effect on the social structure, Radcliffe-
Brown gave serious thought to the issue of ‘function’, how the various interlinking parts 
within the system operated, developed together, and helped maintain society’s healthy 
condition (1952). For instance, anthropologists have seen in joking relationships distinct 
modes of behaviour that perform the vital function of easing the strains of problematic 
relations, of releasing tension (Apte in Billig, 2005). But humour and laughter have many 
different functions in this respect, although promoting group cohesion, creating inter-group 
conflict, and providing social control through the mere threat of ridicule and disparagement, 
seem to be among its most common applications (Billig, 2005).  
 
Of interest to Radcliffe-Brown was the relational networks prevalent in ‘native’ cultures, and 
in particular relationships ‘involving both attachment and separation’ (1952, p.91). He noted, 
for example, that certain marriage customs in tribal societies can provoke tension for the 
bride and groom insofar as their new in-laws are concerned. Although they are clearly taken 
into the family, and enjoy a special relationship with that family, the bride/groom remain to a 
large degree as outsiders. This inclusive-exclusive relation is described as involving ‘both 
social conjunction and social disjunction’ (1952, p.91). The question Radcliffe-Brown 
attempted to answer was how can a relation which combines two potentially antagonistic 
positions be given a stable, ordered form? One way, he noted, was through the deployment of 
the ‘joking relationship’ (p.90) – the joke which is set aside for specific ritual occasions. He 
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observed that hostility can be circumvented by playful disparagement and teasing, and this in 
its regular repetition is a constant expression or reminder of that social disjunction. Radcliffe-
Brown understood this as being one of the permitted, essential, components of the 
relationship. Concomitantly, the social conjunction - the inclusive condition - is maintained 
by the expected friendliness of the disparaged person, the butt, who is required to take no 
offence at the pretended tease or insult. More generally, the joking relationship is part of 
customary banter that extends in varying degrees across a range of different cultures. In many 
circumstances it is considered to be a social balm that is deliberately applied at times of 
tension for the purposes of appeasement and putting people at their ease.  
 
Mary Douglas chose to examine the part joking plays in West African kinship traditions. Like 
Radcliffe-Brown before her she believed that ritualised joking ‘connects and disorganises’ 
(1999, p.156), a routine assumption to make given humour and laughter’s propensity to 
include and exclude. But she was critical of some of her colleagues and predecessors who felt 
that joking-based fieldwork was just a question of classifying joking rituals (1999). Failure to 
consider the jokes themselves, the significance of the witty repost or scatological laughter, 
without making any attempt to determine a joke’s origin (on the understanding that all jokes 
have a social reference), does not make, she argued, for comprehensive analysis (1999). 
Much of anthropology’s interest in classification schemes can be attributed to Durkheim and 
Mauss’s ‘Primitive Classification’, published in 1903 (Ellen, 2006). Since then, interest in the 
organisation of human experiences and perceptions, and the related processes of 
differentiation and distinctions, groupings and social hierarchies in advanced and rudimentary 
cultures, has become obsessive. Douglas is drawn in particular toward anomalies, examples 
of objects and concepts that defy easy classification, and where strict taxonomies have been 
flouted. Some items will invariably be adjudged difficult to label. It is Douglas’s belief that 
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the way a society manages its aberrant and ambiguous forms will parallel its relationship with 
outsiders (1999). Furthermore, she notes the flexible ways in which some categories are 
arranged, a flexibility borne out of the fact that most rudimentary cultures of interest to early 
anthropologists were not able to rely on systemised storage and arranging techniques due, 
essentially, to the absence of written records.  
 
Douglas notes, too, the subversive potential in all joking relationships. Laughter and jokes 
‘attack classification and hierarchy’, she says (1999, p.156). Ritual joking provides a relief 
from social classifications, suspending the codes, observances, and stipulations that operate 
within the structural system. Although jokes can do this, their effects, however, are only 
short-term. They have no intention of actually overthrowing the controlling social system 
(Berger, 1997). A joke can cause but a temporary suspension of it, creating only a minor 
disturbance (Douglas, 1999). It could, on the other hand, do more damage, be more 
destabilising, if there was greater consensus on a joke’s recognition. But the thorny question 
remains: how does anyone know when a joke has actually occurred? What is the difference, 
she asks, between an insult and a joke (1999)?  
 
Douglas may be alluding to those nuanced joke-forms like sarcasm and irony, tropes which 
often confuse readers or recipients, who may, for whatever reason, be unable to appreciate 
their essential double meaning. An ironic tone, in particular, one that says the opposite of 
what one means, has a strong association with humour (Partington, 2006), and is an approach 
popular among those ethnographers who seek to challenge received wisdom and contradict 
officialdom (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). Used deliberately by a writer it can become a 
‘device for excluding as well as including’ (Booth, 1961, p.304). Stylistically, irony has been 
branded elitist (Bakhtin, 1984), bringing a new meaning to laughter’s superiority model, one 
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that does not simply equate it with eminent triumphalism. Bakhtin’s formula suggests that 
this laughing habit bonds an author to certain readers in a very partial and privileged way. 
These high-brow forms of humour only appeal to a select audience, he argues, a community 
of insiders who collusively share the same values and the same knowledge. Although a type 
of kinship is created it is of a type which means that, almost inevitably, some people will fall 
outside of its rarefied circle. Since they depend on the reader or listener having the ability to 
unravel their two-fold structure, sarcasm and irony can effectively marginalise the 
uninitiated. Non-native speakers and people with communication difficulties, for example, 
are among those at most risk of failing to distinguish joking material from what may seem 
like a much harsher, more deleterious use of language and literature.    
 
The problem for ‘primitive’ participants as much for their modern counterparts or for 
individual fieldworkers lies in the interpretation of human actions. But, following fellow 
anthropologist Victor Turner, Douglas calculates that while the concept of ‘structure’ is 
firmly associated with authority, laughter and joking are potent and appropriate symbols of 
‘community’ (1999, p.156). ‘Structure’ connotes the mundane apparatus of orderly ranks and 
positions arranged in an essentially hierarchical and non-egalitarian formation. ‘Community’ 
is the counter principle, ready to momentarily overturn the structure’s rigidly defined world. 
Contrary to Bakhtin’s (1984) thesis, ritual joking and laughter creates generally positive 
values which cohere around a form of anti-structure. Based on the sharing of common 
experiences, good natured relations and interactions, the concept of ‘community’, as distinct 
from ‘structure’, provides a better, richer means of interpreting ritualistic patterns of 
behaviour (Douglas, 1999, p.157).  
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Of frequent relevance to anthropological studies on humour and laughter is the presence of 
some contradiction or incongruity built into the structure of a local society. According to 
Douglas, this is where jokes originate; they are born into a system with all of the necessary 
joking material, as it were, pre-installed (1999). Her formula for identifying jokes rests 
largely on the belief that a joke will only stand a chance of being amusing if it expresses the 
social situation in which it occurs (1999). ‘Joking takes place because the organised patterns 
of social life themselves involve disturbances, oppositions, and incongruities’ (Mulkay, 1988, 
p.153). Jokes can challenge and disrupt that structure, that system of neat categories, those 
carefully designed sets of standardised and institutionalised acts that prescribe people to 
behave in predictable ways, by giving voice to its inherent inconsistencies and irrationalities 
(Douglas, 1999). Herein, ethnography can provide a unique and disquieting view of this 
precise system’s underlying fragility.  
 
Focus should be placed on situations, circumstances, and settings where humorous-provoking 
discrepancies and incongruities are likely to occur. Some are most likely in systems where 
behaviour is habitually guided by strong normative conditions. As humour and laughter 
involves the temporary infraction of both formal and informal norms, they successfully draw 
attention to them. By attending to these infractions, we can discover not only the norms 
themselves, but how such codes, rules, and prohibitions thrive or decay depending on the 
extent to which they are embedded within the social, cultural, or institutional infrastructure. 
Children’s humour and laughter may be singularly important in this respect. Apte has 
suggested that the prevalence and range of humour among children indicates and reflects a 
society’s or culture’s attitude toward humour (1985). ‘That adults encourage children to 
participate in humour and to appreciate it suggests a society’s positive attitude toward it. On 
the other hand, the relative paucity of children’s humour reflects a society’s negative attitudes 
106 
 
toward it’ (1985, pp.83-4). Studying children’s humour and laughter in a school setting, for 
example, may help in discerning institutional norms and values by highlighting those 
practices and processes that either encourage or inhibit pupils’ freedom of expression.    
 
When ethnography began to flourish as a discipline in its own right, among its most edifying 
and practical ideas was that data should be obtained directly from a community or culture in 
situ, away from artificial or experimental settings. As Bergson said, ‘to understand laughter, 
we must put it back into its natural environment, which is society, and above all must we 
determine the utility of its function, which is a social one’ (1911/2005, p.4). Some of the very 
best fieldwork that has examined laughter in school-based cultures, either placing it as its 
primary focus (e.g. Woods, 1984) or as a topic in passing (e.g. Willis, 1976), have relied on 
ethnographic observations and interviews. Shining examples like these stand out chiefly 
because of the humorous content, the risible comments made by the research participants, 
comments faithfully reported by the researchers concerned in the culture being investigated. 
In many texts, recorded speech can appear as a refreshing interlude that punctuates often 
tedious stretches of narrative or dense theoretical explanations. It brings the reader not only 
some light relief but much closer to the events and to the action described, humanising the 
participants involved, bringing them to life, ensuring they don’t ‘exist only as the muted 
objects of the ethnographer’s scrutiny’ (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p.203).  
 
The inclusion of humour in ethnographic writing is not without its problems, however. As 
Apte indicates, humour may well prove to be a rhetorical device of some importance (1985), 
yet some readers may see its inclusion as evidence of researcher-participant over-familiarity. 
Such an accusation has been levelled at Paul Willis (1976). His school study was memorable 
not least because of the amount of time he spent with one of two pupil-groups under his 
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examination, a group who expressed an unusual devotion to humour and laughter. It 
encouraged not only a strong bond between the group members but, it might be argued, 
between them and Willis, too, to the point where his data may have been compromised as a 
consequence. Willis’s proximity to laughter, his transcription of it, his asking questions about 
it, his seeking explanations for it, may have been enough for some people (e.g. Hammersley 
& Atkinson, 2007) to have misinterpreted this level of familiarity, the amount and detail of 
textual analysis, and effectively assumed that it was evidence of the kind of damaging 
affiliation that can reduce the safe ethical distance expected between researcher and 
researched.     
 
‘One predominant characteristic of ethnography…is its serious and sedate mien’ (Fine &  
Martin, 1990, p.89). It might be argued that one of the reasons for the continuance of this 
description is that when researchers step outside the sphere of serious discourse they leave 
themselves open to critical scrutiny for their imagined lack of respect and unprofessional 
attitude. There is a general belief that the world of humour is ‘where the strictures of the 
serious no longer obtain’ (Wickberg, 1998, p.170), as if there was no equilibrium between 
these two opposing modes. Although writing and researching about laughter has grown in 
popularity over the years, ethnographers are disinclined to incorporate humorous techniques 
into their work either as a significant or as a supplementary textual feature. One searches in 
vain through the pages of scholarly journals for any evidence of wit (Buckley, 2005). One of 
the difficulties faced by researchers is that humour draws a crowd, and very likely draws a 
critical crowd, eager it seems to treat with hostility any deviation from sober academic 
conventions and standards. Humour, therefore, demands great skill in its handling since it 
seems to invite so much extra attention. And yet the prevalence of ethnography’s serious side 
is surprising given claims of its association with literary comedy (Chambers, 1989). It is 
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suggested that they share a range of structural similarities. Unlikely as it sounds, they 
regularly use specific literary modes of ‘exaggeration…and reversal’ (1989, p.589), not to 
mention the ‘literariness’, the expressive power, of much ethnographic presentation (1989). 
Some of the parallels, however, are even more tenuous. Much is made, for example, of the 
growing awareness among writers of comedy in the 18c that ‘satire derived less from their 
imaginations than from careful observations of human behaviour’ (1989, p.591). 
 
Erving Goffman is looked upon as one of the few social scientists to take the serious and 
sedate ethnographic approach and successfully shake it into a state of mild effervescence. 
Introducing highly diverse sources and an array of humorous elements into his work did not 
limit the number of admirers who marvelled at this centrally important theorist’s creative 
genius. And yet, despite the plaudits, he remains a figure who stands accused of taking an all 
too casual methodological approach to his investigations. The strongest objections allege that 
his data-gathering was unreliable (Fine & Martin, 1990). Being the recipient of such reproach 
recalls the responses made to Paul Willis’s most famous work (1976). One is inclined to 
wonder, therefore, whether humour and laughter will always provoke this level of criticism, 
and that either phenomenon will perhaps long be regarded as a disruptive and damaging 
influence on the integrity of the social sciences, forever viewed as a sign of either flippancy 
or over-affinity. 
 
But one of the reasons for Goffman’s popularity as a writer, why he is read with so much 
pleasure, can be attributed to his witty tone of voice, his dry humour which manages to be 
both entertaining and informative. This also extends to his deliberate violation of rules 
governing the use of language, his habit of what some describe as ‘atom cracking’ (Burke, 
1984, p.308). This term refers to the practice of introducing a word that by custom belongs to 
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a specific category, but is wrenched free from its taxonomic straitjacket and applied liberally 
into unexpected textual settings. This dramatic use of vocabulary is routinely employed by 
children who, in the process of language acquisition, much like Goffman, appear to have 
great fun exploring and manipulating its morphological and semantic structure, bending it out 
of shape, in what amounts to a form of linguistic play (Apte, 1985).  
 
Anthropology and ethnography’s strong association with laughter and humour is all the more 
remarkable because their principle methods of enquiry – observations and interviews – are 
not particularly suited to the task of gathering laughter data. Naturalistic studies have been hit 
particularly hard by the recent ethical restrictions on recording equipment, once a mainstay of   
school-based fieldwork. Apart from that, laughter is a form of expression that is, first and 
foremost, detectable chiefly by the ear. To rely on visual perception alone or on the 
interpretation of purely facial cues, for example, is likely to lead to confusion. Equally, 
asking people questions about their laughter behaviour is unlikely to yield much important 
information. Berger (1997) offers a cautious note to those about to conduct research on 
laughter: ‘one must be very, very careful, or the thing [laughter] will break before our very 
eyes’ (p.xv). His advice is not to approach it directly, but to go around it with calculated 
circumspection (1997). ‘The experience of the comic is fragile and fugitive’, he warns (p.xv). 
It may be difficult for a person to recall - let alone rationalise - why something was able to 
provoke in them a humorous response (1997). Despite these doubts and caveats, ethnography 
comprises many of the credentials necessary to lead an investigation with a focus on school 
children’s laughter. Its historical concern with behavioural patterns and issues of 
communication in small-scale societies make it, in many ways, the ideal approach to be used 
in micro-cultures such as a school or a school classroom.  
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In any mainstream classroom laughter plays a dual role. It functions as an affiliative, 
cooperative force and as a divisive, anti-social one, simultaneously supporting and 
undermining a school’s inclusive ethos. Given its duplicitous nature it would appear to 
present primary school education with something of a dilemma. Should laughter be managed 
so that only its positive ‘inclusive’ side prevails? Or might its negative ‘exclusive’ side be 
positively valued on the understanding that, counter-intuitively, exclusive laughter may be an 
important constituent of inclusive schooling? Perhaps its negative ‘exclusive’ side should 
simply be tolerated on the understanding that it is an imperishable polar opposite. It is all-too 
convenient to judge between the dimensions of inclusive-exclusive as one might be tempted 
to distinguish, for example, between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ laughter or ‘genuine’ and ‘contrived’ 
laughter. But these boundaries are not always easy to define. Each dimension, in fact, can be 
mutually influential.  
 
Arguably the most widespread explanation of why we laugh, the anti-inclusive superiority 
theory, is said to account for all genuine, spontaneous laughter (Buckley, 2005). Furthermore, 
even where it can be argued that laughter may be characterised by disparagement, 
discrimination and malice, ‘this does not negate its status as a creative act’ (Conroy, 2004, 
p.91). Such thoughts have provided some educators and educational commentators (e.g. 
Willis, 1976; Keltner et al, 2001) with cause to re-assess commonsense understandings that 
set about constructing notions of exclusivity, and in particular those that almost unthinkingly 
identify ‘exclusive’ with ‘negative’. Inclusive and exclusive are distinct entities. However, it 
may be helpful in this context to think of their relationship functioning like patterns of 
breathing. Inhaling and exhaling, for example, are quite different respiratory actions, but both 
are vital for the well-being of the human body.  
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In many ways, laughter’s double-life reflects the many binary themes that feature in this 
particular investigation. The decision, for example, to use the theoretical framework of 
Robert Putnam’s paired bridging and bonding forms of social capital can be justified on two 
counts. Education’s relationship with social capital is long and distinguished. The term’s 
emergence at the beginning of the last century has been attributed to a former teacher 
(Putnam, 2000). Education has also been at the heart of some influential idea-systems and 
conceptual analyses. Monographs by Bourdieu (1986) and Coleman (1988) have paved the 
way for contemporary researchers to examine educational achievement, attainment, and 
development from a range of different perspectives, including key social themes such as 
family and class structure. In addition, the inherent strengths and indeed the principal 
weaknesses of the concepts of bridging (inclusive) and bonding (exclusive) will best explain 
the conjugated nature of the inclusive-exclusive school environment. For example, a taken-
for-granted view maintains that bonding forms of social capital are bad, for they can lead to 
closed, homogeneous communities, whereas bridging types are considered to be good since 
they are more outward-looking. On that basis, not unreasonably, Putnam enthuses about the 
importance of creating more bridging social capital so that we can ‘connect with people 
unlike ourselves’ (2000, p.411).  
 
And yet Putnam concedes that it is not always easy to distinguish between these two 
particular forms (2000). Under many circumstances both bridging and bonding social capital 
can have positive social effects (2000). The problem, as Fine (2010) indicates, is that 
bridging and bonding tend to cut across variables such as class, gender, race, disability, etc, 
and, as a result, ‘overlook the fact that one person’s bond is another person’s bridge’ (p.29). 
Only by understanding the contexts within which social capital is generated and applied can it 
become possible to differentiate between each type. Moreover, one can have bonding social 
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capital without bridging - but not vice versa (Schuller, 2007). The exclusive bonding form is 
therefore hugely important and, arguably, the most powerful – if not exactly the most socially 
desirable – of the two types. ‘A social unit with no bonding social capital is hard to imagine’, 
Schuller explains (2007, p.15), indicating that in certain contexts exclusivity is the more 
natural orientation. It therefore becomes possible to sense in the opposing tensions present in 
bonding and bridging social capital echoes of contradictory themes common to studies in 
laughter. The task, then, is to examine if they have any affinity with inclusive-exclusive 
issues in education, and to assess whether the former continues to merit its preferred status, 
and if the latter is still deserving of its largely unfavourable reputation.  
 
Quality not Quantity 
Choosing the most appropriate methods to capture and analyse school-based laughter will 
usually mean deliberating on the ‘best fit’ between research questions and research 
paradigms. But it has also become necessary to take into consideration the type of ‘fit’ 
involved, e.g. the type deemed to be the most useful, the type likely to provide the most 
impact, that makes the biggest contribution to the community, and is the most attractive to 
parties of potential interest and influence. A single-minded qualitative researcher concerned 
about the condition of their  research because it lacks, for example, a quantitative component, 
and is therefore considered to be lacking in validity (Gorard, 2001), may find the pressure to 
quantify – be it warranted or not – difficult to resist. Quantification could make any amount 
of meaningful contributions to a study hoping to gain insights into the social exchanges that 
shape attitudes, dispositions and meanings among the population of a primary school. 
Counting and measuring laughter has a long and significant history in the behavioural 
sciences. But the pressure to find at least a complimentary role for some quantitative methods 
derives less from methodological expediency than from political and economic expectation. 
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Many politicians and research funders who share a dislike for non-replicable, interpretive 
studies do so on the understanding that they are too parochial to be of any general benefit 
(Gorard, 2001) 
  
The decision therefore not to include any quantitative methods in the chosen design frame is 
based on a point of principle rather than on any lack of confidence in using numbers (Gorard, 
2001). An exclusively qualitative approach can be justified on the grounds there is simply too 
much quantitative authority in the current educational system, a system already clogged and 
encumbered with numbers, tables and targets. Attempts to account for this abundance follow 
a circular logic, in that ‘[n]umber drives the economy and children’s education is driven by 
number because their education serves the economy’ (Conroy, 2004, p.6). But an educational 
setting seems singularly unsuited to increased degrees of quantification, given its history of 
reducing complex educational practices to simple, supposedly objective measures, and its 
habit of creating statistical profiles based on league tables, SAT scores and Ofsted ratings.  
 
In matters of social research, too, the researched community have often been treated by 
quantifiers as though they were nothing more than enumerable units (Oakley, 1999). 
Nonetheless, numerical indices can bring a sense of order to what Stephen Ball describes as 
the chaotic organisation of school life (1998). Evidently they retain a measure of influence 
among some parents of pupils, seemingly impressed by their presentment of certainty and 
rectitude. However, it is not so much that figures can or cannot always be trusted. The point 
at issue is that the most important figures in the school equation (pupils and their teachers) 
can easily get overlooked amid the welter of performativity-related arithmetic. Ironically, it is 
those innocent sounding ‘everyday numbers’ (Gorard, 2006) that are routinely employed to 
evaluate schools, its teachers, and their pupils, putting them under an extra burden of 
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scrutiny, and measuring them against exclusively quantitative benchmarks. Johnson (2005) 
pointedly contests this kind of behaviour, arguing that school performance measures are 
incompatible with quantitative standards. Her alternative, highly original, thesis favours the 
use of laughter as the sole reference point for school performativity.    
 
But Johnson’s proposal, worthy in so many respects, suffers from the same weakness in 
construction commonly found whenever  inclusive-exclusive criteria are based solely on 
better or worse, good or bad, binary values. It has been said that whatever people wish to 
purge, relegate, isolate, marginalise or ignore is invariably concentrated deeply within the 
very condition they choose to retain, favour, or prioritise (Castoriadis, 1997; Kristeva, 1991). 
Johnson’s otherwise commendable recipe for a qualitative laughter–based rating system 
actually contains most of the quantitative ingredients she is so keen to replace. Introducing 
numeric categories and publishable league tables to sit alongside SAT scores, for example, 
seems to defeat the whole purpose of her exercise. That said, however, to design a qualitative 
performance indicator without recourse to some quantativity would prove to be a difficult - if 
not impossible - enterprise. To illustrate the degree of difficulty involved it has been noted 
that even purely qualitative-minded researchers are unable to resist employing quasi-
quantitative terms like ‘many’, ‘frequently’, and ‘some’ (Bryman, 1988, p.127). Fastidious 
though this type of argument might be, it nonetheless illustrates the challenges to be faced 
when attempting to eradicate conditions many would argue to be ineradicable. If this is 
indeed the case, and that the poles at either end of a continuum are much closer than 
previously imagined, could the current state of the quantitative-qualitative orientation be 
applied to bridging-bonding and, by extension, inclusive-exclusive? By pursuing the putative 
distinction between them is it possible we might find more equivalences than differences?  
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Today, the integration of quantitative and qualitative perspectives enjoys widespread support 
among the academic community and within scholarly literature. The big metaphysical issues 
thought to be behind much of the acrimony between the two traditions have either been 
conveniently side-stepped or temporarily deferred. The early claim that research craft and 
practice should take precedence over the application of philosophical ideas (Bryman, 1988) 
has now assumed much greater authority, although down-grading the influence of the 
metaphysical is still viewed with alarm in some quarters (e.g. Peim, 2009). But even in the 
wake of this embracement of the ‘Third Way’, the metaphysical underpinnings of social 
research have not been entirely abandoned. With little fuss or fanfare the movers for 
‘methodological inclusivity’ have been quietly but conscientiously going about their 
business. Despite the name, it does not appear to be a full-blown methodological system as 
such. Research handbooks seldom mention it. Researchers rarely make exclusive use of it. It 
may, in fact, be understood more as an inner (personal) self-guidance system, functioning 
according to largely extemporised standards and operating principles. All the same, some 
broad-based ideals are frequently championed. Among them include a dedication to ensuring 
that a diversity of methods should have greater representation in social research. Also, in an 
effort to make the research experience more democratic, all participants - particularly 
children - should be made to feel like valued partners and not just passive subjects. But what 
raises it above the level of similar-minded systems is that it links to a single facet of social 
reality. According to Davison and Martinsons, to be methodologically inclusive is equivalent 
to being socially inclusive; it amounts to a complete identity of opinion (2011). Bearing such 
an outlook suggests that inclusivity is operational whether one is actively engaged in research 
endeavours or not.  Inculcating such an attitude may be a way of transcending the overtly 
selfish ‘means-to-an-end’ view of social research held by some aspiring members of the 
research community. Its neat one-piece formula resembles a type of prescription that gives 
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shape to current and future practices that are assembled throughout everyday life. Its essence 
is overtly cosmopolitan and caring. It seems to be more than just having that largely passive, 
almost hackneyed ‘view of social reality’. Instead, it is about being actively motivated so that 
one can achieve a suitable position to effect some real change to that reality, should it be 
required.  
 
An Inclusive-Exclusive Methodology 
And yet, if it was ever necessary - or even possible - to measure the inclusiveness of an 
inclusive methodology, its estimates are liable to fall far short of many people’s expectations. 
In terms of the values and principles that inclusively-minded researchers profess to uphold, a 
commitment to collaborative processes and practices are among the most well-known. But 
despite reconfiguring the power difference, could there be any reason to believe that a 
methodology described as ‘inclusive’ has, in fact, rather more in common with its polar 
opposite? Its elusive - not to say exclusive - character may call into question its dedication to 
egalitarianism. Inclusive research, it is argued, seems only capable of focusing on single 
issues, its adherents not seeming to care or understand, for example, that educational 
concerns relating to ethnicity and learning disability do in fact evolve from similar 
discriminatory social factors (Allan, 2010). There is deep frustration felt by junior researchers 
not knowing where, when and how an inclusive methodology can be applied, i.e. whether it is 
actually intended to be used as a supplement to conventional methodologies or as an 
alternative. Fundamentally, there is a suspicion that while an inclusive methodology should 
indeed be a positive way forward in democratising the research process and delivering 
significant outcomes, its principle achievement is in raising a flag to its own good intentions.   
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Of perhaps greater interest is the claim that research with an inclusive bias has, unwittingly, 
contributed to a rise in exclusive practices and procedures (Allan, 2010). This indicates that at 
least for some researchers their understanding of the term ‘inclusive’ remains incomplete or 
confused. To some extent this is understandable, for even among experienced professionals 
and practitioners the specialised discourse surrounding the concept remains highly contested. 
‘Labelling’, for example, a term with critical significance in mainstream education, can either 
be deemed inclusive or exclusive, depending on whether the practice is viewed from a 
‘rights-based’ or a ‘needs-based’ perspective (Ravet, 2011, p.670). But one of the hallmarks 
of inclusive research remains its near obsession with process. A fundamental objection to 
inclusive methodologies is that their desire to meaningfully include those traditionally 
marginalised from the research experience threatens to engulf the very real need to produce 
findings and outcomes which can ultimately guide policy (Walmsley, 2004). As a human 
disposition, self-consciousness generally denotes a sign of uncertainty; people require 
assurances from others, in the form of positive feedback, about the kind of impressions they 
are making (Buss, 1980). Something similar may be said to occur with those who use 
inclusive methodologies, that is, in the way they appear to divide their focus explicitly 
between concerns for the welfare of research subjects and the maintenance of their self-
regarding image, over-mindful perhaps of the undoubted goodness of their own actions.   
 
But this need to focus both ways demonstrates that social research (and ethnographic research 
in particular) is, like laughter, two-faced. Modern-day ethnographers are advised to be 
simultaneous insiders/outsiders (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007), a description which recalls 
Powdermaker’s (1966) Janus-like stranger/friend combination. As for the postmodern 
position, ethnography is envisioned as a study of the self/other, the researcher and the 
researched (Vidich & Lyman, 2003). These apparently countervailing orientations feed into 
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the notion that, like the binary nature of other paired distinctions (bonding-bridging, 
qualitative-quantitative, exclusive-inclusive), though they may be a useful way of classifying 
and understanding human interactions, there is a risk they may lead to static either/or 
positioning. Perhaps the manner in which social capital’s bridging-bonding relationship is 
considered should be the way to begin thinking about other binaries, i.e. that they are, in 
effect, ‘two qualities in the same network’ (Portes in Patulny & Svendsen, 2007, p.36). This 
idea corresponds to some early-modern thoughts on laughter. Its inclusive-exclusive 
alignment is not always in contention. It can be a perfectly complimentary relationship, their 
arrangement resembling two atoms (Dupréel, 1928), their assured mutuality obviating the 
need for artificial efforts to synthesise or to reconcile them dialectically. Although ‘exclusive’ 
is often positioned as antithetical to ‘inclusive’, arguably its most persuasive explanation lies 
in Dupréel’s molecular metaphor, as one half of a whole. As he first explained, not only are 
laughter’s two forms interconnected, they can be inclusive and exclusive at the same time 
(1928).  
 
Failing to appreciate that exclusivity has a significant value, and that the inclusive-exclusive 
pairing is best considered on a relational level that stresses their interdependence, was the 
principal inspiration behind this present study and gave shape and structure to its subsequent 
design. After conducting a small piece of laughter-based research in a primary school in 
2008, a copy of the finished dissertation was presented to the school’s head teacher. Upon 
reading it she promptly returned it, her indignation so profound it rendered her temporarily 
speechless. It was left to the deputy head, speaking on her behalf, to explain that among the 
document’s findings evidence of exclusive practices flourishing within the school should not 
have been judged so harshly and did not in fact compromise the school’s proud claim to be 
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‘fully inclusive’. I was then politely advised that for the purposes of any future research I 
should try and access an institution elsewhere. 
 
When participants in ethnographic inquiries are moved to challenge research findings and 
dare to ‘talk back’ (Brettell, 1993, p.20), ethnographers can often react assertively, 
emphasising the rightness of their interpretations and the wrongness of the participant’s 
responses. Denied an opportunity to speak directly to the headteacher meant that I was not in 
a position to defend my fieldwork. The alternative course was to try and make some 
reflective sense of how I had found myself traduced and excluded after collecting, analysing 
and presenting data as objectively and conscientiously as I could. For some time afterwards 
the head’s high dudgeon was a reminder of the dimension of damage caused to an otherwise 
cordial relationship; the threat posed by this break in relations to a burgeoning and mutually 
valuable school-university partnership was more worrying still. At all events, I considered the 
headteacher’s response to be an overreaction, and that her evaluation of my research 
performance, perceived as some kind of betrayal, to be in very poor judgement. It was only 
much later that I began to have second thoughts. Gradually, I came to the conclusion that her 
grounds for grievance may in fact have been entirely justified. It has been said that 
researchers who have gone in search of the inclusive school have often came away 
disappointed, finding little evidence of inclusivity (Allan, 2010). This is because exclusive 
pupil behaviour and/or exclusive pedagogy might not actually militate against inclusive 
schooling, but be necessary components of it. It is entirely possible that inclusive and 
exclusive elements do occur simultaneously (Allan, 2010), and that their presence is not 
necessarily evidence of any contention.   
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Ethnography and Race 
Of the many different traditions that count collectively as qualitative research, ethnography 
remains one of the most inspiring and popular, despite it also being among the most 
contentious and excluding (Vidich & Lyman, 2003). Its long established partnership with 
anthropology has earned for it an unwelcome reputation. Perhaps this has been more 
deserving in former times when it was put into service by colonial governments the world 
over to carefully document the social systems in their overseas possessions. Many of these 
‘studies’ were conducted by bureaucrats and administrators investigating indigenous 
populations and their customs ‘in order to provide the dominant white minority with 
information prejudicial to native interests’ (Turner in Asad, 1973, p.15). But, despite having 
divested itself of virtually all of its colonies, Britain is still coming to terms with the various 
aspects of its imperial past. Today, those who migrate from the old dominions in the East to 
the so-called ‘motherland’ do so in spite of how their ancestors and distant relatives were 
affected by Britain’s past actions and omissions. Even though there is much to condemn 
regarding Britain’s Asian exploits, the two peoples in fact share an intimate history and also a 
growing cultural affinity. Indeed, it is at the old Empire’s epicentre where today many 
migrant families choose to cash-in their stocks of social capital. Being in possession of an 
impressive network of  kinship connections improves their access to potential social 
openings, which may ultimately provide them with stronger economic security, improved 
welfare provision and, for the children of industrious parents, a greater range of educational 
opportunities. The motility of successive generations from the subcontinent has, among other 
things, helped make it possible for the modern ethnographer to continue studying unfamiliar 
social groups, but from a more ideologically respectable and methodologically reliable 
vantage-point. No longer the unequal power encounters of old; the emphasis now is on 
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respectful dialogue, with the only condition likely to be exploited being the mutual desire 
among people from different traditions with different identities to get to know each other. 
 
Heeding the advice that ethnographers should be simultaneous insiders-outsiders may prove 
to be empathically valuable when coming to study a school society whose pupil population is 
of mainly Pakistani heritage. It has been noted that within this particular ethnic grouping 
many youngsters in the UK live a divided insider-outsider existence (Bhatti, 2011). The 
Crescent Primary School has borne the brunt of similar divisions in its recent turbulent 
history, with internal difficulties necessitating some harsh external remedies. The 
introduction of special measures on the back of perceived weaknesses in school leadership 
and below-average SAT scores (in maths and English) has produced an enforced union with a 
high-achieving school in an outlying neighbourhood. The most recent Ofsted report indicates 
that as a result of federation some improvements have been noted in both areas. Despite such 
efforts, however, the school remains severely under-resourced and is constrained by a 
substantial budget deficit, a burden inherited from the previous school administration. Its 
larger than average number of pupils on roll (450) has a correspondingly larger than average 
population of pupils on the SEN register. Its situation in an inner-city area of significant 
socio-economic disadvantage is perhaps the single most important element in a cumulation of 
debilitating social and economic factors. Into this inauspicious environment one might be 
tempted to find that a complex like laughter is viewed with having very little significance in 
the course of routine school business. Nonetheless, if and when laughter is eventually 
presented, the immediate task will be in knowing how to recognise it.  
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Participant Observation and Specific Listening 
Peter Berger (1997) asks, how can you tell if someone is laughing or in pain? The suggestion 
being that it is not enough to rely on outward appearances alone. Physiological knowledge of 
the ‘co-ordinated contraction of fifteen facial muscles…accompanied by altered breathing’, 
(Koestler, 1964, p.29) could in fact describe any number of human emotions. Attentiveness to 
those who are able to describe their own laughter experiences, however, may be of slightly 
more value. Taken together, the two methods of observing and interviewing should make the 
task of identifying laughter more rigorous. And yet, situated somewhere between these 
techniques, one of the most important instruments available for the detection and analysis of 
laughter goes largely unrecognised. In our culture and in this context the priority given to the 
visual over the auditory is difficult to justify. Normally its unique acoustic signature is the 
first indication that laughter has transpired. Yet even respected anthropologists who have 
written extensively on laughter insist it is essentially a facial expression (e.g. Douglas, 1999). 
In a school setting, however, it is the sound of laughter that is deemed to have most 
significance. From it, for example, we can determine whether it is the product of healthy or 
harmful interactions (Johnson, 2005). But whichever way it is utilised, listening remains a 
skill that is rarely thought important enough to be justified as a research tool in its own right. 
Usually it is subsumed as a configuration in the questioning techniques that are fundamental 
to the art of interviewing (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Sometimes it is included as a 
component of the many approaches that can be applied to observational studies (Robson, 
2011). But listening to, and for, laughter, demands that researchers develop not only a 
discriminating ear, it requires the development of a broad range of auditory skills - skills 
which approximate more to predictive listening, that is, listening in anticipation both for the 
laugh stimulus as well as for the laugh response.  
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The importance of specific listening has been demonstrated in the work of Gail Jefferson 
(1985). It was through careful machine analysis of laughter that she was able to show how, in 
the course of everyday conversations, its expression is rarely spontaneous but more often 
applied deliberately, strategically. That laughter can be controlled and carefully managed for 
either interactional effect or because of social constraints may have important in-school 
consequences. Concerns raised over ‘the voice of the child’ have typically focused on its 
absence in research projects involving children (e.g. Allan, 2010). Taken literally, however, 
this term can also apply to the act of vigilant listening, not only to or for the vocalised 
laughter of children, but also their unvoiced laughter. Unvoiced nasal forms may be a 
growing phenomenon in schools, and could indicate, in their arrested expressiveness, a bodily 
response to an institution’s over-reliance on rules, norms, and other behavioural and 
communication constraints. Nasal laughter tends to be heard but rarely ever seen since it 
occasions few discernible facial signals, except for a very short, sharp movement of the head 
and a sudden flexing of the diaphragm. The sound emitted is from the force of air pushed 
down through the nose. Researchers will be expected to get close enough to participants in 
order to hear these, at times, discreet articulations. Searching for these two forms of laughter 
in particular will justify the design and implementation of a laughter ‘map’. More properly, it 
might be referred to as a ‘schedule’, which details in sequence the everyday risible events that 
may be subject to some degree of prediction.  
 
To be receptive to laughter means being favourably placed to those situations most likely to 
elicit it. It is tempting to believe that in a primary school setting a researcher on the alert for 
laughter will be spoiled for positional choice. It is a mistake, however, to assume that such 
outbursts occur so frequently that laughter can be considered ubiquitous. Previous experience 
(Nugent, 2008) has indicated that looking and listening for laughter requires something more 
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than just sitting, waiting patiently for it to happen. If a researcher’s positioning and timing 
could be organised to coincide with outbreaks of laughter it would circumvent any need to 
depend on good fortune, and would mean that sampling was not only more systematic 
(Woods, 1986) but that it would likely produce better quality data (Hammersley & Atkinson, 
2007). This may be crucial given the inevitable time constraints placed upon fieldwork by the 
sometimes small windows of opportunity provided by the always busy host sites. Here, the 
familiar school timetable could prove to be a research tool of fundamental significance. 
Functioning akin to a laughter map, it could be used, in conjunction with some personal 
intuition and prior knowledge, to help inform the whereabouts - and the time division - of 
possible laughter ‘hotspots’.  
 
A Time for Laughter 
This is not as fantastic as it sounds. Two teachers have independently mentioned that, for the 
duration of SATs week at their respective primary schools, laughter would be made 
temporarily ‘unavailable’, and therefore my presence (as a laughter researcher) would not be 
required during this particularly testing period of national testing. Contingencies like this 
merely confirm the widely assumed notion that the serious and the humorous are conditions 
which are mutually excluding (Berger, 1997). But instances that give rise to cases of 
‘laughter withheld’ do not sound particularly healthy, although it probably and hopefully was 
only intended as an indication of the strength of the pupils’ academic focus. Even so, it may 
confirm in the minds of some the suspicion that schools can find it too easy to close down, 
draw in, and quickly engage their exclusionary procedures. Nonetheless, a laughter map may 
succeed in producing two things. Firstly, it has the ability to provide an indication of 
‘people’s time-bound experiences of laughing and responding to laughter’ (Glenn, 2003, 
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p.39). Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, mapping laughter might make findings from 
an ethnographic-based case inquiry more generalisable.  
 
Up until quite recently, it has been regarded as a golden rule within social science research 
that it is not possible to generalise on the basis of a single case (Flyvbjerg, 2006). That the 
substance of this notion has remained valid for so long has meant that case methodology has 
managed to stand out, not just as ‘an exclusive method of inquiry’ (Anthony & Jack, 2009, 
p.1177), but in a way that its assumed limitations are made more conspicuous. Being 
amenable to the intense examination of the particular, case study proves attractive to 
investigators where there is an intensity about the research site in question and an equal 
intensity about the methods used to locate and collect data. The primary focus should be fixed 
on understanding all intrinsic particulars of the case. This, and not making generalisations, is 
the real business of case study (Stake, 1995). There are some, however, who maintain that the 
general-particular relationship is a misleading dichotomy (e.g. Fay, 1996). Generations of 
students and researchers, for example, committed to the interpretative understanding of 
human experience, have been brought up to believe that the general and the particular enjoy a 
much closer association (Berger, 1966). The true bearing of their alignment is best 
appreciated if it is accepted that mainstream schools function according to the same, or a very 
similar, set of codes and conditions. The central idea being that the rule-based nature of 
classroom instruction, which presumes a certain amount of coordination in order to proceed 
(Evers & Echo, 2006) encourages, through largely regular and repetitious staff and pupil 
behaviour, patterns of expectation.  
 
On this basis, it may then be possible to anticipate instances of laughter across a school 
setting. Laughter influences and is influenced by patterned human behaviour (Buckley, 
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2005), behaviour which occurs in mainly informal zones and, it may be argued, at specific 
school times. If this is indeed the case, then it corresponds with the interpretivist view of the 
phenomenon, that laughter is a largely deliberate, controlled action (e.g. Mulkay, 1998; 
Jefferson, 1985), and not, as the positivist model entertains, an involuntary, spontaneous 
reaction. On the understanding that ‘classrooms are [so] similar the world over’ (Evers & 
Echo, 2006, p.518), the level or amount of predictability required to have any investigative 
significance would need to be substantial, something more profound (and precise) than, say, 
the popular conception that pupils and teachers are more inclined to laugh at 3pm on Friday 
afternoon than they are at 9am on Monday morning. If it could be predicted that not only is 
there no laughter during SATs week, but that pupils also refrain from laughing during break-
time (because playground activity is now subject to strict regimes of supervision) this might 
have some relevance to much broader educational concerns. It may indicate, for example, that 
mainstream schools, in their desire to become more inclusive, have become more controlling. 
It may be the case that including greater numbers of children with special educational needs 
has made them more sensitive, perhaps over-sensitive, to health and safety issues. If laughter 
can indeed be predicted, it may suggest that schools are so keenly organised, that behaviour is 
so strictly managed, that children’s laughter displays are subject to such careful governance, 
that teaching and learning now approximates to a strict stimulus-response formula, much like 
a mechanical conditioning process, or as one would find during a poorly conducted interview.  
 
Conversations not Interviews  
As a researcher who privileges the ethnographic approach Woods (1986) questions the 
suitability of the term ‘interview’. It implies a formality that most fieldworkers seek to avoid. 
The best method to transfer information, to discover others’ perspectives, he suggests, is by 
cultivating ‘conversations or discussions’ (p.67). Conversations, especially, are a more 
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democratic, two-way, free-flowing process, marked by flexibility and friendliness, wherein 
participants can be ‘themselves’ and are not restricted by an obligation to adopt designated 
roles. Kvale & Brinkmann (2009) use the terms ‘conversation’ and ‘interview’ 
interchangeably, describing the interview, for example, as a ‘professional conversation’ (p.2). 
Among the various types available, the ‘true conversation’ (Gadamer, 1979, p.347) is 
characterised by a state of openness between parties promoting a reciprocal to-and-fro. 
Related to it is the ‘casual’ or ‘everyday conversation’ (Eggins & Slade, 1997, p.6), which is 
the kind of talk in which we feel most relaxed and most spontaneous. Conducting interviews 
in conversational mode attempts to change the relationship between researcher and 
researched. At its most basic it allows the former to engender trust, thereby encouraging the 
latter freedom of expression. However, even these forms of talk, informal and colloquial 
though they might be, are highly structured and functionally motivated. The exercise of 
power is always present in each verbal transaction (Nunkoosing, 2005). Even casual 
conversation is talk that involves the element of ‘complimentarity’, where one interactant or 
party ‘demands’ and the other ‘gives’ (Eggins & Slade, 1997, p.20).  
 
Challenging this type of interchange will mean constructing an alternative method, one more 
in keeping with the collaborative principles of interpretative research. This, however, does 
not necessarily exclude the possibility of employing techniques that, while not ethically 
questionable, may blur the distinction between sincerity and cynicism, decency and 
deception. When conducting interviews, for example, it is claimed that the interviewer and 
the interviewee behave like actors engaged in a theatrical performance (Nunkoosing, 2005). 
Goffman used the term ‘dramaturgical’ (1969, p.246) to refer to the way individuals wish to 
present a certain aspect of self in order to influence an audience. A researcher’s profile, for 
instance, their ‘best side’, can be favourably lit. Their complete image can become highly 
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polished through regular rehearsals, or piloting. Props such as pens and note-books can be 
made noticeable by their absence. Every effort will be made to show interviewees that there 
is nothing up one’s sleeve, that is, their words will not be recorded or so obviously 
transcribed. Of course their words will be recorded, although this takes place in post-
production, out of sight, where it will be transcribed from memory in preparation for later 
analysis and interpretation. This ‘illusion’, if it can be so described, is not intended to 
dissemble. In everyday conversation verbal exchanges are not normally committed to print, it 
being one of the types of talk a participant may feel reasonably free from any threat of 
surveillance or accountability (Eggins & Slade, 1997).  
 
In rejecting the idea that face-to-face communications are stage-managed, Jurgen Habermas’s 
main objection to the dramaturgical approach focuses on the way it appears to privilege an 
inclusive-exclusive relationship between speakers. As outlined in his work on communicative 
action (1986), speakers and listeners operate within a system of distinct yet interrelated 
worlds: the subjective, objective and the social world. Those who seek to achieve mutual 
understanding must meet with each of these landmarks in what amounts to a validity-check, a 
form of ontological triangulation. The performance approach to interviews and conversations 
is deemed to be only a two-world model, with participants connecting successfully with the 
subjective (exclusive) and the objective (inclusive) world, but failing to establish any 
meaningful correspondence with their social world. This is considered a serious oversight, for 
social reality is the key mediating influence between the subjective and objective domains. 
When operating together all three reference points help to further the goal of ‘reaching 
understanding’ (Habermas, 1986, p.286), i.e. coming to an understanding with others rather 
than by exerting influence upon them. Crucially, the rational, intelligible values in everyday 
communication are, thanks to Goffman, at risk of surrendering to insincerity and artifice, 
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bringing into question the validity of what people say to each other by improving the 
prospects for distortion and misunderstanding. Goffman seems to admit as much when he 
says, ‘we spend most of our time not engaged in giving information but in giving shows’ 
(1974, p.566). The point at issue here is that when conversational behaviour is restricted to 
self-conscious posturing it produces a highly stylised ‘presentation of self’ - a depiction 
incapable of encouraging spontaneous expressive behaviour (Habermas, 1986). 
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METHODS AND FINDINGS 
As a way to highlight some of the issues affecting the practices employed to obtain field data, 
and the conclusions arising from examining that data, this chapter divides the conventional 
thesis headings dedicated to ‘Methodology’ and ‘Findings’. Introducing a combined 
Methods/Findings section will bring to the fore some of the basic questions that continue to 
trouble qualitative fieldworkers. It will underline the participant/non-participant tension in 
unstructured observations, the formal/informal aspect to conducting interviews, and how the 
inclusive-exclusive nature of these research methods impact on the laughter data. It is a way 
also of introducing the primary schools that form the two research sites from which data were 
collected over two terms in 2012. It is also an opportunity to make a brief authorial 
introduction by way of some selective vignettes, a series of singular encounters that occurred 
early on in the field. These have been chosen to some extent for selfish reasons, to act as a 
means for some reflective analysis, but are included primarily to provide some background 
details, revealing some personal characteristics, some trait impressions, personal strengths 
and weaknesses, to all intents and purposes those discovered ‘surprises and undoings’ 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2003, p.579). ‘It is the requirement for methodological rigour that every 
ethnography should be accompanied by a research biography’ (Ball, 1990, p.170). From it, an 
audience might get a better sense of a laughter researcher’s feelings, fears, attitudes, and 
interactions, all of which subsequently gave significant shape to the generated findings. 
 
Thick Participation    
Although not as old as some of the binary oppositions common to early Greek pathological 
and cosmological doctrines, the distinction between observing as a participant and as a non-
participant has only been active since the birth of the modern disciplines of sociology and 
anthropology. Although it rarely provokes the kind of spirited debate familiar to other 
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methodological issues, it continues to cause some uncertainty among novice researchers as 
they try to decide which of the different types of observer role to adopt. The number of 
options now available has increased to the extent that school-based observers, for example, 
must choose between an assortment arranged across a dimension that has inclusive (complete 
participant) at one end and exclusive (pure observer) at the other. Participant observation is 
the role most often associated with researcher-practitioners, such as teachers and teaching 
assistants, who already enjoy a level of integration in the community being studied. Non-
participant observation, on the other hand, leads to the collection of data without any 
deliberate contact with participants (Fine & Glasser, 1979). Here, a laissez faire approach is 
intended to uphold a researcher’s dedication to detachment and unobtrusiveness, operating as 
a ‘fly on the wall’ for fear their presence will have a reactive influence on participants’ 
behaviour.   
 
The act or process of observing is the cornerstone of the ethnographic method (Delamont, 
2002). ‘You do not ask people about their views, feelings or attitudes; you watch what they 
do and listen to what they say’ (Robson, 2011, p.316). At one time, non-participation was the 
field technique of choice for British ethnographers (Woods, 1986). Its popularity was due in 
part to its defensive strength, preventing observers from getting too close to their participants, 
thus reducing the chances of allowing over-rapport to develop with any particular element 
within the research setting (Woods, 1986). However, the decision to be made as to the type of 
observer to become can be motivated by our feelings about people generally, about the kind 
of relations we habitually make, and the type of interactions we experience or prefer. Putnam 
(2000) stresses the importance of building and maintaining social connections – ‘doing with’ 
as opposed to the altruistically-inspired ‘doing for’ (p.117). This is particularly relevant to 
researchers who may be so minded as to select a detached, non-participating strategy as the 
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purest, most purposive way to collect data. While it may leave some participants in awe of - 
and grateful for - the researcher’s singular expertise, it may also mean that social connections 
become strained, since the research undertaking might assume the tenor of a one-sided act of 
kindness. It makes a mockery therefore of the view that qualitative research is best practised 
as a ‘two-way street’ (Lankshear & Knoble, 2004, p.112). Moreover, the term ‘non-
participant observation’ fails to obey its own logic. All explicit forms of observation in the 
human milieu are to a great extent participatory. The level of interaction, according to Dewey 
(1916), may only be between sense organ and subject, but if we are given to observing people 
then we can also expect to be observed by them. This is the reciprocal nature of vision 
(Berger, 1972); on that understanding alone, the observer and the observed have a distinct 
commitment to one another. 
  
At The Cross Primary School everyone seemed fully committed. After a business-like tour of 
the premises the headteacher introduced me to Ms Jones, head of Year 6. She was in her 
classroom making last-minute preparations before the influx of pupils at the sound of the 
school bell. It gave me an opportunity to move around the room, noting its shape and 
dimensions. Despite its resemblance to a large carton, even when empty it had a nest-like 
snugness, its walls over-laden not with leaves, moss, and lichen, but drawings, paintings, and 
pictures, each layer fattening out the flat square lines making the entire space appear cosy, 
friendly, and warm. This must be what Dewey meant when he described education as a 
process of ‘rearing and raising’ (1916, p.12). On my short saunter I found a promising spot 
from which to observe. Positioned at the back of the classroom, set adrift from the main 
arrangement of tables and chairs, was a solitary child’s seat topped with a red cushion. From 
here a broad prospect of the interior was offered, affording views of all the key stations and 
personnel. I was pleased. I saw no value in remaining conspicuous although, unlike other 
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non-participant observers, I had no desire to become invisible (e.g. King, 1978). When the 
children came in and the register taken it was from this back-of-the-room vantage-point that I 
stood up and introduced myself to those present.  
 
There was no timetable as such, certainly not of the kind used in secondary schools, but the 
opening ninety-minutes on Monday morning were always devoted to English. The lesson 
began with the teacher reviewing the previous session, which apparently was the first in a 
sequence of studies concerned with what the curriculum describes as ‘myths, legends and 
traditional stories’ (DfEE, 1999). On offer this morning was a continuation of the tale of King 
Midas. After the brief period of revision, in which the importance of the tale’s moral element 
was underlined (greed and its harmful consequences), the children were directed by the 
teacher to take their chairs and form them into a circle by placing them around the inner 
perimeter of the classroom. This manoeuvre was performed precisely and efficiently as if it 
was a familiar routine. To my surprise I found that I’d been joined at my remote outpost by 
two small neighbours, a boy and girl, who had moved into positions on my right and left side. 
Before very long all thirty seats in the large circle were occupied. Ms Jones took control of its 
centre and waited patiently for quiet. 
 
I had assumed that the seating was arranged in this way because it was a convenient method 
of grouping the children. For the teacher went on to explain to the class that each child in the 
circle would be asked in turn what they would wish for if they were granted just one wish. 
But before making their choice public, Ms Jones urged everyone to remember the cautionary 
story of King Midas whose wish for the golden touch very nearly proved fatal. (Alas)/But as 
the class activity got under way it was clear that the first few children questioned had paid 
little heed to the teacher’s advice. One after another they declared in favour of such examples 
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as wishing ‘to own Manchester United Football Club’ or ‘to live in Disneyland’. As each new 
wish was revealed Ms Jones, with growing frustration, was at pains to point out either the 
moral flaw or impractical weakness in each offering. As the teacher slowly worked her way 
around the room I began to sense with mounting unease that I too might be invited to make a 
contribution. As if to make such an event less likely, I kept my head down and began writing 
phantom field-notes in exaggerated scribbles. This was my ‘do not disturb’ sign. Now, 
whether Ms Jones simply did not recognise or chose not to respect my abstention strategy, all 
the same after what seemed like an eternity I heard her call my name questioningly, and, with 
an impish rising pitch, ask me if I had anything to declare. Given the meagre amount of time 
available to think of something appropriate, assuming that a wish for world peace and an end 
to poverty might sound slightly self-righteous, and desperately trying to locate the child 
within me, all I could muster, under the circumstances, and at such short notice, was that I’d 
like to live in a house made of chocolate. 
 
In the time it took before order was restored to the classroom and the children had finally 
stopped laughing, I was able to reflect on how pleased I was with my answer, and in 
particular the effect it had made. Not only did most of the children find it amusing, it also 
chimed with the general literacy/fairy-tale theme under discussion, connecting particularly 
with the confectionary gingerbread house made famous in the story of ‘Hansel and Gretel’. 
Ms Jones, however, was doing her best to defy the prevailing high mood. Her pique may 
have been due to my disregard for her advice, since I had simply repeated the same errors 
made by the children in asking for a wish that was rashly intemperate. Much like Midas’s, 
mine was predicated on a form of greed, in this case gluttony. Even before Ms Jones moved 
on to the next child in the circle I knew that I fully deserved - but was politely spared - at 
least a modicum of her reproach. On reflection it would have been useful had the children 
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been made aware of the impracticality of living in a house where every bite of it would 
destroy its capacity to provide shelter and safety (not to mention the problems a hot summer 
would bring). Earning her displeasure so soon was disappointing and embarrassing. The 
teacher was probably expecting that I would provide an answer that showed at least some 
evidence of having understood the rubric. Impelled, therefore, to demonstrate how it should 
be done, she proceeded to explain in careful detail and in a considered tone how, from the 
time of her early childhood, she had always wanted to be able to fly.   
 
As I tried to get the image of Ms Jones soaring on motionless wings out of my mind, I felt 
that all was not lost. By dint of unintentionally reducing the pupils in Year 6 to giddy laughter 
I gained some comfort from assuming that I had succeeded in becoming a member of their 
circle. Those who did not actually laugh at my chocolate house reference made ‘hmmm’ and 
‘aaah’ sounds, as though the mental picture I created was deemed approvingly delicious. 
Woods (1986) calls attention to the divisive nature of participatory research. Although it 
‘could aid one’s relationship with fellow teachers, it could [also] negatively affect rapport 
with pupils’ (p.37). Somehow, I had managed to turn this hypothesis on its head. 
Nevertheless, it proved to be a propitious moment inasmuch that I had every reason to expect 
that follow-up interviews, intended to complement the observation schedule, would be made 
so much easier after my morning’s performance. The success of the interviews depended on 
there being a certain amount of correspondence between interviewer and interviewees. Even 
interviews that are conducted informally, casually, will generally benefit from an ice-
breaking effort to stimulate conversation. The sociability thesis proclaims that laughter has a 
unique ability to do this. Furthermore, laughter is a signal of trustworthiness since it serves as 
a bonding device between wit and listener (Buckley, 2005). Pupils who know so little about 
the person with whom they will be interviewed may feel that an ability to make others laugh 
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can make the stranger appear less strange. This may be important. Trends reported a decade 
ago indicated a worrying decline in social citizenship among youngsters, many of whom felt 
that, in their experience, people who did not count as their personal friends were, in the main, 
not to be trusted (Putnam, 2000).  
 
Although it was not appreciated at the time, Ms Jones’s decision to include me in the 
classroom interaction made a lasting and favourable impression. Perhaps her rearrangement 
of the chairs was a furniture version of the sociability thesis. After all, the sweeping line of a 
circle’s geometry reveals a space of both intimacy and unity. Whether she knew her Euclid or 
was aware of Kristeva’s (1991) meditations on the circles that bind people together, it was for 
all that a most worthy and appreciated intervention. If it was the sight of my preferred 
observer’s position that may have offended her inclusive sensibilities and prompted her to 
take remedial action, it might have been because it stood out for her as a glaring example of 
social dislocation, and instinctively provoked in her the kind of response more usually in 
evidence whenever she notices, for example, a child at break-time wandering aimlessly 
around the playground on their own. Detachment and disconnection can of course represent 
valid and legitimate individual choices. When a person is reluctant to participate, is showing 
signs of withdrawal, it may be for genuine, personal reasons, some of which can be health 
related. Social barriers, too, can hinder participation. But, generally speaking, the quality of 
society and the basic foundations of social solidarity are thought to be compromised by non-
participation (Putnam, 2000).  
 
The decision to practise as a non-participant observer is considered by some to be a form of 
protection against ‘going native’ (e.g. Woods, 1986, p.38), although more accurately it is to 
guard against going completely native. Problems with this questionable term notwithstanding, 
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most teacher-researchers, for example, will have achieved ‘native’ status at the outset. The 
issue of over-rapport may have some relevance where there is a strong feature of cultural 
dissimilarity, but it becomes less relevant when there is a pre-existing identification with and 
affiliation to a particular culture, such as the culture of schooling and pedagogy. It matters 
little that the teacher-researcher may never have practised at the chosen school setting. But it 
may explain why those who enthusiastically embrace the role of ‘pure’ observer can often 
approach their fieldwork with a highly disciplined single-mindedness, as if to create the 
outward appearance of utter impartiality despite knowing that this is not – nor can ever be – 
the case.  
 
King’s (1978) focus on the task of obtaining data proved so unflinchingly clinical that he 
would not allow anyone to stand in his way, even if it meant being rudely uncommunicative 
to his infant-school participants. But then what he was attempting to achieve was something 
approaching the impossible, that is, to collect observational data while simultaneously 
maintaining an inclusive and an exclusive position. Taking such a strikingly objective 
approach could be argued as making very good sense given his specific research goals. 
Sustaining an engagement in a learning environment whereby the interactions between 
teachers and pupils are of sufficiently important value, yet having to initiate a detachment 
from those same participants so that their actions appear sufficiently natural, is an imposition 
that would confound Harry Houdini. To effect a complete ‘social separation of the researcher 
from the subjects’ (Hayhoe, 2000, p.231) may be a genuine attempt to try and minimise the 
researcher’s presence, neither wanting to be an unwarranted attraction or a disturbance. It 
does, however, leave them open to accusations of unethical and anti-social practice. 
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Researchers of the future who might be inclined to make that social separation absolute can 
take heart from the knowledge that wearable technology, in the form of clothing that renders 
a person invisible, is the type of hi-tech attire that may soon be widely available, and not 
limited to the fantasy world of Harry Potter (Pendry, 2011). But until that day arrives, 
observers who aspire to be ‘a fly on the wall’ may find they must continue pretty much as the 
elephant in the room. A not uncommon tactic deployed while conducting fieldwork is to 
remain incommunicado. Declining to correspond with participants, even when they are small 
school children, and even when they make sincere requests for help with their spelling or 
reading, ensures that nothing can get in the way of a researcher’s determination to ‘observe 
clearly and research effectively’ (King, 1984, p.123). Using silence as a means to disengage 
from potentially distracting interactions with participants is, however, a risky procedure, not 
least because silence has an inherently ambiguous value. Proverbially, at least, it is said to 
speak louder than words. More interesting, perhaps, is the way in which silence is understood 
as a dynamic entity. Not so much a popular metaphor of absence, omission, or inaction as 
presumed by some, but, in fact, ‘a pronouncedly active performance’ (Zerubavel, 2008, p.8). 
As a crucial component of our communication system, linguists, for example, take a 
particular interest and place a significant value in those pauses and spaces placed in-between 
pieces of speech.  
 
Averting one’s gaze to discourage interactions is a more familiar avoidance technique. The 
principle here is that ‘if you do not look you will not be seen’ (King, 1978, p.4). It proved to 
be so successful for King he was moved to declare that the teachers he had been observing 
‘had forgotten I was there’ (1978, p.4). Yet his reluctance to speak to any of the pupils in his 
infant school study means we will never know if, like their teachers, they felt that the non-
participating observer had become invisible or in fact remained highly conspicuous. That it 
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was a child who first saw through the illusion that lay at the heart of the tale of ‘The 
Emperor’s New Clothes’ is deeply significant. Whereas adults will often unwittingly collude 
in perpetuating a delusion, as Hans Christian Andersen memorably demonstrated, children 
will be more inclined to speak out - such is the extent of their naturally active inclination 
towards spontaneity and curiosity (Dewey, 1916). 
 
The research community had been alerted many years previously to the dangers in persisting 
with this fiction that research participants, particularly children, will over time get 
accustomed to a non-participating observer’s presence. Polansky et al (1949) were part of  a 
team who, at a summer camp for children, systematically observed, over a 4-week period, a 
cohort of youngsters described as ‘disturbed children’ (p.282). Employing tactics and 
techniques familiar to those often favoured by modern-day non-participating researchers, 
observers in the team adopted a completely passive, neutral role, diligently following their 
remit to ‘maintain a bland exterior composure, [and] engage in a minimum of social 
interactions with the children’ (p.284). In an important - but almost fatal - act of reasoning, 
they assumed that the participants would simply become inured to the group of silent, 
expressionless, and emotionless scientists watching them. The first week passed off without 
incident. But by the second week it was reported that tensions between the observers and the 
observed had resulted in a series of ‘blow-ups’ (p.285), with the research team facing a 
genuine prospect of open hostilities should the observations be allowed to continue. It 
appears that the children found the process of being observed by people who were physically 
and emotionally removed from them, who made no attempt to engage or communicate with 
them, to be unnerving, threatening, and the cause of their deepest distress. The study team 
were forced to react smartly to try and rescue the situation. Practices and procedures aimed at 
‘humanizing the observer’ (p.286) were quickly introduced, beginning with a dedicated move 
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toward warmer, friendlier associations with the children, which included more meaningful 
participation with them during formal and informal occasions.       
 
Back at The Cross School, in the first session after lunch, Year 6 were treated to a classroom 
screening of Ray Harryhausen’s splendid 1953 stop-frame animated film, ‘The Story of King 
Midas’. Harryhausen intended that his series of Fairy Tales (there were 5 in total) should be 
used in schools, for he had an idea they might one day have an educative value (Harryhausen 
& Dalton, 2009). Despite the film’s age, its 10-minute duration, and in spite of an audience 
made up mainly of youngsters raised on high-definition computer graphics and hot electronic 
technology, they were enthralled with the jerky (by modern standards) celluloid curio. They 
expressed genuine shock and surprise, some even jumped back in their seats, at the moment 
the hapless king inadvertently turned his little daughter into a solid ingot, a scene not 
included in either Ovid’s original version of the tale or in the pupils’ modern class-book 
adaptation. Such was the impact of witnessing the princess’s transmutation that had we seen 
it - and the film - before the morning’s class activity, it would assuredly have improved the 
quality of our revealed wishes to Ms Jones.   
 
Stop-frame methods of cinematography have more than just a single application in school 
settings. Not only do they provide an extra dimension to children’s text-based literature, they 
have also been put into service as an effective means of collecting data. This was the motive 
behind Rob Walker & Clem Adelman’s decision to combine photographic and sound 
recordings, a union that became a signature of much of their early observational work, which 
reached fruition in their famous paper published in 1976. ‘Strawberries’ has achieved a kind 
of cult status in laughter studies. In the methodological literature, too, it remains something of 
a hidden gem. The technical innovation that went into observing classrooms longitudinally 
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with cameras and tape recorders, which may seem primitive (and inappropriate) today, was 
aimed chiefly at helping teachers to reflect on and develop their own practice. More 
significantly, in providing the technical know-how and popularising the specialised means, 
Walker and Adelman may have been partially responsible for encouraging school-based 
practitioners to get actively involved in investigating and ultimately understanding the 
interactions occurring in their own classrooms. It is quite possible they were prompted by 
Stenhouse’s earnest appeal for more teacher-researchers made the previous year (1975).  
 
The stop-frame process used in the classroom by Walker and Adelman was similar to the 
system used by Harryhausen in his studio. Photographs were taken at intervals of 2 or 3 
seconds and then synchronised with a sound recording. With this technique they were able to 
record teaching and learning sessions over days, weeks, and even years (1976). Importantly, 
it showed that even with sophisticated (for the time) technology, pupil-teacher interactions 
have little significance unless they can be set within a contextual structure. Thus, the well-
known reply given by the under-productive schoolboy, ‘strawberries, strawberries’ to his 
teacher’s query ‘is that all you have done?’ (Walker & Adelman, 1976, p.134), although 
causing laughter among the other pupils, completely mystified the two observers. The cryptic 
reference, however, could have been unravelled had they known that in repeating the word 
‘strawberries’ the pupil was alluding to the teacher’s enduring catch-phrase. Implementing an 
extensive longitudinally-recorded research programme may be one way of establishing the 
context, with a view to decoding the content, of classroom interactions. But ethical 
sensitivities today generally preclude the use of such methods, meaning that traditional 
observational instruments will by necessity maintain. 
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It might mean, for example, employing a very large research team or launching a very long 
research investigation. Alternatively, in order to stand any chance of getting at those 
important background situational conditions, it should be possible to encourage much greater 
engagement on the part of the observer, to raise their level of participation. This would entail 
reconsidering issues of positionality: to think again about one’s placement at the margins, on 
the outskirts, to re-arrange those viewing-points habitually situated in extremis, at ‘the back 
of the classroom…’ and at ‘the back of the hall…’ (Woods, 1986, p.36). It’s as though in 
bestriding these remote regions, maintaining an insider-outsider existence, researchers 
express not only a lack of genuine belonging but also a distinct lack of commitment. ‘It’s 
better together’, (Putnam et al, 2004) may sound like a mawkish platitude, but as Polansky 
and associates (1949) discovered, participants under observation can become critically aware 
of the ways in which observer-researchers unwittingly acquit themselves, and the ways in 
which their conduct and bearing is laid open for public scrutiny. It is, after, all, at the edge 
where inhabitants are generally configured differently from those who occupy the centre 
(Conroy, 2004). The concept of what might be termed ‘thick participation’ can become a key 
ingredient, a unique type of bonding agent, that helps draws the observer away from the 
periphery towards the very heart of pupil-teacher operations. Here, researchers can partake, 
where necessary, of classroom activities, be they on a minor or more substantial scale. It 
should be possible for an observer to make these kinds of relations without having a 
professional portfolio, without having any established school credentials, connections or 
qualifications; ‘participation’ in this sense should not be the preserve of practitioner-
researchers. Making such a commitment therefore may be the only way in which to get a hold 
on those elusive sequences, those essential background circumstances behind classroom 
actions, behaviours, and communications, which are vital in order to help determine their 
meaning.      
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During that first day at The Cross School I was repaid in kind for having the impertinence to 
situate myself beyond its collectivist boundary. It felt as though my non-participatory status 
was challenged at every turn, with staff and pupils working earnestly to prevent me from 
operating outside the school’s inclusive orbit. Putnam likens this effect to an irresistible tide 
at sea (2000). Either way, it seemed that during the course of my school inquiry I was 
constantly reminded of the social – not the solitary – nature of the research enterprise. 
Whether this was manifested in a courteous ‘hello’ in the corridor, ‘high-fives’ in the 
playground, being asked to adjudicate in classroom disputes, helping pupils with their 
spellings, reading their written work, being invited to accompany Year 5 on a field trip, all 
these and similar instances that occurred on that particular day served to underline how non-
participation is not only incompatible with a school so blatantly oriented towards a system of 
sociability and affiliation, it just doesn’t make any practical sense. Non-participating 
observers who take to social research with a cold calculating eye can be admired for not 
permitting the pupils’ or teachers’ natural inclination for association to impede their view or 
to impair their findings. But cold detachment, it can be argued, is no match for a warm heart. 
When the task is not just to observe, but to put observations into some kind of temporal 
framework, to set interactions within a historical context, their success will depend on how 
much of a physical and emotional commitment has been made. While signs of ‘thick’ 
participation might indicate, for some, a lack of professionalism or evidence of a researcher 
having gone dangerously native, confessing to a passionate involvement in the research 
process is a reminder, rather, that no matter how thorough and systematic our observations 
are advised to be, they remain, above all else, a distinctly human experience. 
 
The decision to increase one’s level of engagement in and around a school classroom may be 
justified and validated by the dimensions of the inquiry. For example, getting close to 
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participants and their interactions can be justified lest those small but significant laughter 
behaviours go unnoticed. The task is not just to look but to listen, to be so well positioned to 
hear the variety of laughter sounds - from the raucous to the gentler more discreet forms. But 
that dedication, that level of commitment, will at times be severely tested. To a large degree, 
the amount an observer’s profile can be raised depends on how ‘thick’ the school will allow 
participation to be; to this extent, much will depend on the teachers’ and pupils’ goodwill. 
When negotiating entry into a classroom it is often a good idea to become acquainted with the 
various codes and regulations in operation, knowing the correct procedures to follow, for 
example, in the event of encountering disorderly behaviour.  
 
At The Crescent School, towards the end of the summer term, Year 3 pupils were enjoying an 
assortment of classroom games and fun activities as the formal teaching and learning 
programme was slowly winding down. As I was observing a particularly lively game of ‘pass 
the parcel’, in which half of the pupils were involved, sitting cross-legged in two lines on the 
floor facing each other, with the remainder standing and watching, one of the spectators 
produced a toy gun from his pocket. Holding it sideways (in the modern manner), he applied 
its muzzle to the head of a classmate, and with each click of the plastic trigger the gunman 
uttered a small exploding sound. The boy on the receiving end regarded the event with 
complete indifference, being so absorbed with the ‘parcel’ game to take much notice. Of the 
three adults present in the classroom, only the teaching assistant failed to see the incident. I 
saw it, as did the class teacher. But his first response was to do nothing, except to shake his 
head in astonishment, his face registering an incredulous expression, which he may have felt 
was sufficient or all that he could manage given that he was supervising the class game. At all 
events, he continued his supervisory role without any interruption.  
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It was one of those occasions when it is hoped that other people who saw what happened 
would make the necessary intervention in order to save anyone else from having to do so. 
Knowing that the only other witness was the teacher, who may to his credit have been 
waiting patiently for a more opportune moment to find out more details of the incident, 
determined perhaps in camera, was enough to prevent me from approaching the boy, making 
clear my disapproval, before tactfully disarming him. As Horton (2001) discovered, being 
party to pupils’ misbehaviour presents researchers with a dilemma, not least in knowing when 
or how to make their presence felt - to intervene or not to intervene. Even though one may be 
dedicated to the principle that participation should be ‘thick’, intervening is a very precise 
form of engagement that can often be misconstrued as interference. Indeed, my own reticence 
was because I weighed up that, on balance, it was more important to maintain relationships in 
the field (Delamont, 2002) than risk upsetting the class teacher. He may have viewed any 
intervention on my part as an attempt to undermine his authority, especially when he might 
have the situation already covered. Even though researchers have adult-world responsibilities 
in situations where classroom rules are being violated (Polansky et al, 1949) there remains 
nonetheless something very comforting about the non-participant observer’s status, that 
feeling of protection and privilege one has in maintaining such an ambiguous position, 
inhabiting that borderland between the inclusive and the exclusive, having, in effect, so much 
freedom to be far less responsible. 
 
And yet, as King Midas was to discover, having a concern solely with one’s own advantage, 
wanting to have the best of both possible worlds, amounts to selfishness, plain and simple. Be 
it in the castle or in the classroom, the pursuit of individual self-interest runs counter to the 
very basis of community participation. Unlike the all-round hospitality shown by Ms Jones 
and her Year 6 group, the non-participating observer occupies an exclusive circle of one. It is 
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easy to forget sometimes that with much of the focus trained on large social entities’ efforts 
to stimulate participation, e.g. in the political, civil, and religious sectors (Putnam, 2000), 
social capital is, fundamentally, about how people interact with each other. While the macro 
factors tend to make all the headlines, those day-to-day performances that occur at the micro-
level can often get overlooked. But it is here that qualitative researchers can help to re-align 
the somewhat skewed nature of existing observational fieldwork. The range of observer 
categories that currently abound are misleading and unhelpful. There is need only for one 
type of observer. The category of ‘participating observer’ would accommodate those 
researchers committed to teaching or teaching support, as well as the researcher without such 
a pedagogic background or remit but with a desire to improve their level of engagement, to 
become more thickly involved in their fieldwork. For me, then, the default position is always 
to participate. For even an observer sitting silently at the back of a classroom with their collar 
up and their head down is, for all that, making an engagement. They are still taking part.    
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PLAYGROUND FINDINGS 
The idea and practice of children’s play covers many manifestations. Its most favourable 
aspect implies an activity that is affectively bonding and non-serious. But within the confines 
of a typical school playground, play can have both moderate and abrasive connotations. 
Football, for example, which remains one of the most popular forms of playtime interaction, 
can be engaged by some pupils with almost ruthless determination, as this chapter will verify. 
It may be better served therefore by a description that more accurately reflects its 
competitive, aggressively physical and contentious-arousing elements. Football is play, but 
rarely is it ever playful. 
 
Findings suggest that the absence of laughter during formal and informal (football) matches 
echo much broader social and behavioural concerns. Two such instances occurred at about 
the same time (as) results of a nationwide survey revealed that our levels of laughter (much 
like our levels of social capital) were in sharp decline. Given the extent of our diminishing 
degrees of social connectedness the results were unsurprising. They remain, nonetheless, of 
interest despite being - or because they were - commissioned by an online gambling website 
(Jackpotjoy.com, 2012). Indeed, their appearance here may constitute a form of ‘ludic post- 
modernism’ (Ebert, 1991, p.115), that is, a playful intrusion upon the decidedly dull criteria 
threatening to overrun our understanding of what counts as research quality (Ball, 2001). 
  
The inclusion of two pupil-specific case-studies brings a semblance of rigour and re-
alignment to the playful-serious dichotomy. Each study provides an insight into the vast 
dimensions that aggregate as play behaviour. These children were engaged in robust play 
behaviour, but perhaps it would be more correct to say they were actually playing the game. 
For children, once they get a little older, learn to play in another sense of that word. As the 
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findings significantly demonstrate, they learn not only to mimic and pretend (Morreall, 
1983), but to apply a very skilful form of playfulness built around strategies and tactics. 
 
The Play Space: Design Features 
If the school is the principal venue where children are likely to form friendships and learn 
about their consequences, if it is the key arena where they are able to take those vital first 
steps (outside of their immediate families) towards procuring - with a view to exploiting – 
friendship networks, then it is on the playground substantially where those friendships will be 
put through their paces. It might be said that playgrounds can make a significant difference to 
the quality of pupils’ interactions and associations. That they can either encourage or restrict 
pupils’ free play depends on the quality of their design, the amount of play space available, 
the quantity and variety of play equipment, the intensity of adult supervision, and the sheer 
number of playground interdictions in force. But in spite of the range of school-level 
variables, there are in effect just two types of playground. The functioning survivors of the 
school building enthusiasm that spread throughout the second half of the nineteenth century 
might be distinguished as the no-frills model. Soon after the passing of the 1870 Education 
Act, The Crescent School, distinguished by its pitched roofs and its large dormer windows, 
surrounded by densely set terraces of Victorian housing, was founded. It has provided four 
generations of children with a dedicated space in which to play. Although a modern, artificial 
slope has been introduced to deter standing water, the playground retains much of its original 
shape which, in the form of an elongated dog-leg, remains enclosed on all sides by walls and 
metal fencing. The walls have been decorated with colourful and distracting murals. At some 
recent point in its history a small number of birch trees have been introduced. This seemed no 
more than a modest attempt at landscaping, but the saplings nonetheless provide a welcome 
contrast to the acre and-a-half of featureless tarmacadam.   
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The school rebuilding programme, which reached its peak during the middle period of the 
twentieth century, was the inspiration for a new type of play (space)/ground. In response to a 
sharp increase in the birth-rate immediately after the Second World War, new schools were 
built on the peripheries of towns and cities where more space was available. The Cross 
School materialised from one such suburban settlement, benefiting from both the revolution 
in modern design materials and progressive ideas in education. Gothic angularity gave way to 
flat roofs and strong horizontal lines. Hard, asphalt play systems yielded ground to those 
advocating softer surfaces amid a growing awareness of ecological and safety concerns. 
Attempts to link break-time to the national curriculum were done in the belief that 
playgrounds could bring cognitive and social shape to a child’s school experiences, as well as 
the traditional emphasis on physical skills development. Thanks to the ample site that was 
available at The Cross School, a substantial playground could comfortably accommodate 
pupils from the upper and lower school, without any need for playtime to be staggered. 
Plenty of additional space which lay around it had been carefully cultivated into facilities of 
undisguised charm, like the adventure play area complete with climbing frames, rope swings, 
and slides, all dressed in a soft wood mulch to minimise injuries. There was also a dedicated 
nature trail with maze-like low hedging, natural pathways, boxes for nesting birds, and logs 
formed into small piles to replicate the natural habitat of a variety of small creatures and 
insects. Both sites were adjacent to, and overlooking, a great swathe of green-belt land where, 
in the summer term, the school was able to hold its annual ‘sports day’, and where for 
recreation or for play children were at liberty to pick flowers or safely perform handstands.  
 
But the ideal playground conditions of a child’s joyful, spontaneous, physical activity cannot 
be taken for granted. Even though their conjunction is routinely emphasised, the expressive 
forms of laughter and play remain ambiguous. Social and psychological concepts of school-
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based play are founded on and organised around a functional contradiction. Common notions 
of ‘play’ must be given a more expansive ambit to include, for example, a child’s strategic, 
artful playground performance. Given this degree of circumspection, bystanders and trained 
observers will naturally struggle to maintain the distinctions between serious and non-serious 
(formal and informal) interactions. Nor for that matter is it even clear what that special phase 
of the school day should be called. ‘Playtime’ is in fact ‘break-time’ for older pupils, who see 
the former as a term more appropriate for use by - and to describe the activities of - children 
at Key Stage 1 than Key Stage 2. This was explained to me by two Year 6 girls at lunchtime 
as they strolled around the playground hand in hand as though they were taking a digestive 
promenade. These girls may indeed have been enjoying the designated play period, but they 
were not ‘playing’ as would fit any typical understanding of the term. Some younger boys 
nearby were similarly engaged, wrapped up physically, exclusively in one another, their arms 
extended across and around each other’s shoulders in a mutual embrace that was splendidly 
matey and distinctly old-fashioned. There they were, these boys and girls, amply content it 
seemed to be in enjoyable company, moving around the playground with little obvious 
purpose, no doubt affirming their friendship, their camaraderie, but not really playing, and 
not yet laughing.        
 
At The Cross and The Crescent schools the mid-morning and lunchtime break periods 
continue to be occasions in which high levels of laughter and play are anticipated. Even 
though some children choose to engage in more earnest, less frivolous playground pursuits, 
and despite reports that Britain’s laughter levels are in terminal decline (Jackpotjoy.com, 
2012), a popular view maintains (a remnant perhaps lingering on from the Victorian era) that 
because both actions involve muscular excitement they both provide natural outlets by which 
children’s pent-up energy and aggression can be released (Spencer, 1890/1970). It is, for 
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example, the main reason why the boys in Year 6 at The Crescent School are watched closest 
of all. They cause the most trouble, according to one playground supervisor. As a result they 
receive extra supervision, although some maintain that this level of attention amounts to an 
undeserved privilege. Football is played each break-time. It is played vigorously, although 
the children’s vigour can on occasion be construed as a problem. A community coach has 
been employed to come in several days per week to supervise playtime matches, because ‘if 
you don’t’, he said, ‘they end up arguing’.  
 
The ‘Beautiful’ Game 
Football is taken very seriously. A game played between Year 6 pupils can take on the 
organisational significance of a Moon landing. The overseeing coach was stringently 
efficient. With one hand he was able to set out in intermittent sequence some plastic cones to 
define the boundary of one of the touchlines, and with the other distribute distinguishing 
yellow training bibs to each player on one team. Spectators standing too close to the action, 
mainly younger children, were cautioned by him to move away for ‘health and safety’ 
reasons. For the duration of the game the coach’s voice was the only one to be heard, 
constantly motivating, urging, exhorting, encouraging and praising the players from both 
teams. There is a view that in receiving such personalised attention the boys are being 
rewarded for their sometimes querulous behaviour. It might be said, however, that their ‘play’ 
period is not really play at all. When adults intervene on the playground like this they re-
inscribe the meaning of play; football becomes less of a break-time game and more like any 
another organised lesson. It is an example of how adults risk ‘overrunning pupils’ freedoms’ 
at playtime (Blatchford, 1998, p. 172). It could be argued, indeed, that given the degree of 
concern within the school about the behaviour of the boys in Year 6, the coach’s goal was 
simply to tire them out. His task may well have been to ensure that the pupils became so 
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exhausted that their troublesome urges would be purged before the commencement and the 
possible disruption of their post break-time classes.  
 
There was another football match played that day. In an area dedicated to ball games for 
younger children, separated from the main playground by a small picket fence, two teams of 
pupils from the lower school faced each other at the kick-off. As one of the teams was short 
of a goalkeeper I was only too happy to make myself available. Where the earlier game was 
disciplined, efficient, and the rules were strictly enforced, this one was notable chiefly for its 
decidedly casual approach to all known sporting regulations and procedures. In fact, it was an 
event more notable for an assortment of surreal comedic moments. The reduction in scale, for 
one thing, proved so disorienting it had a deleterious effect on my ability to keep goal. It was 
as though I had entered the kingdom of Lilliput. Somehow the miniature goals - only 2m 
wide and 1m high - were proving most difficult to protect. It did not help that their hollow 
plastic tubing construction were prone to breaking apart at the slightest touch from ball or 
player. Although the diminutive ball-players ran around like terriers showing terrific energy, 
many of them were randomly leaving and then re-joining the game as a visit to the dining 
room was necessary so they could obtain their lunch. Moreover, as all the players were 
wearing the same blue school jumpers it was impossible to distinguish a team mate from an 
opponent. As it happened, it didn’t make much difference since the game soon degenerated 
into a free-for-all. Every pupil who was playing – even those on my side – wanted, more than 
anything else, to score a goal past me. Of all the outfield players playing the game none were 
defenders – everyone was an attacker. Like Gulliver before me I was assaulted by shots and 
volleys that came thick and fast and from every angle. The match only ended when the ball 
was inadvertently booted into the garden of a neighbouring property. Despite that, it seemed 
clear the children had been absorbed in their game, even if there were few visible signs that 
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they had found it fun and entertaining. I made a mental note that laughter output here was 
very low. It was a theme, in fact, common to both games. The two matches, the formal and 
informal, seemed to agree with Huizinga’s claim that children’s games, and in particular 
games of football ‘…are all played in profound seriousness – the players have not the 
slightest inclination to laugh’ (1970, p.24).  
 
It was frustrating and surprising to find so few children cast with a laughing attitude. Our 
mini-game may have been less structured than the other fixture, but that did not diminish the 
players’ determination to score a goal, nor did it guarantee they would find my goal-keeping 
abilities any more amusing. Even when goals were scored there was little or no laughter, no 
celebrations, just a moment’s satisfaction, a look of accomplishment from the scorer, and 
then a determination to try and do it all over again. It was reasonable to assume that a 
school’s informal sphere, evinced in the second game, would lend itself to a lighter overall 
mood and thus be a secure motive for a measure of risibility. But it was a mistake to believe 
that football would lend itself so easily to that end. Somehow the boys had contrived to take 
the ‘association’ out of association football, turning it from a team sport into a competition 
for individuals. Even though those who had taken part were mainly from the lower school, 
they were well aware that their reputations were being show-cased, and could be handsomely 
enhanced on the strength of their footballing prowess. It was not just a chance for them to 
impress a visiting adult with their fancy footwork, but an opportunity to instigate or 
consolidate their all-round standing among their peers and within the culture of the school. 
Two general forms of status, academic and social, operated at the school. Social status being 
informed, to a large extent, by a pupil’s general level of popularity, enables footballing ‘stars’ 
(Skelton, 2000, p.13) to earn for themselves a measure of high regard within the school. 
Although it had the appearance and feel of a slackly managed kick-about, our football match 
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nonetheless was held in high regard by those pupils involved. The playground, of course, can 
provide a useful platform for the staging of individual performances, providing opportunities 
for pupils to shine in a host of non-academic ways. Given such a seriously interactional 
context, where individual flair had a chance to stand out, and also the high reputational 
rewards that were at stake, laughter on the playground would have been an entirely 
inappropriate intrusion.   
 
‘It is difficult to over-stress the role that football can play in the playground activities and 
indeed the lives of many English boys’ (Blatchford et al, 2003, p.502). In its most idealised 
apparition football is said to promote the successful interaction between peers, and for pupils 
to engage in games requires a fair degree of social and cognitive sophistication (2003). But in 
those two primary school playgrounds, I saw conditions that were not so encouraging. Only 
in the supervised game was there any indication of team-work, and even then it had to be 
insisted upon by the coach, since the intuition of the Year 6 players was to charge around 
with their heads down oblivious to the existence of their team mates. Despite football being 
played so often, The Crescent was one of the few inner-city institutions that did not have its 
own designated school team. Although football was played by pupils of all ages, it was not 
their preferred playground game. Here, the boys would be far happier playing cricket. Their 
attitude to both games could be gleaned from the large sporting murals that decorated the 
walls bordering the playground. Among the colourful depictions of various global sporting 
activities which included an American surfer, a Canadian ice-hockey player and an 
Australian swimmer, were representatives from the world of football and cricket. The 
footballer was an anonymous goalkeeper shown diving through the air in a manner recalling 
Marc Chagall’s free-floating figures from his series of famous circus paintings. Next to it, 
presented in full face, was a steely-eyed portrait of Pakistan’s 2009 Twenty20 World Cup 
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winning captain, Younis Khan, stepping out onto the Lord’s pitch, resplendent in his national 
team’s verdant jersey, with the famous white Pavilion situated behind him. 
 
If educators feel that pupils should have access to a game that combines a competitive spirit 
with the principles of fair play, there is much to commend the game of cricket. In many ways 
it is the quintessential team game, a game arguably demanding greater social and cognitive 
sophistication than football, it being a mixture of the cerebral and physical, reliant upon 
individual skill and strength, and collective strategies and responsibilities. Despite it having 
all the qualities necessary for a more rounded and egalitarian playground ball-game, pupils at 
The Crescent School spoke painfully when explaining that their headteacher took the decision 
very recently to ban playground cricket due to concerns about the aggressive ways in which 
the bat was being swung and the ball (albeit a tennis ball) was being struck. It was only after 
the ban on cricket came into force that the boys started playing football, a game they played 
not so much grudgingly, but without the enthusiasm and affection evidently shown by those 
English boys (Blatchford et al, 2003), although they still played it one feels more so with an 
eye on its social possibilities, its way of affording a measure of personal prestige if not for 
personal pleasure. Perhaps the fact that these school boys were ‘playing the game’, inasmuch 
they were playing a game they didn’t much care for, and not part of their culture, was the 
fundamental reason it was played at all, and why the cricket-mad footballers at The Crescent 
School were, in so doing, able to keep such a straight face.    
 
Unlaughter 
Where it was assumed to be found in abundance, laughter would prove uncommonly elusive. 
On a busy playground, its unique acoustic signature often struggled to make itself heard. It 
had become closely embroiled with other sounds, of pupils’ shouts and screams or it had, for 
156 
 
some reason, been held in check. By a most singular coincidence, right in the middle of data 
collation, the results of a survey were published which declared that our national laughter 
levels were dropping at an alarming rate, leading to what has been described as a ‘laughter 
recession’ (Jackpotjoy.com, 2012). Troubling though this information was, the language and 
tone of the report’s findings proved to be of more interest. Interpreted by a consultant 
psychologist, they broadly echoed those made by Robert Putnam in 2000 when he warned of 
the consequences for communities across America should their stocks of social capital 
continue to fall. Identifying generational differences as a possible cause and contributing 
factor, he concluded that contemporary Americans were not as civic-minded as their parents 
or their grandparents. As with Putnam’s data, the sponsors of the laughter study relied on a 
range of quantitative commercial life-style surveys (Jackpotjoy.com, 2012). Their findings 
also pointed to generational concerns. They specifically expressed unease that previous 
generations had laughed a lot more - 18 minutes per day, to be exact - compared to today’s 
sulks and cynics who can only muster a measly 6 minutes each (Jackpotjoy.com).  
 
A corresponding decline in levels of laughter and social capital may be a matter of some 
significance. The association between these phenomena extends far beyond the sharing of 
inclusive-exclusive dimensions. As an interactional tool, laughter helps in the lubrication of 
everyday communion, facilitating introductions and easing through all manner of social 
negotiations. It is one of the most economical means by which bonding and bridging 
networks - ties within groups and between groups - can develop. Therefore if Putnam is right 
and social capital levels are decreasing across Western societies (2004), it is reasonable to 
assume there will be a parallel reduction in levels of laughter. The tendency to cite 
generational differences in order to establish causation is a feature common to both 
structures. But creating sentiments of lost laughter and social capital, drawing on the past to 
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explain difficulties experienced in the present, only serves, it is argued, to constrain and 
devalue the vibrant, creative, communication spirit in contemporary society (Murphy, 2009). 
To suggest that some aspects of the social and cultural past, in effect, offer the best way 
forward remains a disquieting paradigm, however, not least because it can present an 
idealised depiction of bygone times, a lost - and largely fictionalised - world of happy, 
laughing, close-knit communities.  
 
When lamenting the demise of popular, festive, carnival laughter, for example, Mikhael 
Bakhtin (1984) claimed that the laughter spirit of the late middle-ages had slowly been 
extinguished by official (church and state) prohibitions. It left little in its wake, he claimed, 
except for bookish and superior laughter forms such as irony and sarcasm (1984). Laughter 
became devalued, he felt. It lost its universal, democratic character, where everyone who 
laughed was also laughed at. Since Bakhtin’s day, there has been a persistent suspicion that 
the laughter of previous ages should be the standard against which to measure the vanishing 
laughter of the present. Some have even expressed concerns that genuine laughter would go 
the way of the dodo (Grossvogel, 1959). Stephen Potter (1964) bemoaned the loss of a 
specifically English form of laughter. Writing on the condition of laughter in the 1970s 
Richard Boston found the abiding theme could be summed as ‘things are not as funny as they 
used to be’ (1974, p.11), a sentiment, he notes, which remained popular in the early 20c, and 
in the 19c, too (1974).  
 
It might be safer to admit, however, that it’s not so much that we are laughing any less - it’s 
just that our attitudes to what we find funny have become more varied and better educated. 
As Boston (1974) says, we no longer go to the local asylum to laugh at inmates. A sense of 
propriety and a concern with other, newer forms of amusement, suggests that our laughing 
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habits are dynamically oriented and subject to frequent adjustment. To that extent, it might be 
said that our attitudes to civic participation changes over time, too. It’s not so much that we 
have become more anti-social, but that our means of participating are being applied in 
different and exciting new ways. Formal and fixed membership structures are being replaced 
by more informal interactionist repertoires (Stolle & Hooghe, 2005). Use of the Internet, and 
the popularity of online social networking, means that people - particularly young people - 
are more connected than ever before, using faster, innovative forms of engagement. That 
said, however, Putnam’s misgivings about the technological revolution can on occasion touch 
a raw nerve, especially with those who also feel that the virtual community is no substitute 
for the tangible contacts to be had with kith, kin and one’s immediate neighbourhood 
community (2000).  
 
Data collected from the two school sites has helped to identify some of the enduring as well 
as the fleeting dynamics that lie behind the management of pupils’ playground behaviour. 
Taking laughter and play as the key reference points has made it possible to consider the 
quality of their interactions in order to test the rhetoric that ‘every child matters’ (DfES, 
2004). The playground affords a much clearer view of how physically and socially included 
children feel within their school community, which may go some way to predicting how they 
will be disposed to view the prospect of making future ties to, and within, the wider adult 
community. The principle has been to fix extra attention on pupils who were, for whatever 
reason, unable to show any evidence of interacting with their peers, those offering few if any 
of the typical signs of showing interest in acquaintanceships, such as those playing on their 
own, those who, in effect, may be at greatest risk from being left behind. Laughter, herein, 
becomes an important behavioural marker and social signal through its recognisable presence 
and its disquieting absence. It is frequently claimed that children are less inclined to laugh 
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when engaged in solitary play (e.g. Smoski & Bacharowski, 2003). As Provine succinctly 
puts it, ‘laughter is about relationships’ (2000, p.44).  
 
Putnam has noted the problems associated with ‘loners’ (2000, p.289), those children isolated 
from their peers and their school community, and the related dangers posed by them in some 
extreme (specifically American) scenarios. But wherever they may be, pupils who find 
themselves disconnected at school are more conspicuous on the playground than in the 
classroom (Foot et al, 1980). A very small number of children will spend much of their 
playtime alone, walking around in circles, with their head down, unperturbed or even 
stimulated by the act’s repetitiveness. The vast majority, however, associate freely, with some 
of them interacting carefully and considerately, while others are more vocal and vigorous. 
And then there are some like Peter, a pupil at The Cross School, whose preference was for a 
sort of half-way position, not fully inclusive or exclusive, hoping perhaps instead for the best 
that both dimensions could provide.  
 
Loners 1: Peter 
Having newly arrived from Poland, Peter joined his Year 5 cohort at the most awkward of 
times, right in the middle of term. His command of English was such that in most of his 
classes he was accompanied by an interpreter who translated some of the more technical and 
vernacular strains of teacher-talk that was apt periodically to confuse him. At playtime, 
however, he was very much on his own, an indication perhaps that ‘play’ is still conceived in 
some quarters as a universal language, one that requires no translation (although it could be 
argued it was on the playground where Peter was in fact in most need of additional support). 
But what he may have lacked in English language skills he more than made up for in 
ambition, creativity, and sheer guile. For Peter practiced a very different kind of play, a type 
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that although relationship-driven was problematic nonetheless. In an effort to make some 
form of contact with his unfamiliar peers, most of whom were busily engaged in paired or 
group play, Peter pioneered a form of play-acting worthy of the tangentially valid ruses and 
schemes cited and studied by the likes of Erving Goffman (1970) and Stephen Potter (2008).  
 
To many new pupils the teeming theatre of the school playground can either make them ache 
to be a part of it or leave them frustrated that they are not. Peter’s game plan may have been 
hatched with both of these thoughts in mind. His plan involved throwing a tennis ball high 
into the air expecting, hoping, knowing, that on its fall to earth it had a better than average 
chance of striking somebody who happened to be situated on the playground. He did not 
seem particularly choosy as to who got hit, but his aim was generally concentrated over an 
area where large numbers of his Year group played. His early attempts followed a set routine. 
Upon scoring a ‘hit’, he would rush over to the disconcerted ‘victim’ and, being careful not to 
admit or show liability, simulate some concern for their well-being. Then, using a 
combination of suitably ‘concerned’ facial expressions and animated gestures, he would 
begin speculating as to what might have happened. With a choreographed performance 
straight out of Huckleberry Finn, he’d look around bemusedly, scratch his head theatrically, 
and then shrug his shoulders before pointing up at the sky as if to invite the possibility of 
force majeure. 
 
Originally, it was assumed that his performance was enacted in order to make contact with 
one of his new peers in the hope that the consequences of any ball-pupil percussion might be 
enough to open communication channels and, perhaps, eventually result in Peter receiving an 
outright invitation to play. Anthropologists and psychologists have studied the effects of this 
behavioural phenomenon (e.g. Fox, 2004; Crusco & Wetzel, 1984), although Peter’s efforts 
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to manipulate social encounters by means of provocative contact is a version yet to be 
explored or explained in any significant detail. But having observed many of his later efforts 
with the ball, a time perhaps when he was beginning to grow weary of repeated failures, it 
became clear that his laughter had changed. Previous to this, his sheepish laughter-chuckles 
were always as a consequence of the ball having found a human target. But for many of his 
later attempts Peter was laughing before a ball had even left his hand. There were occasions 
when, standing with his back to the playground, preparing for a speculative launch high over 
one shoulder, he’d already be in a state of mild delirium. Peter’s laughter seemed out of sync; 
he was laughing before anything had actually happened. After the ball was released, however, 
and in the fragment of time it took to complete its curving airborne journey, it was as though 
his whole motor system had locked down or had frozen over. In that tense, suspenseful wait 
for impact, the ecstatic agony of expectation being so powerfully drawn, Peter was left 
gripping tightly at his clothing, unable to speak, unable to breathe, momentarily petrified by 
the most intense fear and the most thrilling anticipation. 
 
Seized by this rapture, Peter’s emotional condition seemed not only inappropriate but 
disproportionate to any serious effort at breaking the relational ice. What may have begun as 
a genuine if unconventional attempt to engage pro-socially with his new peers, had taken a 
decidedly anti-social turn. If it was doubtful that Peter’s priority was to try and bond with his 
peers, it raised the possibility that his objective in fact was to succeed only in hitting 
someone. Or perhaps his intention, as a matter of convenience, was to do both. The way we 
tend to think about laughter and play is in terms of their affinity. There is a sense of 
expectation that they should be framed together, but it is a taken-for-granted combination that 
reflects a popular but largely ill-informed viewpoint. While we shouldn’t necessarily discount 
the existence of playful laughter, we should as a matter of good judgement be at least 
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suspicious of it. Theorists have argued strongly that the only reason we are moved to laughter 
is because of some innate competitive and aggressive element. Although this does not 
account for all the reasons why we laugh, it is a view that was and remains influential (e.g. 
Hobbes, 1650/1994; Freud, 1905/2001; Gruner, 2000; Buckley, 2008). Peter was capably 
demonstrating as much, and demonstrating further that playful and aggressive laughter are 
susceptible to a flat and static form of classification, as either an inclusive or an exclusive 
category. But Peter also managed to draw  attention to the way in which good natured 
laughter transmutes easily into laughter perceived as aggressive, thereby signalling the 
presence of a grey area - a transition point situated at the interface of these contrasting poles 
where laughter is capable of being perceived either way (Platter, 2010).  
 
Loners 2: Tahir 
Peter’s behaviour may not have been consistent or indeed laudable, but it was arguably an 
authentic display of his frustration with events on the playground. It showed how important it 
can be for some pupils to have a sense of belonging and the extremes some will go - and 
believe they must go - to achieve affiliation with others. Another pupil, Tahir, was an 
exponent of a particularly audacious method of fostering some association. Despite exhibiting 
coordination difficulties, most noticeable whenever he ran, Tahir’s overall playground 
movement was only slightly inhibited by his developmental delay. But he did like to run. And 
he liked to laugh, too. In fact, whenever Tahir was observed on the playground he was 
engaged in what looked like spontaneous running and laughing activity, evidence perhaps of 
some form of hyper-mobility. Any casual observer would be forgiven for thinking that he 
was indulging in dynamic interactive free play. But Tahir’s play, for the most part, was a 
solitary pursuit. His unaccompanied performances were carefully crafted, for they were 
managed in such a way as to give the appearance that they included the active involvement of 
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others. In this case, the ‘others’, a group of four classmates, were the unwitting targets of 
Tahir’s legerdemain. This quartet of friends regularly indulged together in playground ‘tig’. It 
was one of their favourite games, and demanded lots of running and produced lots of 
laughter, due largely to the exhilarating experience of chasing and being chased. But even 
though he was not a member of their group, Tahir made it very clear that he was determined 
to play with them regardless. Taking it upon himself to instigate proceedings, his routine was 
to run up to any member of the group, touch them, cry ‘tig’, before running away excitedly at 
speed, expecting, but usually failing, to provoke any kind of response. Occasionally members 
of the group would protest, express annoyance  that he was not in their game, and try to 
‘shoo’ him away every time he ran past or through the group. But Tahir would invariably 
become animated by this response, inclined to believe that their ‘shooing’ was in fact a 
feature of the game, which only spurred him on to run even harder and laugh even more 
excitedly.  
 
In taking such a bold step, it may have looked as though Tahir was attempting to force his 
way into the boys’ clique because he was too impatient to wait for an invitation. Equally, he 
could have been attempting to disrupt the group’s ongoing activities since, like Peter, he felt 
aggrieved by their exclusive nature. But Tahir did not seem the type of lad to wilfully upset 
others, to deliberately flout playground codes or peer-group protocols. It makes far better 
sense to recognise in the shape of his behaviour a determined means by which to convey 
information about his play-competencies so that their merits could be subjected to peer-group 
appraisal. Tahir was hoping to pass what was, in effect, an audition. His behaviour amounted 
to a demonstration, a practical display of his skills, abilities, and virtues that might give 
potentially interested parties an indication of his character, his background and personality, 
and whether it would make him an attractive candidate, one with the right group-member 
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potential. He may simply have felt that in having all the credentials necessary to play ‘tig’ it 
would go some way towards impressing the group’s gatekeepers. Tahir’s expressive playing 
ability was, for one thing, fully coordinated with theirs; in his quest for acceptance he was 
demonstrating that he could run and laugh just like them. Incorporating echoes of current 
members’ behaviour in the hope of impressing them is a traditional access tactic for aspiring 
group members (Cromdal, 2001). In this context, his earlier tendency to run and laugh while 
playing on his own could be constituted not so much as random play behaviour but more 
likely as a form of dress rehearsal.  
 
Attempting to establish relationships with individuals or groups can be a difficult proposition 
for any child. For outsiders like Tahir and Peter it can present significant challenges - 
although it can provide opportunities, too. Encouraging, in this regard, is that both boys 
proved to be highly enterprising and creative agents. Their attitude towards playtime was to 
make use of its recreational frame so that they could take seriously the need to make contact 
with the wider pupil community. Peter’s outlook soon changed, however, once he realised 
that his original well-intentioned efforts at finding a friend had largely gone unrequited. His 
subsequent actions grew more reckless and vindictive. Indeed, one of the consequences of 
social exclusion is that frustrations can metamorphose into aggressive behaviour (Baumeister 
et al, 2001).  
 
Tahir’s investment in a combined running and laughing routine may have been organised 
according to the belief that a prerequisite for peer group entry was all about making a good 
first impression. Although he might have taken this idea rather too literally, homogenous 
groups often have a tendency to stress the similarities between members (Putnam, 2000). 
Demonstrating an ability to imitate existing members’ behaviour may, in his mind, have 
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improved his chances of gaining group access. It risked, however, diminishing his 
appreciation of not just the diverse make-up of a small school community, but the diversity 
which is commonplace in wider society. Tahir was not properly laughing at anything, but was 
making the responses he imagined others expected of him given his specific circumstances 
(Grossvogel, 1959). In this respect, both his play and his laughter were premeditated. Peter’s 
laughter illustrated the dynamic quality of the phenomenon, it being in perpetual inclusive-
exclusive tension. Between these two pupils they managed to show the ambiguity of play and 
the ambivalence of laughter. Such an achievement is impressive, although it remains unclear 
where Peter and Tahir learned to behave in such ways. Was it merely instinctual or can their 
sleights and skills be attributed to any specific pedagogic influence? 
 
Robert Putnam’s work on social capital may prove to be important here. He has 
acknowledged the influence of education, that it is ‘the most important predictor… of many 
forms of social participation’ (2000, p.186). Since New Labour’s decision in 1998 to 
introduce citizenship education into the national curriculum for Key Stages 1 and 2, Putnam 
has been adjudged - or accused - as the programme’s principle influence (Kisby, 2009). 
Among the guidelines listed in the curriculum’s framework document, are those which 
encourage pupils to develop good relationships and to respect difference (DfEE, 1999). In the 
primary school sector, the citizenship programme offers only guidelines since it is not a 
statutory component of the curriculum. By rights, this should allow or encourage teachers to 
exercise a degree of creativity in the programme’s development, providing innovative and 
imaginative approaches to their citizenship studies in the classroom. But the effects of pupils’ 
attempts to appreciate the value of togetherness, membership and solidarity, as outlined in 
their PSHE-related studies, are more likely to be seen on the playground than in the 
classroom. It might not be the case that children like Peter and Tahir require a great deal of 
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coaching in social skills, more a case that teachers need to be aware of how their skills are 
being practically deployed. If teachers are the single means by which citizenship education 
will be delivered, they should be better situated to see for themselves how those relationships 
are being negotiated and constructed. As it happens, they may not be getting such a good 
view of children’s social behaviour from the confines of the classroom. A far better position 
can be obtained on the playground.  
 
Play Supervision 
If the playground continues to be thought of as an additional classroom (Santa, 2007), as an 
essential venue where, during free play, children are able to learn about themselves, about 
forms of communication, and develop the social skills necessary to interact with their peers, it 
seems strange that most playground supervision is now under the control of non-teaching 
adults. Mostly it is the task of well-meaning volunteers, often mums and dads who live in the 
schools’ immediate vicinity, to monitor pupils’ behaviour at playtime. Their remit is to 
identify and discourage all forms of impropriety, from bullying to the use of bad language. 
One of the reasons why there are so few teachers supervising at playtime is the feeling that 
children deserve or need to have specific periods in the school day where they are free from 
excessive official adult scrutiny. With an increased parental presence, the playground bears 
the look of a less institutional, more homely environment. It conforms to Putnam’s (2004) 
view that many schools should encourage more direct links to parents and to other 
community members. On the playground, then, adult supervision becomes more family 
oriented, operating according to a seemingly straight-forward combination of instruction and 
care, represented most conspicuously in that venerable adult intervention which regularly 
cautions children to ‘play nicely’. The implication here is that parents (and not teachers who 
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may happen to be parents) have the greater ability from years’ domestic experience to 
distinguish between non-consequential and deleterious play.  
 
Making sense of Peter’s gleeful or possibly malicious laughter, as with Tahir’s derivative or 
possibly spontaneous offering, was always going to be difficult and contentious, whether one 
happened to be a parent or not. Despite persuasive arguments detailing its ambiguity (Billig, 
2005) and its inherent slipperiness (Platter, 2010), laughter remains in the minds of many an 
immediately recognisable and therefore a distinctly reliable behavioural marker. From 
playground supervisors (Boulton, 1996) and psychologists (Smith, 2005) to educationalists 
(Johnson, 2005), there is a will to believe in laughter’s assumed goodness. Laughter and its 
cognate, smiling, together carry a force of considerable social weight permitting others to 
make reliable inferences about one’s behaviour. On the playground, the presence or absence 
of laughter is often the key signal that alerts ones senses to help pupils and adults distinguish, 
for example, playful from non-playful interaction. Many playground supervisors are expected 
to read and then encode facial signals. They have suggested that, along with other contextual 
factors, a child’s facial expression which is brightened by laughter and smiling, indicates to 
them that, for example, ‘fighting’ is just boisterous horse-play and therefore undeserving of 
censure (Boulton, 1996; Smith, 2005). Duchenne du Bologne, the French anatomist, was 
thought to have found a reliable way of distinguishing between genuine and contrived smiles. 
The so-called ‘Duchenne smile’, which has an instrumental role in the production of laughter 
(Ruch & Ekman, 2001, p.436) has been deemed difficult, if not impossible, to control 
voluntarily. But recent evidence has brought this long-established view into question 
(Krumhuber & Manstead, 2009). It is now thought that facial expressions are in fact easily 
manipulated. A child, for example, can produce a ‘genuine’ laugh, or the smile of enjoyment, 
be they happy or sad, whether they happen to have good intentions or not.  
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The task of interpreting children’s behaviour can be put into some perspective if it is 
appreciated that playgrounds constitute school spaces where the nature of children’s 
interactions are unlikely to make much sense to adult observers. They are one of those 
educational settings where fact and fantasy, where the genuine and the contrived, operate, 
temporarily at least, with equal legitimacy. I spoke to two Year 3 girls from The Cross School 
who were sitting outside one morning playtime quietly snacking on some food items from 
their lunchboxes. I asked them if they were going to play. They shrugged their shoulders and 
continued eating. ‘There’s nothing to do’, one of them said after a few seconds. ‘There’s 
nothing for girls’, her companion corrected. Looking out on the busy play areas most of the 
boys were actively engaged. They were either chasing footballs or chasing other boys in 
vigorous but good natured forms of pursuit. Most of the girls were arranged in small groups 
chatting and laughing, but not being so obviously active. ‘Netball?’, I said hopefully, pointing 
at the redundant pair of free-standing pole/hoop combinations, one positioned at either short 
end of the playground. The girls looked at me askance, clearly wounded by my 
thoughtlessness. ‘They’re for basketball’, they said authoritatively, ‘they’re for boys’.  
 
Perhaps it was the sheer variety of play-related equipment on offer at The Cross that had 
prompted the girls’ inertia. Indeed, it might be said that what The Cross’s modern school 
facilities gained in its diversity it managed to lose in the paucity of peer-peer interactions. 
Most of the resources on the ultra-functional playground were human ones, that is, they 
consisted solely of pupils and their imagination Although it could never be accused of 
fostering solitary forms of play, or even instances of non-play, sedentary social encounters 
were more noticeable at The Cross than at The Crescent School. It was as though the array of 
children’s play opportunities had succeeded only in causing confusion, leading some pupils 
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to experience difficulties when attempting to manage their playtime motivations and choices. 
In a small number of cases encountered they became not just choosy but exacting.   
   
At an institution with much of its High Gothic anatomy on constant display, it seemed 
appropriate that the venerable game of playground ‘tig’ still enjoyed huge popularity at The 
Crescent School. For one thing, it’s a terrific game to play if play-related apparatus is in short 
supply. It comes into its own if ball games are difficult to manage because of the steep 
playground gradient, or if there is a ban on all forms of cricket. And if temporary 
accommodation, in the form of prefabricated classrooms, continues to encroach upon 
playground space, there may be a point when ‘tig’ will constitute the diversionary residuum.  
Being a derivative of the ancient form of ‘tick’ meaning ‘to touch’ (OED, 2013), ‘tig’ is an 
excellent way for children to stay connected, to remain in physical contact with one another, 
to exert some old-fashioned forms of association during playtime. When Robert Putnam 
bemoaned the ‘anticivic contagion’ that swept across America (2000, p.247) and many 
Western societies (2004), his use of the term ‘contagion’ may have been partly intended for 
dramatic purposes, as if to suggest that diminishing civic-mindedness can spread 
untrammelled like a virus. But he might also have been signalling that the lack of physical 
contact between people, between communities, the basic abandonment of ‘first order’ sensual 
communication, lies at the very heart of this anti-social malaise. It could be one of the reasons 
why he is not entirely convinced of the electronic mass media’s contribution to civic society 
(2000). As if anticipating the unprecedented popularity of online social networking he 
wonders whether ‘virtual social capital’ might in fact be a contradiction in terms (p.170). 
Digital technology’s speed and efficiency appear to be valorised at the expense of intimate, 
face-to-face interactions, of the kind Putnam lauds as examples of ‘genuine community’ 
(2000, p.172).  
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Talk of ‘contagion’ need not be wholly negative, despite its pathological tendency to provoke 
alarm. A contagion of goodness is a much rarer item, but one that is not impossible to come 
across. Given its fast-acting transmission, laughter could prove to be a very useful and 
effective predictor of a community’s well-being. It is not a matter of disputing Putnam’s data, 
or even suspicioning the somewhat gloomy forecast of the overall condition of the nation’s 
laughter capacity (Jackpotjoy.com). But the evidence at community level - from the school 
playground - suggests that the outlook for social connectivity is far brighter, and a cause for 
exciting more hope, than many commentators and pundits have predicted. One of laughter’s 
more remarkable features is its ability to produce a highly contagious effect (Billig, 2005; 
Bergson, 1911/2005). Its infectious quality can provoke laughter in others, a case of laughter 
begetting laughter (Glenn, 2003), causing a chain reaction capable of quickly touching 
individuals and entire communities, arousing feelings of closeness, inspiring a sense of 
togetherness, and proving almost impossible to resist. 
 
The Girls in the Gazebo     
One memorable outbreak occurred during mid-morning playtime at The Cross School. I 
found myself drawn towards a polygonal gazebo which occupied one corner of the 
playground. At first sight it seemed empty, but after slowly walking around it I happened 
upon the small opening and found four girls lying face down on the wooden floor, one on top 
of the other. It looked as if they were re-enacting the story of The Princess and the Pea, or 
attempting to build a column of bodies as one would find in a circus. But what attracted the 
attention was the sound of the girls’ laughter. Each child had been reduced to a state of 
collapsible hilarity. The sound that rang out soon encouraged a crowd of adult and pupil 
onlookers who, curious as to the source and nature of the exhilaration, were soon laughing 
among themselves having been happily and helplessly contaminated. If the tower of bodies 
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was not the most elegant sight ever seen, it certainly produced the most attractively natural 
sound one could ever wish to hear. Their fabulous laughter continued for some minutes, more 
so perhaps out of sheer delight that despite their high humour the girls had managed to 
preserve the integrity of their vertical shape - that somehow none of the upper bodies in the 
human construction had toppled over. In its sheer simplicity the girls’ column embodied the 
noblest properties of physical solidarity, each human course providing mutual support and 
held together by laughter, the bond of union. Such an innocuous, trivial occurrence almost 
went unnoticed yet was responsible for holding a small playground audience spellbound, and 
encouraged a spread-ability factor for which laughter’s infectiousness - its ability to touch 
others - could and indeed should be of fundamental social importance. 
 
Although laughter may be apt at times to spread like a contagion, quite often it develops from 
the least consequential detail, sometimes having little or no purpose at all (Zijderveld, 1983). 
The cascade of giggles issuing from inside the gazebo had no obvious stimulus beyond the 
incongruity of the girls’ precarious physical position. Their laughter may have simply been a 
natural accumulation, with the sole reference point being the girls’ immediate and exclusive 
company, the sheer delight and pleasure of peer group association (Woods, 1984). And yet it 
also successfully managed to affect a thoroughly inclusive outcome. The girls’ laughter was 
not only located in - or even between - themselves, but concentrated in the relationship 
between them and the small party of onlookers, reverberating around all those concerned who 
were, momentarily at least, indelibly connected. The group of people who shared in this 
playground experience may have gone away slightly richer, more warmly disposed towards 
their fellow beings, and possibly set to gain one day on the strength of their having been 
touched by laughter’s awesome sociality (Provine, 2000). As Putnam says, all it takes is an 
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episodic nod or a wink for rudimentary informal connections to develop. From such 
seemingly tiny investments real social profit can sometimes accrue (2000).  
 
Burning Questions (of our Movement) 
In the final section of ‘Bowling Alone’ Robert Putnam asks the cardinal question, ‘What is to 
be Done?’ (2000, p.365). In providing his own answer he focuses on six key areas or 
‘spheres’ which he believes will bring radical change to community fortunes. Education, 
unsurprisingly, features prominently. It is the key agent in cultivating attitudes which will 
encourage civic and social engagement. Interestingly, it is education’s end product - 
attainment levels and qualifications - that receive most attention, underlining the view that 
those in receipt of a good education are more likely to make good citizens of the future. But 
this neat and simple equation ‘conceals much, probably most, of what is important about the 
educational process’ (Campbell, 2006, p.34). With many of the discussions centred on 
secondary or post-secondary education (2006) we may be forgiven for thinking that social 
capital has no real value, prospect, or significance at any of the early learning phases that 
occur before Key Stage 3. Had Putnam taken a more considered view of primary/elementary 
schooling, he might well have added an extra sphere. In it he could have expressed an interest 
in understanding just how and why some children of this age group place such value on social 
participation, and why others are not motivated enough or are reluctant to show any desire to 
form interpersonal relationships. Given the abiding importance of this issue, it seems strange 
that Putnam has made no attempt to discover whether schools at this level should be directly 
or only partially credited with instilling either a pro-social or anti-social frame of mind.  
 
This ethnographic study has discovered three kinds of laughter used in three different types of 
play situations. Together they provide an indication of the current state and effectiveness of 
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connective trends. Football, as one example of common play, encouraged a singular form of 
laughter, a case of laughter deferred or unbegotten. Children’s urge to laugh – even in an 
informal playground encounter – was effectively put to one side, as they set about the serious 
business of fashioning for themselves a positive individual image and status. There is a belief 
among certain pupils that academic weakness in the classroom can, to some extent, be 
mitigated by a strong showing on the playground, given the kudos in school that goes with 
being designated a ‘good player’. Peter and Tahir proved to be very good players, but not in 
any sporting sense. Their play-related abilities only caught the eye as a result of their tactical 
practices, that is, when both pupils felt compelled to employ the art of gamesmanship. Two 
small case-studies helped to illustrate how their strategic use of both laughter and play 
perhaps entitles us to view their personal futures with a degree of hope and encouragement, 
taking into account their innovative, single-minded approach to obtaining a stake in a 
friendship network. It is hoped that determination of this nature may mean that in adulthood 
Tahir and Peter become instilled with what might amount to an associational ‘habit’. Finally, 
there were the girls in the gazebo. Their laughter just seemed to happen, although its 
spontaneity was not the most salient aspect of its occurrence. That particular honour went to 
the way in which laughter rapidly engulfed a small community with a great choral effect, 
creating a social network that brought people together, connecting us, as Putnam (2000) so 
keenly approves, to people we didn’t already know, and in a way that we still do not truly 
understand.     
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CLASSROOM FINDINGS 
Although largely absent from discussions in the previous chapter, teachers will assume now a 
much higher profile by way of this dedicated section. In respect of their executive and 
interactive classroom duties it will be useful to assess how their day-to-day operations and 
performances impact on their pupils. Despite many of their pupils’ best efforts, teachers 
remain, by design or by default, the primary suppliers of laughter-generating behaviour. 
   
The way that informal classroom events and conditions develop depends to some degree on a 
practitioner’s proficiency in laughter management. How it is dealt with, administered, and 
governed can be considered from a range of different perspectives, not only from that of the 
teacher’s. Children, for example, will routinely attempt to suppress their laughter. Instances 
of stifling and inhibiting will often indicate a child’s awareness of normative classroom rules 
and restrictions. They are widely believed to be spontaneous expressions, although evidence 
which follows suggests that so-called acts of restraint can be very deliberately applied. 
Laughter management also refers to those actions performed by senior school figures, most 
notably the individuals responsible for planning my fieldwork (schedule), who took charge of 
my laughter quest and led me to areas in each setting where they thought likely examples 
would flourish.  
 
A teacher’s sense of humour is also placed under scrutiny. Arguments about its importance in 
establishing rapport, in creating a happy and friendly learning environment, are discussed. 
Among many educators there is a presumption that it is vital to have a sense of humour. 
Findings here, however, indicate that perhaps it is not nearly as important as teachers having 
a good sense of what might be called comic timing. Knowing when to apply some informal, 
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light-hearted respite in the face of pupil lethargy, stress, or restlessness may be of more 
practical value than simply being the bearer of a humorous disposition. 
 
For that reason, being sensitive to not only temporal dimensions but capacities relating to the 
effects of touching and listening, and their relationship with laughter, are calculated. This will 
herald a momentary modification to the main method of inquiry. The privileging, hitherto, of 
an observational approach can be questioned when one’s gaze becomes too narrowly focused, 
either as a result of incessant over-use or simply due to field-fatigue. When this happens it 
may be an appropriate time to broaden the phenomenological scope of the investigation. An 
ability to capture impressions of the classroom can vary according to ever-changing 
conditional and temporal dynamics. A coldly formal regime of silence, for example, 
unexpectedly realised copious amounts of data, which called for some specific listening 
techniques since it was important to distinguish nasal laughter from its more usual vocal 
form(s). Equally, a noisy but warmly informal lesson gave pupils an opportunity to 
communicate through playful physical contact. They engaged in a singularly digital (touch-
related) process of interaction, executed at a precise time of the school day when laughter, 
serving in its capacity as a means of comic relief, is thought to function at its very best 
(Stebbins, 1980).  
 
Laughing on the Inside 
Unlike the pupil-pupil interactions that dominate break-times on the playground, most of the 
important interchanges that take place in the classroom are teacher-pupil oriented. But just 
like on the playground, there are some significant relationship issues that affect their 
arrangement, from the motives for their establishment to the means by which those 
relationships are maintained. Some have argued that the classroom and the playground are 
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qualitively different places producing different types of affiliations (Pellegrini & Blatchford, 
2000). Fundamentally, however, the dynamics are much the same, with each milieu 
encouraging a mixture of emotionally and tactically inspired connectedness. As a feature of 
their professionalism and humanitarian outlook some teachers make a genuine, personal 
commitment to the creation of qualitative, person-centred friendships. Other teachers may 
feel pressurised into assuming a suitable persona, one recommended by policy-makers and 
outside bodies as a purely functional undertaking. Either way, the identity they present is 
done in the interest of establishing a mutually stimulating classroom environment.  
 
Experienced teachers and their newly qualified colleagues may have different methods for 
effecting structured objectives and outcomes, but both will be mindful of the value placed on 
unstructured, informal teaching and learning processes. Their sense of humour, in this 
respect, will prove to be important depending on how it is engaged and whether it is viewed 
as a specifically individual aspect of one’s personality or as an objective, outward projection. 
Of the many different aspects of management in operation, which includes a teacher’s (self) 
impression management and the way they manage their pupils (classroom management), 
there are also the many different dimensions to laughter management. Suggestions that 
laughter is a slippery, unstable construct raises questions as to whether any amount of 
administration can ever render it subject to personal and/or public governance.   
 
The way laughter is managed in schools is usually in terms of its coping potential. Often it is 
deployed on an individual basis as a means to reduce stress, for example, in the staffroom, or 
when teachers use it as a way to ease through a difficult topic or mollify a challenging Year 
group. In addition, there are those occasions when children utilise it to construct and/or 
deconstruct friendships (on the playground), etc. But a phenomenon like laughter which is 
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felt to be slippery and intangible, is not something one would ordinarily consider being 
subject or responsive to any form of administration, personal or otherwise. And yet, across 
the two schools its practice was widespread. A school’s code of conduct will often place a 
threshold on many forms of vocal and bodily expressions. Those like laughter can, in some 
circumstances, be conceived as a disturbance to adjacent classmates, to pupils and teachers 
elsewhere in the school building, and even to those communities residing beyond the school 
gates. In an effort to deal with such eruptions, teachers and pupils have developed many ruses 
and strategies. Out of necessity they have become accomplished exponents in the art of 
laughter management.  
 
Children need to manage and take control of their affective states as part of the socialisation 
process. Aspects of personality are often judged according to the amount and type of laughter 
an individual produces. Some traits of personality have to be negotiated tactically while 
others are made on impulse. Thus a child’s cognitive and communicative development should 
accompany an increased ability to produce laughter, not only as a direct expression of 
pleasure or amusement, but also for social reasons (Glenn, 2003). During this period, the 
child becomes aware of social norms and develops a measure of sensitivity to civic-minded 
attitudes and behaviours, and the accompanying expectations to conform to them, as well as 
the likely penalties for their contravention. With this sense of development comes the ability 
to modify, exaggerate, hide, and control their laughter. Key Stages 1 and 2 can be viewed, 
therefore, as developmental milestones. By the time children enter primary school they will 
already have attained a level of competency in laughter management. They laugh when 
reporting a misdemeanour in the hope that their mirth becomes contagious and pacifies any 
adult reproval. Depending on the strength of peer group norms some boys, for instance, may 
be discouraged from showing they are scared or easily frightened. When nervous they 
178 
 
conceal their fear be feigning a laugh in order to ‘put on a brave face’. Teachers’ 
interventions are often modelled along similar lines and attempt to heighten positive arousal 
through the use of humour. They will encourage a child to laugh at times of negative affect, 
for example, after sustaining a playground injury or when experiencing some form of 
distress. It is almost customary for teachers to make light of such moments by inducing the 
tearful to laughter. 
 
Laughter Management 
In order to create and maintain interpersonal relationships children will find it an advantage 
to become acquainted with what is described as the ‘art of suppression’ (Conroy, 2004, p.78). 
Rarely are any efforts made to suppress laughter when on their own. But in the company of 
others, children have been observed trying to smuggle unbecoming laughter into their hands 
or/and attempting to contain it by pinching their lips shut with their fingers. At other times, 
they are often seen biting their lower lip as their tummies buckle and strain under a laughter 
attack. All attempts, however, are usually in vain for the laughter almost always breaks 
through. But these small units of behaviour, these apparently reflexive gestures, are often 
deliberately executed for they show a heightened awareness of classroom norms and codes, 
the rules that regulate their conduct. It helps to think of the child’s body in this respect as a 
communicative medium in its own right, distinct from the sound of laughter articulated from 
the mouth (Douglas, 1999). Normally, the physical, bodily channel supports and agrees with 
the vocal one. But sometimes they contradict each other, so that the momentary loss of 
control (the spontaneous laugh) will need to be redressed. Masking, hand gestures, and lip 
biting communicate to others a conspicuous but pardonable ‘I am laughing…but against my 
better judgement’. As Aristotle pointed out, ‘we don’t blame someone for laughing if she’s 
179 
 
tried hard not to’ (in de Sousa, 1987, p.279). In the context of the school classroom, pupils 
and teachers know that this can be very important. 
 
Laughter management practices also include those that approximate to an occupational 
function, as those conducted by school leaders. At The Cross and at The Crescent School two 
managers, the headteacher at the former and the school business manager (SBM) at the latter, 
were responsible for directing me to the likely places where laughter at their respective sites 
could be found. There were no requests on my part to observe specific classes or interview 
particular children or teachers. I was content to be guided by their good administration and 
was happy to be placed in what appeared to be their capable hands. As a result, very nearly 
all of the classroom observations which took place occurred in the afternoons. This was due 
principally to a core/non-core curriculum distinction. The post-lunch period was the part in 
the school day when the non-core curriculum subjects took place, and when both managers 
felt laughter conditions were most likely to flourish. It was made clear at both schools that in 
the mornings KS2 pupils would be so focused on their core curriculum subjects that laughter 
incidents would be negligible. Furthermore, I was never invited to attend either school during 
SATs week, or even in the weeks preceding it, because the pupils, I was informed, would be 
purposefully and seriously disposed. In management’s view there was clearly a proper time 
for laughter. 
 
Indeed, temporal dimensions proved to be highly significant. It wasn’t just that more informal 
teaching and learning took place after the lunch-break. The transition from the formal part of 
the school day to the more informal learning stage was also evident in the extended school 
periods, i.e. those phases denoted by breakfast clubs and after school clubs. It was also 
evident that teachers knew instinctively when their pupils needed a change, a bit of light 
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relief. For example, at the end of a particularly dreary and painfully dull ICT class the reward 
for the pupils’ perseverance and endurance was an impromptu classroom game.  
 
But being at the mercy of the school managers’ judgement meant that it rather upset my one 
and only research desire: to test the common sense theory concerning behaviours that are 
likely to occur at the beginning of the week compared to the end of the week, i.e. that 
children (and adults) are in a more playful mood on Friday than on Monday (morning). 
Efforts here were in determining, especially, whether there was any evidence of cultural 
variation. Managerial guidance notwithstanding, as far as could be told, there was no 
significant difference between the two schools, except that at The Crescent School on a 
Friday, among the pupil population at least, it is always a cause for high moods and good 
spirits since it is the most important day of the week for young Muslims. This is manifested 
in a more easygoing atmosphere throughout the school. School uniforms were temporarily 
suspended in favour of a smart, splendidly dressed-sense for boys and girls. Pupils were 
decked out in their finery: sharp shirts and ties for boys, with splendid waistcoats beneath 
smart jackets over long white shalwars. Many of the younger girls wore princess-like multi-
layered tulle dresses, of the brightest lacey fabrics that would not have looked out of place at 
a party. At The Cross School, Friday was sometimes designated a casual day, an opportunity 
for all school personnel to ‘dress down’. At The Crescent School, Friday, by way of a 
contrast, was always an occasion for pupils to dress up. 
 
Certain features of the management models in operation at both schools came close to 
expressing cadences of exclusivity. They presupposed, for example, a particularly rigid 
perception of formal and informal learning domains. Although, no doubt, managers were 
guided to a great extent by a national curriculum divided into discrete halves - its two tiers 
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encouraging ‘an invitation to treat the second tier with far less seriousness than the first’ 
(Alexander, 2010, p.261) - there were however clear concerns in their approach to school 
organisational activity being too business-like. While it would be inappropriate to conceive of 
laughter as some kind of intrinsic element in the curriculum (Conroy, 2004), it does not mean 
that laughter deserves to be lumped in with ‘the rest’ in curriculum terms, kept separate from 
the protected and highly valorised core-curriculum components (Alexander, 2010). The 
headteacher and the school business manager naturally wanted their schools to be perceived 
as orderly and efficient institutions and, as agents in those institutions, as orderly and efficient 
representatives. It was not unreasonable to assume therefore that a school manager at work in 
a setting that was well-managed knew or would be expected to know where everything was, 
including something insubstantial like laughter. It could be imagined that with their ability to 
think and operate in a focused and rational manner distinguishing relevant from irrelevant 
material would be easy. For example, when they were told that my research objective was to 
find evidence of laughter neither individual turned a hair. I could have made any search-
related request - no matter how outlandish - but it would have been met with the same 
unflappable can-do attitude befitting a pair of administrators ever keen to demonstrate their 
efficiency and organisational prowess. 
 
The world view on which much school management planning is predicated follows the 
Newtonian paradigm that presents the school environment as a place of order. Here, 
everything operates according to specific, knowable and predetermined rules (Bell, 2002). 
But any type of manager operating in an educational setting should recognise that today’s 
schools are ‘…complex, contradictory, sometimes incoherent organisations’ (Ball, 2006, 
p.96). It can be argued that in their striving for order and rationality some managers, at 
whatever level, fail to take this into account, and fail to appreciate that contradiction and 
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incoherence are antagonisms not necessarily to be avoided or eradicated. These are in fact 
necessary features of any organisation or institution since they can function as catalysts for 
change and improvement. But the manner, for example, in which the school managers’ search 
for laughter was conducted, the way in which it was steered away from formal curriculum 
areas of learning to the informal areas, suggests that this separation forms part of a 
dichotomous discourse which continues to exert a powerful grip on the professional practices 
and commentaries surrounding primary education (Alexander, 2010). In many ways it is 
unsurprising given that the act of dividing and separating are habitual ways in which our 
culture organises meaning, and recalls the attempt to preserve a ‘humour-free zone’ in Britain 
at the turn of the last century (Wickberg, 1998, p.172). Constructed as part of a wider scheme 
of social taxonomy by which the middle class and the working classes, high culture and 
popular culture, work and leisure, and humorous and serious, could be distinguished, they 
were, as Wickberg (1998) reports, modes of distinction that proved ultimately to be unstable 
and unsuccessful.    
 
School managers, of course, would not be expected to have much of an appreciation of 
laughter’s social mechanisms, at least not beyond its basic social cohesive utility. But failing 
to appreciate that informal and formal are not exclusive spheres in a primary school is a 
serious misperception. It may also have some serious consequences if the recommendations 
of the Cambridge Primary Review are accepted, and that in the primary curriculum of the 
future every subject, be it P.E. or Mathematics, English or Art, will be treated with equal 
seriousness (Alexander, 2010). One wonders where, then, if these prescriptions ever come 
into effect, school-based laughter researchers of the future are likely to find their subject 
matter? Where would they be encouraged to search for it if there were no recognisably 
informal areas within a typical primary school, apart from the playground? Laughter remains 
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a difficult phenomenon to regulate. It grows and it unfolds. It becomes uncontrollably 
contagious, and is capable of crashing thresholds and storming all types of boundaries and 
borders. However, where attempts are made to constrain it, where patterns of classification 
continue to be developed, and whether they succeed or fail, those patterns and those attempts 
will continue to provide evidence of significant value.  
 
The Silent Reading Class 
While waiting for a local repertory company to set-up in The Crescent School’s main hall 
(they were performing a Christmas pantomime for each Year group, and running slightly 
behind schedule), rather than remain in the corridor for 20 minutes and rather than waste 
some impromptu observation/interview time, I was ushered by the SBM towards Mr Khan’s 
Year 5 class, who obligingly took me in since they had already seen the troupe’s 
performance. The room was full, and all of the children seemed dutifully studious. At first 
sight, it looked more like a liturgical than an educational setting, for most of the pupils 
attending to their books were producing soundless but significant lip and chin movements, as 
if in meditation. Mr Khan pointed to the large collection of books that were available at the 
back of the class which were spread across three bookcases with more books piled high in 
colourful, plastic storage boxes beneath, and quietly explained that the children were engaged 
in some silent reading. With this news my heart sank, for the laughter prospects at this 
juncture looked decidedly slim. The lack of classroom interaction would surely limit any 
moments of expression let alone occasions for mirth. I imagined that my unexpected gift of 
an extra twenty minutes observation time would promise little more than tedious agony. But, 
against all expectations, the interactive vacuum proved to be a highly profitable laughter 
resource. The axiom that ‘one cannot not communicate’ (Watzlawick et al 1967, p.51) was to 
prove not only comforting but propitious. It was particularly encouraging to see and hear that 
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only a few minutes after I had sat down the children were doing their level best (without 
really doing very much at all) to break the silence. It was just as Zerubavel said: as silence 
becomes more pronounced so do the pressures and opportunities to end it (2008).  
 
The merest sound would be enough to send the children into tummy-buckling chuckles, into 
creases of half-smothered giggles, titters, and compressed grunts. A squeaky chair, footsteps 
in the corridor, or the siren from an emergency vehicle somewhere in the distance, these and 
other noises both natural and manufactured suddenly assumed the intensity and amplification 
of gun fire, with each volley registering squarely on the pupils’ funny bones. If Mr Khan ever 
imagined he was going to have an easy lesson he was very much mistaken. For the duration 
of my short stay he was kept busy trying to maintain discipline, having to make repeated 
interventions in response to unsolicited sniggers. It brought a whole new meaning to the 
practice of reading for pleasure. But despite the children giving every appearance of being 
dutifully engaged with the assorted literature spread out on their desks before them, it was 
clear that very few were actually reading. It was just another demonstration of what one pupil 
has described as a ‘silent lets-pretend-we’re-reading lesson’ (in Barton, 2011).  
 
Events took a distinctly unexpected turn with regard to one particular pupil, a girl whose form 
of autism ordinarily predisposed her to intermittent and involuntary vocal outbursts. Under 
everyday ambient classroom conditions they would probably have merited little significance, 
her classmates being well-used to the sound of these articulations. But now they had become 
so conspicuous in volume, largely on account of the imposing silence, that every spontaneous 
emission she produced ricocheted sharply around the classroom. The noises were considered 
such a distraction to other pupils, since they were encouraging yet more laughter, that at Mr 
Khan’s bidding, and perhaps due to his mounting exasperation, the ‘noisy’ pupil was escorted 
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by a support assistant to another part of the classroom, and safely tucked away behind an 
adjoining door which led to a small ante-room. Here she remained out of sight and, more 
importantly, out of earshot. The child’s removal did in fact succeed in achieving two related 
outcomes. Firstly, noise levels in the class decreased appreciably. Secondly, the remaining 
pupils in all probability presumed that the girl had been punished for her actions, hence the 
chastening effect her dismissal had on the rest of her classmates’ activities.  
 
Many of the pupils clearly struggled to cope with the classroom conditions. Understandably, 
they found it difficult to uphold the artificially benign atmosphere. Perhaps they had good 
reason to consider silence in a negative light. There is an institutional tendency to associate it 
with normative restrictions, such as classroom rules and school strictures. The historic 
conditioning of silence in education, and schooling in particular, has been linked not only 
with codes and norms but also with examinations, and, not least, as a form of punishment. 
What was impressive, though, was the way in which many of the children, through their 
collective laughter responses, attempted to defeat it, attempted to break the silence. It was 
akin to an organised rebellion. What may have so exasperated Mr Khan was that despite the 
wide range of reading material available to the children, much of it humorous with stories by 
authors like Roald Dahl, Jacqueline Wilson and the Goosebumps series, it was the mundane 
common-day sounds that were carried and that prompted the children to laughter. But then 
the silent reading exercise raises a variety of different teaching and learning questions, not 
least its suitability as a form of instruction. More importantly, and from an inclusive-
exclusive perspective, if the children had indeed been reading diligently and studiously would 
their laughter (at the humorous content in their reading material) have constituted a breach of 
the silent reading rule? Or were the children expected to laugh silently, to stifle their mirthful 
responses on pain of being rebuked by the teacher for laughing out loud?    
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Attempts at interpreting the amusing silence offered up a range of different theoretical 
perspectives. The relief/release theories of Spencer (1890/1970) and, later, those of Freud 
(1905/2001), had clear application. But some others proved equally relevant, specifically 
Bergson’s view that ‘our laughter is always the laughter of the group’ (1911/2005, p.3). The   
children’s collaborative and contagious laughter was evidence of that, or that it certainly 
seemed to be as a result of a cooperative effort. But Bergson’s better-known use of the 
incongruity theory could be pertinently applied here, too. This view supports the idea that the 
laughable element consists  of a certain ‘mechanical inelasticity’, of oppressively rigid 
behaviour, and is provoked in circumstances ‘where one would expect to find the wide awake 
adaptability and the living pliableness of a human being’ (1911/2005, p.5). Bergson’s 
foresight seems to be particularly well-aimed, here, and perhaps no better description of a 
school classroom and its pupils currently exists, and certainly comes very close to summing-
up the behaviour of all parties in Mr Khan’s class.  
 
Bakhtin’s ideas on laughter also contribute usefully to the ongoing issue. For him, laughter is 
a way to challenge, to disturb and disrupt oppressive social orders (1984). This position only 
makes sense in light of the Year 5 class if the seriousness and solemnity accredited to the task 
of silent reading is regarded as an unnatural practice, created in an artificial environment, and 
therefore as repressive, which may then justifiably warrant a measure of subversive 
behaviour in response. What occurred were a series of small acts of defiance, some relatively 
minor flouting of official classroom norms. Perhaps the pupils’ laughter was a way of 
mocking the whole idea of reading silently. Perhaps they were confronting their fear and 
frustration of silence with nervous laughter, as would a child’s fear of the dark. It’s 
conceivable the children were deliberately attempting to upstage or overturn the teacher’s 
position, and just as likely they were trying to show him the idiocy of that particular 
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classroom exercise. Alternatively, it is quite possible that they were simply laughing in spite 
of themselves, i.e. they had no possible sense of self-control, since that when a noise was 
heard they had basically given themselves up to laughter, completely surrendered to it: noise 
- any noise - became an irresistible laughter trigger. This, however, seems unlikely given that 
when the school bursar and I made our unannounced (and noisy) entrance to the Year 5 
classroom in the first place it prompted no laughter from the children. Sound was not the 
issue; it was the regime of silence. The meanings of certain sounds change according to the 
context in which they are heard. It is not the sound that provokes laughter so much as the 
social, the actual listening, conditions.  
 
A Sacred Silence 
Similar restrictive behavioural conditions can produce quite different results, however. A 
service of commemoration was the reason why Year 5 from The Cross School paid a visit to 
their parish church. It was situated just beyond the school’s main precinct but remained well 
within its local and spiritual jurisdiction. It was interesting to note that before and during the 
service, although there was a good deal of ambient noise inside the sacred building, there was 
very little laughter from the mainly pupil congregation. The occasional snicker/titter could be 
heard, but there was nothing like the amount of laughter activity I was expecting. If the 
children were showing their relief at being away from the classroom, their laughter did not 
approach the quantity that was produced when engaged in silent reading. Here, instead, all 
emotions appeared to have been carefully controlled. There were few, if any, profane 
outbursts. The small number of pupils who so much as dared to transgress in any capacity 
were typically fixed with the cold stare of disbelieving outrage by highly affronted members 
of staff. It was enough. No words were necessary.  
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On the whole, the pupil church-goers seemed to have little interest in wanting to break this 
particular silence, either through laughter or through any other means. This may have been 
due to there being a greater sense of respect for the premises they were in, since it was an 
environment where silence was naturally to be expected, it being a fundamental part of 
organised religion’s ‘plausibility structure’ (Berger, 1967, p.11). It’s what helps to make 
religion so revered, lending atmospheric weight to its grave and awesome, if not ominous, 
sense of ecumenical mystery. Although the children may not have felt entirely comfortable 
with this silence, they at least understood its solemn significance. Whether they happened to 
be believers or not, they recognised - if not appreciated - the rationale behind it; they could 
see the point in being carefully respectful and reflectively contemplative.  
 
In a school setting, on the other hand, silence has a tendency to do the opposite. It can, for 
example, mean painful associations for some children who may have first-hand experience of 
the ‘silent treatment’, a form of ostracism routinely instigated by their peers, which involves 
deliberately avoiding eye contact and verbal communication, effectively excluding the 
concerned party from their usual peer group association. Historically, silence formed a 
dominant part of the school curriculum. Indeed, the teaching and learning experience was 
founded on an appreciation for and respect to its maintenance. Until very recently its 
application remained widespread, and was used officially as a form of chastisement, a 
formidable feature of Monday morning assembly, and a fundamental part of the behavioural 
code that enjoined children to stop talking when the teacher was teaching. However, with a 
growing interest in and concern for the concept of ‘pupil voice’ (Lundy, 2007, p.927), silence 
has become something of an anachronism in modern school education. Children are now 
privileged, to some extent, to speak openly, to have their say, to let nothing stand in the way 
of their right to self-expression. Whether many teachers would care to confirm this is, of 
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course, a debatable point. But the principle, if not its actual practice, is the key thing, and it’s 
fair to say that generally speaking silence is no longer such a prominent feature of children’s 
education. Today, apart from the obligatory period of national testing when talk is necessarily 
suspended, silence in a primary school setting is pretty much unheard of.  
 
It is all too easy for schools to become saturated with codes of conduct. While there is a solid 
argument supporting the notion that rules and boundaries are necessary, such a strict system 
runs the risk of having a negative influence on pupil’s physical behaviour, their gestures and 
other expressive flourishes. Half-concealed forms of classroom laughter such as ‘sniggering’ 
and ‘tittering’ may in fact have flourished as a result of the abundance of school interdictions. 
One can see why certain practices such as silent reading could have actually encouraged if 
not forced children to cultivate forms of voiced and, in particular, unvoiced laughter, both in 
response to the literature they engage with daily and also to the classroom environment 
around them. In response to these classroom conditions, a type of laughter, described as nasal 
‘snort-like’ and ‘grunt-like’ disturbances, may have developed (Bachorowski et al, 2001, 
p.1583). These forms articulate a more subdued laughter signal, as if pupils are keen, or are 
required, to keep sonorities to themselves, for their laughter appears to be only grudgingly 
released. It is commonly assumed that laughter is mainly ‘song-like’ and articulated vocally, 
just like the sounds produced by the girls in the gazebo. Analysis indicates, however, that in 
experimental conditions at least unvoiced laughter proves to be the most prevalent type, 
particularly among male student participants in education (Bachorowski et al, 2001). Bergson 
may have had this behaviour in mind when he made clear his unease at the possibility that the 
person laughing ‘retires within himself…and we discern…something less spontaneous’ and, 
perhaps, worryingly, something ‘more bitter’ (1911/2005, p.97).  
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Mr Khan’s decision to deport his autistic pupil notwithstanding, it should be acknowledged 
that he did reasonably well to distinguish between the different modes of communication that 
were kicking up such a dust at that time in his classroom. The mix of unvoiced laughter 
‘snorts’ and the voiced, non-laughing ‘grunts’ produced by his Year 5 pupils were not, I 
found, so easy to separate. The acoustic patterns of these atonalities are closely related. It was 
only possible to tell them apart due to the ‘grunts’, which are a feature of some forms of 
behaviour on the autistic spectrum, being marginally more frequent and repetitive, but 
tending not to be  continuous, bursts of sound. Presumably, being attuned to his pupil’s 
autism-related outbursts made it much easier for the teacher to note the distinction between 
each register. It is important to have some understanding about how teachers respond to 
laughter, how they cope with it, how they employ it, their appreciation of its inclusive-
exclusive dimensions, for to do so will affect the ways in which children apply it in their 
everyday behaviour and day-to-day communications. It is teachers who, in the classroom at 
least, will bear much of the responsibility for either providing or restricting children’s 
opportunities to express themselves. 
 
Teachers’ perceptions and appraisals of laughter can vary. Consciousness levels only become 
heightened whenever they know that laughter and humour are being placed under scrutiny 
within their precinct. Thus, it is possible that Mr Khan’s decision to remove one of his pupils 
from the classroom was influenced as much as anything by my presence. Even allowing for 
some expected reactive behaviour from those being observed, a recurring feature of my 
fieldwork was the support – and at times the overbearing favouritism – it received. Laughter 
is a phenomenon that many people, and particularly many adults, feel certain they know 
enough about since they practice it and produce it as a matter of routine. There is, then, an 
assumption they can make some meaningful input to its inquisition. When they were not 
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demonstrating a well-meaning desire to help the investigation along, attempting to induce it, 
to force it whenever laughter was proving reluctant to appear (rather than letting it appear 
naturally), they were reacting to it rashly if not bumptiously. Mr Khan, for example, may 
have felt that my observations were being hampered by the behaviour of his pupils. He may 
have assumed that I would be left disappointed and unfulfilled, clearly not realising that as I 
sat and watched the events unfold in his Year 5 class I was obtaining data of the very highest 
value.  
 
There were teachers, however, who during fieldwork seemed to carry on as normal. They 
paid no heed to the observations, electing to change very little of their behaviour, 
presentation, or style of delivery. Either by force of habit or through sheer professionalism 
their personalities seemed to undergo no significant modifications. Two key dimensions of 
people’s personality traits are considered to be competence and likeability (Fiske, 2004). In 
the continuing effort to find ways for children to make more meaningful engagements with 
their school-based learning, a teacher’s personality has long been considered an important 
influence. In particular, a quality much prized and widely advocated among the profession is 
‘a sense of humour’ (Nevo et al, 2007, p.385). Among the pupil community, too, a teacher’s 
sense of humour is held in high esteem, it being the main criterion by which their teaching 
ability and general popularity is often measured (Ziv, 1979). Aspiring teachers continue to be 
advised about the importance of teacher collegiality and pupil-teacher affiliations, and how 
conveying a sense of humour ‘can play a useful part in helping to establish good rapport and 
a positive teaching climate’ (Kyriacou, 2007, p.76). 
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A Sense of Humour? 
Even though people laugh for many non-humorous reasons, the link between humour and 
laughter remains strong. A sense of humour may generally mean the capacity to perceive 
something as comical or funny. In this respect, it functions as an outward awareness or 
judgement, but it can also signify a person’s inner attribute. In a school setting, for example, 
it may be expressed as a willingness to laugh at oneself in order to appear pleasantly easy-
going (but not so much as to diminish one’s essential dignity). It also implies a requirement 
to be culturally attuned to one’s colleagues and pupils; a teacher with a sense of humour is 
one who laughs at the things they typically find amusing. But this is not always so easy to 
fulfil. Differences in humour appreciation, between what a teacher and a pupil might find 
amusing can account for erroneous claims that either party actually lacks a sense of humour. 
A teacher who has, for example, a passion for the uncompromising humour of Frankie Boyle 
or the acerbic stand-up of Sarah Silverman may appear to have very little comedy in common 
with a child stimulated by the visual slapstick of TV’s ‘Dick ‘N’ Dom’. But there is another 
meaning of the term ‘sense’ pertaining to sense of humour. It is closely related to 
‘awareness’, an ability to make a judgement. It has a very special application to teachers who, 
it may be said, are considered, personally speaking, to have the wit or common sense.   
 
Among the classrooms and along the corridors at The Cross School, Mrs Bradford cut a 
remarkable figure. She was considered by some of her pupils to be ‘too strict’. Severe codes 
of conduct in her classroom were maintained with very few exceptions. Away from the 
classroom, Mrs Bradford was surprisingly engaging and easy to talk to. I remember noting 
that despite her gruff exterior she was one of the few teachers I had encountered who so 
plainly cared for the future well-being of her pupils. The possibility that her young charges 
might leave her care under-equipped to deal with life beyond the school gates seemed to 
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trouble her greatly. Her rather serious demeanour therefore was perhaps appropriately drawn. 
To that extent, any evidence that she had a sense of humour was not immediately apparent. It 
is possible that privately at least she may have had a very competent degree of humour 
appreciation, and that during her public duties she was simply choosing to be more 
discriminating in terms of her humour performance and  level of humour awareness. All the 
same, she didn’t seem too troubled by it; indeed, there were periods when it looked as though 
she may have even revelled in her notoriety.  
 
Except that Mrs Bradford was capable of delivering some sublime pedagogic moments. 
Every so often, without any warning, she would dramatically change tack and alter the entire 
mood-structure of the classroom. During one particularly stressful Maths lesson, at a time 
when many in her Year 5 class had been left truly befuddled by the rules pertaining to 
fractions that no amount of depictive pizza portions or imagined slices of chocolate cake 
could make palatable, she introduced the children to a fabulous and memorable routine aimed 
at helping them to remember their multiplication tables. Pupils were made to stand to 
attention, face each other in pairs, and then at her command begin beating-out the time-
honoured times-table rhythm according to the format of a traditional hand-clapping game. 
“Three 7s are 21, four 7s are 28…”, they chanted to a cross-handed tempo, that all too 
frequently collapsed as the children collapsed with laughter as they tried and usually failed to 
remember the sequence of each numeric table’s string, as well as perform the clapping moves 
in unison. The meeting of words and hand actions proved too difficult for many of the pupils.  
 
It could, however, be said of Mrs Bradford that, much like the very best comedy performers 
(and the very best teachers), she had impeccable timing. She did the minimum of things 
necessary to alleviate the oppressive atmosphere which, although of her own making, were 
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just enough to rejuvenate the pupils’ interest, executed at a precise time when she anticipated 
signs of pupil fatigue, waning interest or just sensed a general restlessness brought on by 
lengthy periods of seatwork. She knew very well, for example, that pupils respond not only to 
the context of what they are taught but to the ways in which it is taught. She knew what it 
meant to the children to experience these adjustments or pieces of relief, however 
mechanically and passionlessly they were applied. They showed nonetheless that Mrs 
Bradford had the wit and the wisdom to recognise what was needed and when it should be 
applied in order to affect a small mixture of both formal and informal activities. Perhaps 
having a sense of humour is not nearly as important to teachers as having the gumption or 
good judgement to know when to introduce a change, to bring some light relief to pupils’ 
learning. It could be said that Mrs Bradford had the wit, without ever once being witty. Her 
achievement was based not on having an aptitude for humour, or possessing a creative flair 
for it, nor even an ability to appreciate it, but rather on having a wonderful appreciation of 
what sort of thing humour actually is (Wickberg, 1998).    
 
Previous appeals for teachers to have at least some understanding of the role played by 
humour in education have been made (Stebbins, 1980). It was suggested that those who use 
or plan on using it in their classrooms really ought to know about some of the humour 
processes involved. When applied inappropriately, we are cautioned, humour can damage any 
prospects for building teacher-pupil rapport. But when used thoughtfully, status differences 
can be momentarily forgotten and a form of ‘social cohesion is produced through the pleasant 
experience of laughing together’ (Stebbins, 1980, p.91). Given the range of identities and 
behaviours that comprise and enliven today’s mainstream classrooms, it is a sign of good 
practice to try and broaden a teacher’s humour knowledge-base. This would allow them the 
opportunity to absorb and connect with the diversity of classroom influences, taking into 
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account, for example, cultural and gender differences, and being altogether mindful of related 
sensitivities associated with laughter production.   
 
The figure of a single adult instructor pitted against a communal gathering of largely passive 
but developing classroom subjects, is not uncommon. In order to avoid this distinction 
teachers have been enjoined to try and identify with their learners. They have been 
encouraged to see the world from their perspective, to become familiar with not only their 
preferred learning styles and behavioural patterns, but also their affective and emotional 
traits, their likes and dislikes, and their laughter habits. Relationship-building, as Putnam et al 
(2004) maintain, ‘is a way of looking at the world’ (p.18), it is an action-oriented belief 
system and not a short-term strategy artfully applied. Achieving a deeper, more meaningful 
level of connectedness can, for example, enable both parties to operate cooperatively to 
determine the means by which the curriculum can be most effectively engaged.  
 
Traditional approaches tend towards encouraging a blend of classroom interactions. Periods 
of intense seriousness, for instance, will benefit from punctuated bouts of informality. 
Typically, this method is employed in order to ease through difficult or uninspiring phases of 
work. Occasions arise, however, when it is neither possible nor appropriate to implement this 
plan of alternation. Instead of introducing an informal segment at specific points during a 
classroom task, it may have to be introduced once the task has been concluded. On the face of 
it, there seems little point in it occurring subsequent to the main learning activity. But 
teachers who know their pupils know also how important it is that they should take 
something positive and memorably enjoyable from their classroom experiences, even if it 
bears no obvious relation to a specific learning task. Often a topic proves to be so uninspiring 
and inflexible it will resist all efforts to give way to humour or any other creative and 
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innovative mediation. It leaves the teacher little choice but to see it through to its onerous 
conclusion. In such circumstances, a popular option is to provide the pupils with some form 
of restorative, uplifting activity.   
 
Year 4 at The Crescent School were using the forthcoming 2012 Olympics as the frame of 
reference for an ICT lesson concerned with exploring some of London’s famous landmarks. 
The teacher explained that the exercise was to be conducted collaboratively, in pairs, with 
each duo designated a well known building or monument to form the basis of a small-scale 
case study. The children were then required to transfer across the corridor to the computer 
suite from where a specified website could be accessed in order to find an image of their 
designated landmark, download it along with a paragraph of information, print it out and then 
return to the classroom for a presentation. The lesson was delivered with formidable 
efficiency by a NQT whose skill and confidence belied her lack of experience. A support 
worker was on hand to provide help, for most of the pupils needed continuous prompting and 
assistance. The whole event was heavily teacher-led, but then the subject matter was hardly 
the most stimulating or relevant. After speaking to one pupil-pairing in the computer suite it 
became clear that the Olympics, thus far, had failed to ignite much excitement or enthusiasm 
around the school. Moreover, London did not seem to hold a special place of significance in 
either child’s heart.  
 
This particular pair’s specified edifice was the tall glass-panelled office block known as ‘The 
Gherkin’. Neither pupil had much of an opinion about it, although when quizzed on its 
comestible variant they both recognised it as an item used occasionally at home in the 
kitchen. Nonetheless, they easily realised their task-oriented objectives. But despite instigated 
as a joint enterprise, the project evinced few signs of cooperative working. That each pupil 
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sat in front of a computer screen was all the excuse they needed to focus on the array of 
palaces and statuary before them while largely ignoring their partner sitting beside them. As 
will be noted in the playground findings, when children are busy interacting with specific 
resources they often ignore the attention of their peers. Putnam (2000) and others have 
expressed concerns about the prospect of ‘real conversations giving way to…easier screen 
dialogues’ (Baroness Greenfield in Alexander, 2010, p.270). Upon returning to the classroom 
for the plenary stage, it felt as though the presentations were somewhat hastily executed, 
rushed through by a teacher who, to be fair, had been rushed off her feet, constantly 
explaining, guiding, directing and correcting.  
 
As if to acknowledge how difficult the preceding 75 minutes had been for her pupils, the 
teacher, quite unexpectedly, announced that once all of the learning materials had been safely 
stowed away the children would be allowed to play a game before home-time. The change 
was as sudden and dramatic as the mood that immediately engulfed all who heard the news, 
and was greeted with a mixture of wild enthusiasm and blessed relief. Initially, it was 
supposed that the timings on the teacher’s lesson plan had gone awry and the session had 
simply finished ahead of schedule, leaving her with an empty time-slot to fill. Cynics might 
argue that such a strategy was only implemented in order to save the teacher’s face. A feel-
good end-game that brings teaching and learning proceedings to a close will tend to reflect 
well on the teacher since it is very likely pupils will rush out of their classrooms into the arms 
of awaiting parents bearing excitedly happy dispositions. A more plausible explanation, 
however, is that the ICT phase was brought to an early conclusion in order to accommodate 
some much needed interpersonal interaction.  
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Approximately 15 minutes remained in which to get a game up and running. Of the many 
amusements at her disposal the teacher picked an old school favourite called ‘Heads Down, 
Thumbs Up’. On the strength of having produced good work (or having shown the most 
resilience) in the ICT lesson, seven children were invited to stand out at the front of the class. 
The rest remained in their seats. At a signal from the teacher the seated pupils followed 
precisely a well-rehearsed procedure. Placing their heads down on the tables, and with eyes 
closed, holding their hands above their heads, they kept each thumb upraised on open display. 
The seven children of merit then moved quietly among their seated peers. Once a suitable 
target had been identified they each touched by squeezing one of their thumbs before 
returning carefully to their position at the front of the class. When the seated children were 
asked to raise their heads, their task was to try and identify which of their seven classmates 
had made physical contact. The entire performance took place to a musical accompaniment, 
broadcast via the interactive white-board, of the stop-start sound of a piano arranged in 
comical staccato. 
 
It was, quite possibly, the worst game I had ever seen. Even though the children appeared to 
have enjoyed every minute of it, it was difficult at first to identify any of its redeeming 
educative or recreational virtues. And yet it succeeded in producing some inspirational 
moments. Hussain, a boy who had been anonymous for the previous hour and a quarter, 
making no discernible contribution to the lesson during the ICT phase (being one of the 
‘quiet ones’) was nominated by the teacher as one of the seven ‘squeezers’. I had met 
Hussain before on the playground. Whenever I saw him he was intent upon helping me with 
my research. He introduced me to his mother who came into school at lunchtime, a measure 
perhaps of her parental solicitude since her son was quite capable of missing dinner 
completely, disposed as he was to periods of forgetfulness. She would accompany him on the 
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short trip to the dining room just to make sure he received his midday meal. Although 
Hussain was bigger than most of the boys his age, his size was no reflection of his executive-
functioning abilities. Generally, he struggled with routine cognitive tasks, but took to his 
official role as ‘squeezer’ in the class game as though he was Harlequin in the commedia 
dell’arte. The transformation in this gentle giant was striking. When called upon to put the 
squeeze on his peers he played his small part with all the expressive energy of a seasoned 
exponent. His movement, gestures, and bodily attitude all managed to convey the comicality 
of the ludicrous background music. His furtive tip-toeing to the plink-plonk piano was 
gloriously improvised and proved a real hit with the watching ensemble. Even the teacher 
laughed, perhaps enjoying herself and her work for the first time that afternoon.  
 
The classroom game may have been an attempt to divert attention away from the ITC 
lesson’s pedagogic and collaborative shortcomings. Nonetheless, it succeeded in bringing to 
the surface some of the concerns that have been raised about the ways in which recent 
technological advances have impoverished the quality and quantity of interpersonal 
communion in both large-scale and small-scale communities. If the habit of watching a 
television screen is considered anathema to social capital development, it being ‘lethal to 
community involvement’ (Putnam, 2000, p.192), the attention children lavish on their 
individual computer screens may have similar social consequences. Anecdotal evidence from 
Year 4 indicates that computer technology may indeed have had a detrimental effect on the 
performance of a cooperative learning assignment. Despite the positive contributions made 
by computer-mediated communication, Putnam remains suspicious and sceptical of their 
long-term benefits to social cohesion and face-to-face communion (2000). The difficulty 
faced by schools is in achieving a balance between the digital and the physical dimension, 
embracing the massive educative potential of media technology, but mindful also of it being a 
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powerfully self-absorbing resource. The ICT teacher may have had this notion of equilibrium 
uppermost in her mind when having to decide on the most appropriate restorative follow-up 
action to implement.   
 
Appending various games or periods of light relief onto long and wearisome classroom 
lessons is a common strategy practiced across the primary sector. But it was precisely the 
choice of game that proved, in this instance, to be significant and particularly opportune. Its 
introduction was in direct response to the pupil grouping arrangements made for the ICT 
lesson, but not implemented simply as an attempt to act as compensation for it. The teacher 
employed it more to remind the children that they in fact enjoy access to two distinct types of 
digital technology. One type asks of children ordinarily to ‘log on’ using a unique password 
in order to avail themselves of the various on-line and off-line resources necessary for the 
completion of class-based coursework. The other opens up a distinctly human channel of 
communication, one that encourages an interactive and sensuous form of contact. This 
amounted to no more than the application of pressure to the inner digit on another person’s 
hand, but its realisation in the ‘Heads Down, Thumbs Up’ game was deemed to be instructive 
enough to help realign a learning situation that had shifted too far away, for the teacher’s 
liking, from the physical, from the personal. Her motive in so doing was to help pupils in 
Year 4 appreciate that people can keep in touch with one another in ways that are vital and 
unmediated, ways that were largely absent from the learning task conducted in the computer 
suite. Using a fairly ordinary game like this she was able to juxtapose the physical and digital, 
the personal and impersonal, and make it seem that while neither binary was privileged both 
remained fundamental. 
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In an attempt to gain some insights into school-children’s laughter techniques, and the ends 
that they serve, it was anticipated that the role of the school teacher would be a significant 
influence. Instances whereby games and other ludic activities were used in deliberate 
counterpoint to the serious, formal business of classroom learning, showed the amount of 
flexibility demanded of teachers as they respond to the wide array of children’s educative 
needs. It showed, furthermore, the importance of being aware of and attentive to the propriety 
of timing. Most noticeably, teachers are often called upon to judge correctly when it is 
appropriate to break up the solid structure of the learning environment by, for example, 
introducing informal elements and features. ‘Break up’ is a useful and important term here, 
since it can be applied to the act of laughing in two distinct ways. Firstly, it is a way of 
temporarily disrupting the mundane and the inflexible, such as an intensely serious 
curriculum or scheme of work, making way for some small diversions, a little bit of risibility. 
Secondly, the act of laughing is a force that also ‘breaks us up’ (Davis, 2000, p.3, italics 
added) causing us to burst out from our typical selves in ways that seem to defy all forms of 
agency, of self control. To use Hussain as an example, it could be understood as a moment of 
social flourishing. The informal episode attached to the end of the formal ICT lesson 
provided him with an opportunity to break out, open himself up to the world, and in so doing 
help in the process of changing the classroom atmosphere and, perhaps most of all, the view 
that others had of him. The(se) eruptive moment of laughter, Conroy reminds us, allows the 
hidden self to emerge (2004). 
 
A recurring theme to emerge from the data is that laughter cannot be subject to any simple 
system of classification. It is neither spontaneous nor contrived, but falls at a point between 
these two extremes. It is neither inclusive nor exclusive, for the evidence suggests that 
laughter, in many circumstances, assumes an intermediate position. For example, there 
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remains some doubt as to whether the children in Mr Khan’s silent reading lesson were 
indulging in laughing at or laughing with behaviour when responding to a classmate’s 
involuntary utterances. Conversely, there were indications that the laughter which was a 
feature at the end of the ICT class was less ambiguous. In an environment that had suddenly 
become dominated by playfulness, the ‘Heads Down Thumbs Up’ game bore all the 
hallmarks of an inclusive group activity, one deliberately orchestrated to promote some 
underdeveloped bonding and affiliation. And yet it was possible to detect traces of self-
deprecation in the teacher’s willingness to lampoon her ICT class and, in particular, her own 
role in it. The issue then was not so much how the digital and analogue (physical) forms of 
communication were set in comic contrast, but whether an ability to laugh at oneself 
constitutes exclusive, disaffiliative behaviour. The philosopher Thomas Hobbes was 
convinced that self-directed laughter amounted to the same as laughing at others (in Billig, 
2005, p.52), i.e. it remains a form of ridicule. Meanwhile, the state of management’s 
laughter-knowledge, so efficiently traditional given that managerialism in the education 
sector has a reputation for being deeply conservative (Waite, 1998), naturally invited 
speculation as to whether the presentment of a distinctly conservative vision and sensibility 
would have any effect on the search for laughter’s whereabouts. Pleasingly, despite both 
school managers’ best efforts, it was duly noted that laughter was found on occasion in places 
where it was least expected. 
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DISCUSSION 
The process of gathering data presented few real problems. Making sense of that data, 
however, raised a number of significant methodological issues. Attempts to distinguish 
laughing at and laughing with behaviour, even when it was situated in conditional, social, or 
temporal contexts, proved such a challenge that questioning the suitability of the tools and 
techniques by which data were obtained became a daily routine. When not blaming one’s 
tools, it was just as easy to lay the blame on laughter, it being - as many have said - inherently 
fugitive: difficult to grasp and impossible to comprehend. Matters were complicated further 
by having to decide whether the captured laughter was articulated spontaneously or 
deliberately. 
  
Aside from taking into account the culture and the conditions, and the institutional norms, 
fieldworkers are advised to try and get inside the heads of their participants. Interpretivists 
are enjoined to empathise, to see things from their point of view. Thus the intentions and 
motives behind their actions and interactions will become clearer and help in generating a 
degree of understanding. But the effort to get inside their heads may turn out to be a fruitless 
exercise. While this approach may be suitable for some types of inquiry, it can have only a 
very limited application if, as Freud claimed (1905/2001), people simply do not know what 
they are laughing at.  
   
If an individual’s laughter is indeed the product of such uncertain causes, it may help us to 
appreciate why just about every example of laughter that was encountered at The Cross and 
at The Crescent schools could be construed as encouraging inclusive and exclusive 
interpretations. Consequently if, as some theorists have suggested, inclusive and exclusive 
social capital (bridging and bonding) should not be thought of as discrete entities, should we 
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consider the relationship between inclusive schooling and its putatively troublesome, 
exclusive ‘other’ more intimately? The prospects as to how such an institution might 
function, and what it might be called, are discussed.   
 
A Question Worth Asking 
The question at issue has focused on some of the different reasons why children are moved to 
laughter while at school and what this information might tell us about the inclusive 
institutions they attend. It is a question that generates a number of broader points of enquiry. 
It highlights, for example, issues which affect our appreciation of what is meant by 
‘inclusive’ and in particular ‘fully inclusive’ school settings. It posits, further, the value in 
constructing a more suitable alternative term. It also attempts to uncover some of the different 
laughter dispositions of children at KS1 and KS2, and to establish what it is specifically about 
inclusive contexts that move pupils to express their laughter in spontaneous or in 
premeditated ways. According to the evidence, laughter represents many things in an 
inclusive school setting. It can just as equally be a positive signal of well-being, a measure of 
children’s contentedness with the whole mainstream experience, as it can be a disquieting 
sign of their dissatisfaction, discomfort, and distress.  
 
Laughter is closely identified with an opposing inclusive-exclusive dimension. It usually 
breaks down into rather neat categories of laughing with or laughing at behaviour. But this 
simplistic and all too rigid construction is not always so easy to maintain if it can be 
demonstrated that inclusive and exclusive laughter, as with other inclusive-exclusive forms, 
do not always exist in isolation. Quite often they are subject to a considerable degree of 
overlap. That which is deemed to be exclusive can operate as inclusive’s moving principle. 
To appreciate this viewpoint is to go some way towards adopting a new and more rounded 
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understanding of the inclusive concept. This is relevant to a whole range of studies and 
applications, not only those concerned with laughter and humour. A similar relationship 
exists in areas concerned with civic participation and community relations. In the guise of 
social capital, an inclusive and exclusive model (bridging and bonding) is frequently 
conceptualised as competing values locked in opposition. Although Putnam (2000) made it 
clear that bridging and bonding capital should not be considered in such stark terms, he has 
nevertheless thrown his weight behind moves to encourage more bridging social networks 
and connections.  
 
Scholarship indicates that both forms of social capital have merit, and can be mutually 
interrelated. As Portes (1998) argues, they can be two qualities in the same network. The 
popular image of the inclusive-exclusive relationship stands to be altered and much improved 
therefore once a fresh approach and perspective is adopted. Schools are a powerful source of 
laughter and social capital. Taken together they may help expose children to ideas about the 
functions and values of interpersonal connections, and offer institutions the additional means 
of promoting children’s self-esteem and sense of belonging. Inevitably this will create 
exclusive laughter inspired by competition, ambiguity, and tension, yet it will feed off 
inclusive laughter that is cooperative, congruous and comforting. The two types commingle 
and energise each other. Each one has the capacity to fulfil important social roles and both, it 
has been argued, have enormous relevance to mainstream schooling.   
 
The task has been to find a way to reconsider some of the common assumptions that have 
been allowed and encouraged to prosper around the inclusive-exclusive pairing in education. 
This has been achieved by noting this pairing’s nature, aspect, and condition within the 
primary school sector, as well as its near relations active in other disciplines and domains.  
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For the most part they are shown to work in tandem, not in tension. This spirit of cooperation, 
however, raises some interesting epistemological issues. Distinguishing between exclusive 
laughing at and inclusive laughing with behaviour, for example, has proved to be a 
considerable challenge. An inability to distinguish ridicule from playful teasing has not only 
confounded playground supervisors at The Cross and at The Crescent schools. It has on 
several occasions threatened to jeopardise the integrity of this project as it became a 
challenge to place them satisfactorily within an intelligible interpretive framework. Laughter 
cues can be frustratingly ambiguous. In addition to being categorised as inclusive and/or 
exclusive, laughter can be spontaneous or contrived. It can, in other words, be expressed as a 
result of a physiological reflex or applied as a conscious, deliberate act. The spontaneous-
contrived dimension is in itself a noteworthy dualistic phenomenon, but of more importance 
is the way in which these two forms are regarded in wider society. For the most part, they 
function according to an inclusive-exclusive agenda where spontaneity is invariably valorised 
whereas contrivance is inevitably viewed with suspicion. 
 
Be it inclusive or exclusive, spontaneous or contrived, one of the fundamental tenets upon 
which most laughter scholarship depends is that people tend to laugh together. As Provine 
observed, laughter has no meaning or existence outside of a group context (2000). This is 
important for two reasons. Firstly, it provides a suitable means of linking a triad of connected 
subjects - a way of linking laughter to social capital and to children’s education. Thinking of 
each construct as a component in a triangular relationship is particularly helpful, for as long 
as the integrity of this formation is maintained it will discourage thinking in linear and in 
strict oppositional terms. Secondly, it means that when children’s laughter is not in fact 
group-related, it can be presumed to be an activity of some consequence. Accordingly, the 
search for solitary laughers among the pupil population of the two schools amounted to a 
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quest of near Grail-like determination. To be driven by such a single-minded purpose made it 
easier, at least initially, for the behaviour of children like Peter and Tahir to stand out, to 
catch the eye. 
 
The difficulty, however, has been in trying to decipher the common but more complex 
phenomenon of group laughter. The task of interpreting the fine details of fast-moving 
exchanges and interactions was at times overwhelming. Conversational laughs, for example, 
were so pervasive that it was difficult on occasion to even notice them (Glenn, 2003), let 
alone decide who laughed when and why. Sometimes, however, group laughter was produced 
and presented in such a way that it hardly warranted any need to untangle its meaning. In 
some admittedly rare cases, such as the incident involving the girls in the gazebo, it was 
much easier to see and hear what was occurring because the produced laughter was a 
uniformly choral display. In that instance a group of pupils were rendered helpless by 
laughter of a type that had no particular butt or target, and perhaps because of that 
encouraged between them a remarkable feel-good factor which managed to deliver, in a most 
delicious but perhaps unwitting way, an opportunity to make contact, to connect with other 
people. It was not physical or visible contact, but a sonorous connection brought into being 
by the special, rich musical quality of the girls’ laughter, laughter that seemed so genuine, so 
sincere that it was enough to make anyone think (who heard it) that a soul capable of 
producing such a sound must also be a sincere, genuine human being.  
 
Laughing at the girls’ laughter enacted an unusual form of reciprocity, but even so it   
satisfied one of the two conditions necessary for the creation of social capital, according to 
Putnam’s thesis (2000). Along with the concept of trust, these two attitudinal norms figure 
prominently as predictors of civic mindedness. But while laughter is an expression that is 
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easily shared and frequently reciprocated, its ability to evince trustworthiness seems to sit less 
comfortably within the social capital paradigm. Recalling Putnam’s economic approach to the 
issue of trusting other people, which he does in terms of ‘transaction costs’ (2000, p.135), 
Buckley (2005) considers laughter’s unique ability to create trust by first invoking some of 
the big cannons of economic theory. Referencing iconic names like Adam Smith and David 
Hume (2005) he indicates that ‘with trust comes a greater ability to exploit profitable 
opportunities for joint gain’ (p.178). The benefit offered by laughter, he argues, is that it 
establishes a bond between people, permitting them to promote their trust in each other 
(2005). Much of this information may be self-evident, but the point is that laughter does not 
usually appear so high up on the list of factors that we habitually use when attempting to 
make sense of other people, when we have to decide upon their dependability and good faith. 
And yet a trusting orientation based on laughter may be just as useful as other more 
established human motives. In a culture, for example, where clean-shaven men are deemed to 
be more reliable in certain occupational roles (Barber, 2001), such a notion easily extends to 
trusting someone simply because their laughter is openly celebrated, while not trusting those, 
for instance, whose laughter is  concealed behind their hands. 
 
If gradations of laughter could be defined along a risibility continuum, partially concealed 
laughter would occur at a point midway between the openly celebrated and the unbegotten. 
Unbegotten or absent laughter is a disquieting kind of silence that can give school 
playgrounds a haunted ambience, and makes certain playtime activities troubling and difficult 
to watch. The consequences of finding laughter in places where it was not expected have 
been discussed, but a more worrying outcome was not finding any laughter where normally it 
would be expected. That laughter was seldom produced during games of playground football, 
in either a formal, organised match or a more relaxed, casual contest, was a surprise. Football 
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was never like this. The very earliest versions, those Shrovetide set-pieces played with a 
minimum of rules during the seventeenth-century, were done so in fun and with good humour 
(Kitching, 2011). Even today’s high-earning professionals are urged to play ‘with a smile on 
their face’ (Jackson, 2012). Although there may have been good reason for laughter’s 
absence in the highly structured and heavily supervised match at The Crescent School, it was 
difficult to account for the laughter vacuum that was noticeable during the informal game. It 
may, however, have been due to the fact that football played at this level rarely contains the 
all-important social ingredient – the ‘association’ – for which the game was largely intended.   
 
From the number of games observed it was clear that playground football functioned 
primarily to provide opportunities for individual children to show-off their eye-catching 
skills. Despite the best efforts of an outside coach who was keen to encourage a more 
communitarian-based passing game, some bold as well as some rather clumsy solo displays 
won the day. Many of the pupils simply followed the ball around, not caring about positions 
or systems or tactics, but followed it and chased it as would a pack of hounds pursue a hare. 
When one of them eventually managed to get the ball under control their only thought was to 
keep it, and only ever succeeded in distributing it when they were told to do so. To have any 
chance of making a name for themselves players first had to stand out, and that could only be 
achieved when the ball was at their feet and not at someone else’s. Such selfishness was 
understandable considering what was at stake. Around the school, the rewards for having 
good football credentials were comparatively lavish. Localised stardom beckoned for players 
of note. It could confer upon them a range of significant benefits, which included almost 
guaranteed popularity with girls, undoubted respect from their peers, and even admiring 
glances from some teachers.  
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Putnam has noted the rise in soccer’s popularity among American youngsters (2000). He is 
clearly heartened by the small number of team games that continue to retain their popularity 
despite a trend indicating widespread decline in sporting involvement across the States. The 
problem with Putnam’s reliance on sporting-related data, however, is that they are focused 
mostly on participation rates. Popularity is determined according to club and society 
membership, and also by calculating the amount of sporting accessories, such as boots, balls, 
and jerseys, that are sold (2000). Statistical measurements alone are seldom ever capable of 
providing satisfactory accounts to explain the popularity, or otherwise, of playground 
activities and experiences. For instance, not enough attention has been given to the quality of 
football played. Putnam fails to examine what children actually do with the ball each time 
they take part in a game, how they make use of it relative to their team-mates. In some cases 
team-mates are treated much like members of the opposition, as people to beat, to get past, 
rather than colleagues to avail upon. Football is, fundamentally, a team game. Its 
associational nature was one of the factors that helped it to flourish and helped it to make that 
decisive leap across the class divide in the nineteenth-century. From its lofty and semi-
organised origins in London’s elite public schools, its popularity grew in part out of a 
burgeoning spirit of ‘associationsim…the sheer act of cooperation’ (Sennett, 2013, p.42) 
which flourished in mid-Victorian popular culture, particularly within working class 
communities. And yet if the kids in America play school-yard soccer anything like the two 
observed games played by their British counterparts, there may be good cause to question the 
accuracy and value of continuing to refer to the beautiful game as a ‘team sport’ (Putnam, 
2000, p.109). 
   
At about the time the two ball games were kicking off, results from a national survey were 
published which indicated that Britons were laughing far less than their forebears did 50 
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years ago (Jackpotjoy.com, 2012). These findings correlate with those presented by Putnam 
(2000) showing that social capital levels across America and Western Europe have been in 
steady decline since their high point in the 1950s and 1960s. One can speculate about the 
possibility of a causal connection here. More than that, we might wonder whether a reciprocal 
causal relationship is indicated, for laughter is both a cause and a consequence of social 
capital, and vice versa. If we are laughing much less today it may indeed be because our 
stocks of social capital are in short supply. Therefore, once our stocks of social capital begin 
to fall it is reasonable to assume there will be fewer social occasions in which we can laugh 
interactively. But despite sharing a key inclusive-exclusive ingredient, the connection 
between laughter and social capital has rarely, if ever, been recognised. Perhaps theirs is a 
taken-for-granted relationship which, because it is so obvious it has, up until now, remained 
unstated and unstudied. What else could explain Putnam and his associates’ failure to 
document such a conspicuous coupling?  
 
Well, a closer look at the state of school education may have helped. This would have 
allowed Putnam the opportunity to put to one side for the moment his compulsion ‘to count 
things’ (2000, p.26), a method, he maintains, that delivers the best empirical evidence 
possible (2000). Schools are at their most enlightening when studied at close range. It’s only 
when the fine details are examined that they may reveal what it is about these small-scale 
communities which, in turn, may have much to reveal about behaviours, attitudes and 
practices that occur in wider society. To be fair to Putnam, he did in fact manage one visit to 
an elementary school, but only after his initial and most influential American-based phase of 
social capital research had been completed (Putnam et al, 2004). If an American elementary 
school is organised along the same lines as a British primary, it is possible he would have 
seen that education can, at times, undo all the good work in raising people’s awareness of the 
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merits and benefits of civic engagement and community mindedness. He would have seen, 
for instance, that schooling is slowly taking the fun out of pupils’ playtime with its over-
officious supervision in respect of pressing health and safety concerns. In some extreme cases 
this has lead to the complete loss of allotted playtime breaks, and has almost certainly 
contributed to severe restrictions in the choice of games in those schools where children are 
still allowed to play. And even when a range of games are made available the competitive 
impulse continues to drive pupils’ performances, so much so that the collective team ethic 
seems to have little real application within a system intent on only rewarding individual feats 
of excellence.   
 
Even though the inclusive-exclusive profile has been deliberately enlarged here to make for a 
more expansive examination and analysis, the task of trying to estimate what qualifies as 
inclusive and exclusive shows a corresponding increase in difficulty. A principal feature of 
this enigmatic, intangible pairing is their capacity, either individually or taken together, to 
somehow dissemble our senses, to render each element’s appearance deliberately equivocal 
so that it becomes difficult if not impossible to determine with any degree of accuracy its 
form and content. Therefore, while making the area of inquiry as comprehensive as possible 
it was necessary to impose certain limitations for fear of getting encumbered with a 
distracting array of peripheral issues. A line, for example, was drawn at the different types of 
laughter encountered during fieldwork. At the outset, giggles and guffaws, although 
important expressions that helped to determine laughter’s whereabouts (e.g. with the girls in 
the gazebo), did not make a big enough contribution to the thematic economy of the project. 
That said, however, Peter’s rare example of antecedent laughter, which was at once 
provocative and novel, deserved - for those very reasons - further attention. In the main, 
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however, it was the techniques children employed as they conducted themselves in the 
classroom and on the playground that were of central interest. 
  
By ‘techniques’ is meant the various methods of performance, and also the means by which 
some children choose to express their premeditated laughter. It describes the different 
approaches taken by pupils who show some commitment to forms of behaviour entertained in 
their minds ahead of any bodily articulation. Peter’s advanced laughter functioned like this, 
but Tahir’s imitation of the boys’ laughter in the exclusive playground group provides a 
better example. His was a tactical, carefully crafted (and crafty) form of laughter, hatched and 
delivered, it may be reasoned, out of hardship and necessity, at a time when all other means 
of affiliation open to him had failed. Playtime is an occasion when friendships and peer 
interactions assume great significance. It is also a significant phase of the school day in which 
to assess children’s interactive behaviour to see if it corresponds to the inclusive sentiments 
declared in their school’s mission statement. As for the two playground communities that 
occasioned Peter and Tahir’ singular laughter actions, ‘[t]he notion of separation combined 
with union’ (Kristeva, 1991, p.171) amounts to a pretty fair summation. As a venue for 
childish exuberance, of committed peer togetherness and association, the school playground 
can, to some pupils, be a cold and lonely place. Kristeva’s borrowing of Kant’s notion of 
‘unsocial sociability’ (in Kristeva, 1991, p.170) accurately captures many of the frustrations 
felt by pupils who may consider they have little choice other than to use their creative skills 
and inventiveness, to take matters into their own hands, to be, if necessary, aggressively pro-
active and to force the relational issue. Although we begin to get a less flattering account of 
the inclusive-exclusive primary school, a far more detailed, and perhaps more telling picture 
emerges of its character and its internal workings.  
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Reconciling these two warring factions - drawing them together in the form of the inclusive-
exclusive school - produces something more significant than just an ungainly, seemingly 
contradictory, appellation. It is indeed a label, a form of reference, but one that convincingly 
accounts for most, if not all, of the behaviours and practices that described the daily events 
that took place inside two mainstream primary schools. The problem with the much heralded 
and over-subscribed ‘fully inclusive’ school lies, to a great extent, in its nomenclature; it only 
tells half of the story. It tells a traditional tale whereby the seemingly contrary disposition, the 
insignificant ‘exclusive’ other, is effectively imagined away, relegated and seldom mentioned 
for reasons of prudency, since it is deemed to be the inappropriate and immoral member of 
the pairing. But any inclusive community depends to some extent on a variety of exclusive 
ingredients, from principles and structures to habits of thinking, behaviour, and practice 
(Clough, 1999). 
 
Whether any primary school would ever choose to make public such a compilation of 
negatives depends on whether they view such a degree of disclosure as potentially 
unflattering and harmful or refreshingly candid and authentic. Schools like The Cross and 
The Crescent have little choice but to over-describe, to aggrandise themselves in respect of 
the fully inclusive paradigm. Conditions in the market-led education system make it more or 
less a necessity since the very notion of education’s embrace of the business model is based 
on stakes of betterment, of surpassing competition, of the pressures placed upon them to out-
perform rival institutions. To that extent, ‘fully inclusive’ can become a very useful item to 
have listed among a school’s mission statement. Despite the charge that they (mission 
statements) appeal only to the ‘fan of badly written platitudes’ (Hobsbawm, 2013, p.2), it 
soon became apparent, however, that neither school fully deserved this designation. Their 
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inclusive goals, values, and practices scored highly in some areas but missed the mark in 
others. 
 
From the range of behaviours observed those that could be described as missing-the-mark 
originated mainly with pupils. Even so, there were occasions when anti-inclusive behaviour 
on their part was unwittingly solicited by their teachers – either because they were not paying 
attention, they were unaware, or simply not on message. For example, it was at times felt that 
there was no facility (perhaps due to a lack of skills, motivation, desire, time or resources) 
among staff to find in pupils’ exclusive behaviour a germ, a trace of something useful and 
promising, something potentially creative and innovative that could, for the benefit of the 
pupil, the school and the wider community, be worth nurturing. Willis (1976) hinted at this in 
his study of working class schoolboys. One can sense his frustration that pupils with 
undoubted but untapped skills and talent, those who show their abilities in unconventional 
ways (principally through their destructive wit) had little hope or opportunity of having their 
admittedly abrasive humour harnessed and channelled towards more constructive ends. This 
may have been because such skills and ingenuity as those ably demonstrated by Peter and 
Tahir are simply not recognised or accredited in the current system of education. The 
tendency today it seems - as it was in Willis’s day - is to ignore them, unless they have some 
obvious academic relevance or value.   
 
‘Creativity’ has assumed the status of buzzword or cliché in education circles of late, with 
schools urged to provide opportunities for children to express themselves in imaginative and 
creative ways. Most of these opportunities tend, however, to only be available in formal 
learning situations, occurring within the confines of the national curriculum. But as with 
laughter creativity is ambiguous, being equivocal on several levels. Whether it is concerned 
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with valuing and stimulating children’s inventiveness, their divergent thinking, or related to 
innovative teaching/imaginative learning, or is a process confined specifically to arts-related 
subjects, the actual educational significance of creativity remains unclear (Alexander, 2010). 
It could be argued, however, that children’s flair for creative and flexible thinking that occurs 
outside of the curriculum, and outside of the classroom, should be encouraged and be given 
just as much respect and attention. 
 
To ensure that this happens teachers will need to be in a good position to recognise their 
pupils’ creative potential. Schools will be failing those children if they are unable to provide 
suitably experienced staff with a suitable context in which to place the range of behaviours 
typically found in a mainstream setting, everything from the disparaging humour of Willis’s 
‘lads’ (1976) to Peter and Tahir’s playground theatrics. This is not to say that teachers and 
support staff are incapable of recognising a potentially gifted pupil when they see one, even 
one whose exceptional talent is presented in an unconventional guise. It’s more a case that in 
the inclusive-exclusive school this kind of behaviour would not only be expected, but it 
would be expected to be dealt with in a more constructive and sympathetic manner. 
 
Given the appropriate conditions it may even be actively encouraged if it was done so under 
the careful guidance and tutelage, let’s say, of one of those quick-witted teachers that 
frequented Woods’s school staffrooms (1984). Those ‘major laughter makers’ (1984, p.197) 
could be persuaded to put their own singular senses of humour to good use. They above all 
people may be best suited to recognise and appreciate (in a technical capacity) the biting wit 
and abusive humour in others if they themselves have shown a flair for delivering an expert 
put-down, a withering insult, or a mocking aside. They, perhaps, would be able to make some 
sense of Peter’s singular laughter display, and be able to see in Tahir’s relentless laughing 
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marathon a troubled child who seems prepared to go to exhaustive lengths in order to make 
some new friends. As Stengel pointed out, if teachers can learn to recognise the laughter 
produced by their pupils, to distinguish signs of contentment from those of discomfort, it will 
create opportunities for children to open up, to reflect and, as she suggests, make good use of 
this new discursive space (2012). Sadly, such opportunities at The Cross and at The Crescent 
schools were only partially exploited. One of the consequences of teachers at both schools 
ceding playground supervision to local parents is that they were no longer in a position to see 
the range of creative talents pupils displayed each playtime. In playgrounds of ‘unstructured, 
loosely supervised play’ (Alexander, 2010, p.65-66) Peter and Tahir’s inventiveness and 
tenacity went unnoticed by those staff members who matter most. They were too preoccupied 
elsewhere to notice that ‘something interesting was percolating’, something of genuine 
pedagogic value (Stengel, 2012, p.11).     
 
It is easy, however, to get carried away with the benefits and stability implied by the 
imaginary inclusive-exclusive school model. Gittell & Vidal’s (1998) two-model approach to 
community organising provides a salutary reminder of how the macrocosm of wider society 
can have an ominous correspondence with the microcosm of primary schooling. Their study 
has shown that the experiences of a research team’s participants come very close to the 
events and happenings lived through on a daily basis by pupils at school. Their study 
provides an indication of the importance and esteem with which exclusive behaviour and 
consciousness is held, and the powerful hold and elemental position it retains within a 
community of any size. It is a model that assumes within any community the existence of 
aggrieved parties. There will be those, for example who may feel impelled to take direct 
action in order to overcome or highlight their grievances, perhaps something commonplace 
such as those concerned with some form of discrimination (Gittell & Vidal, 1998). This is the 
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conflictual approach. Its sole focus and goal is to create exclusive bonding social capital 
among community members on the presumption that solidarity equals strength; the objective 
being to ‘change the system’ (1998, p.52).  
 
At variance to it is the consensual version. It stresses non-confrontational methods and 
advocates deliberate avoidance of organisations that are based on the conflict organising 
style, preferring instead to construct communities built around bonding and bridging social 
capital. It is an approach wrapped-up in the warm, safe, rational glow and healthy principles 
of mutual trust and reciprocity (Putnam, 2000). It is indicative of a community that is 
constantly encouraged to pull together in order to effect a shared vision based on common 
interests and agreed goals. Despite these fine sentiments, however, the consensual model 
detailed in Gittell & Vidal’s study returned only modest gains during its 3-year period of 
activity. On the very big prize, that of encouraging involvement from a diverse segment of 
the community, it failed absolutely. The conflictual approach was simply too well embedded, 
too deeply entrenched, for the consensual method to make any significant impact.  
 
Even within the idealised construction of the seemingly more democratic and correctly 
proportioned inclusive-exclusive school, some may take the view that each irreconcilable 
force will inevitably be competing and jostling for hierarchical position. It will be tempting, 
therefore, to equalise these relations, to try and maintain a sense of balance for fear that 
exclusive forces will remain a powerful if not over-powering entity in the relationship. As 
Clough notes, it is only when we begin to understand that ‘mind and society are intrinsically 
exclusive’ (1999, p.70) that we begin to realise our inclination towards proposing inclusive 
philosophies and adopting inclusive attitudes is not actually based on any credible 
foundation. But this is not the best way to consider the inclusive-exclusive conjunction. The 
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inclusive-exclusive school should not be thought of as an institution in possession of evenly 
matched orientations, in a state of perfect equilibrium, ultimately churning out perfectly 
balanced children. Thinking about the ways in which two theorists, Bergson and Koestler, 
fashioned their ideas about laughter’s functioning and capabilities, can provide us with a 
much clearer conception of the inclusive-exclusive relationship. 
 
Bergson was of the opinion that society viewed rigidity with suspicion (1911/2005). It is the 
main reason why, he claims, we are moved to laughter. We laugh because of someone’s or 
something’s lack of flexibility; there is a ‘certain mechanical elasticity’ where ordinarily ‘one 
would expect to find the living pliableness of a human being’ (1911/205, p.5). A rigid and 
ossified view of the inclusive-exclusive school would invite scornful laughter, according to 
Bergson. But, as he was at pains to point out, it is important to have the threat of corrective, 
mocking laughter hanging over those people, constructs, or situations that are prone to 
inflexibility. Laughter is endowed with admonishing capabilities; we laugh when a person, 
construct, or situation strikes us as ludicrous. It is therefore more appropriate to think of the 
inclusive-exclusive relationship not just as an overlapping binary, or a pairing in a state of 
constant upheaval, wildly antagonistic, grating and colliding, but one that is always full of 
energy and dynamism, consistent with Ball’s (2006) view of schools as conflicting and 
confusing places. If teachers and education ministers are genuinely concerned that schools 
should encourage creative and flexible thinking in their pupils, there can be no better 
environment than one that will habitually bring into contact two hitherto incompatible frames 
of reference to create a bisociative fusion, an act of creative energy of the very kind that 
Koestler believed gave rise to laughter (1964).   
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Bergson’s theory that laughter functions as a social sanction can be applied to the incidents 
that occurred during Mr Khan’s silent reading class. That laughter played a central role in 
those classroom events comes as no surprise. This is what laughter does. It is inherently 
ambiguous, cloaking itself in clever camouflage, bringing mischief and mayhem to all 
manner of social occasions, troubling our emotions and taking liberties with our perceptual 
senses. It was difficult to tell, of course, whether the ejected pupil’s peers were laughing at 
her, with her, or doing a bit of both. Importantly, however, had any of the adults present in 
that classroom been aware of Stengel’s (2012) formulation, and had anything more than a 
passing knowledge of Bergson’s theoretical views, they would have realised that Year 5’s 
laughter could have approximated to a cry for help, a signal that all was not well in the rigidly 
oppressive classroom, that the children were unimpressed with and probably disturbed by the 
artificial ambience of a decidedly uncomfortable silence.  
 
The children’s half-compressed laughter, at once concealing and revealing (Stengel, 2012), 
puts pressure on children particularly, but also on adults, in how to deal with this volatile 
behavioural marker, an indicator capable of doing two things - being inclusive and exclusive 
- at the same time. Again, it was difficult to tell whether the children had simply failed to 
suppress their laughter in class, that somehow their laughter management systems had broken 
down, or in fact the sniggers, titters, giggles and snorts were deliberately half-released – the 
intention being to ensure they were heard, that they should carry in their semi-compressions 
an overt criticism of the particular learning environment. Stengel’s recommendation that 
teachers should set about recognising laughter’s inclusive-exclusive signals would be given, 
under different (more specifically inclusive-exclusive) conditions, some serious 
consideration. Moreover, if teachers and their pupils stand to benefit from having such 
insight, as Stengel has argued, not only would it render silent reading sessions redundant (in 
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2009 Ofsted described this practice as counterproductive) it would remove the need for Mr 
Khan to have ever considered removing a child from his classroom.  
 
It is not clear from Stengel’s (2012) paper how teachers are expected to acquire those 
necessary recognition skills. Ideally, it would form part of their professional development 
portfolio. Ideally, it would include far more than an ability to recognise laughter and to 
decipher its many contextual signals. It would also cover an appreciation of laughter’s control 
mechanisms, i.e. the means by which it can be suppressed, or planned aforethought, or 
whether it should only be considered as an uncontrollable reflex, etc. Furthermore, it would 
include an ability to recognise that in certain school contexts children’s and adult’s attempts 
at laughter management can differ in some very important respects. At Mr Khan’s school, for 
example, the person responsible for laughter management duties was the school business 
manager (SBM). At The Cross School those undertakings fell to the headteacher.  
 
Mapping Laughter 
Both managers attempted to facilitate my laughter quest by organising a comprehensive 
observation/ interview schedule. Befitting their organisational skills they were able to identify 
not only where but when laughter was most likely to be found. This intelligence specified not 
only the days of its occurrence, but the very times of day. Periods and phases deemed 
favourable for its appearance were plotted and forecast with sibylline confidence. Their 
outstanding capacity for administrative efficiency was such that it seemed as though they 
believed (which was enough to make others believe) that laughter was just another 
predictable and measurable commodity waiting to be arranged and classified. Clearly they 
knew their respective schools well enough to know which lessons, which teachers, and which 
pupils were more likely to produce the requisite data. But at the same time they were obliged 
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to show the most positive side of their respective schools, being careful to protect those on 
the inside as well as to accommodate outsiders, fearing perhaps that instances giving rise to 
pupils’ exclusive laughter, and thus encouraging unflattering accounts of their schools in 
subsequent documentation, would be detrimental to both of their good names. It was 
noticeable, for example, that for the duration of fieldwork that came in the wake of the 
playground football match, the ‘troublesome’ boys in Year 6 at The Crescent School were 
quite deliberately kept out of my way.   
 
Even allowing for the fact that my basic laughter requirements were known in advance, the 
head teacher and the SBM radiated a cool rationality with their business-like approach to the 
task in hand. In meetings arranged before fieldwork began they showed not the slightest 
doubt that this fugitive and ambiguous phenomenon could be identified and located. For 
instance, both were reluctant to let me loose among their respective lower schools. It was felt 
that children of tender years might find my presence too much of a disturbance; the upper 
school seemed to be the preferred fit. Generally, their thinking processes seemed to follow a 
similar alignment. It was reasonable to assume they were based on a shared professional 
commitment to efficiency, order, and control. It was as though both were endowed with the 
same intuitive instincts and thinking patterns that could equally set dynamic strategies in 
place and then swiftly develop viable alternatives. Much of this mental endeavour proceeded 
according to an arrangement of unseen borders and frameworks, looking for windows of 
opportunity amid unyielding institutional bureaucracies, serving both inclusive and exclusive 
purposes, identifying and bracketing what or who belongs inside or outside of them, all the 
time the two individuals, without any need for consultation, were dedicatedly checking and 
matching scenarios in their heads against empty pages in their diaries: ‘Mrs Jones’s class 
might be better than Mrs Lewis’s… Mr Shah hasn’t been with us very long, so he might not 
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be amenable…Year 4 will be rehearsing ahead of a visit by the Lord Mayor that day…Miss 
Clarke is away on sick leave… afternoons will be better than mornings…there can be no 
observations directly before or during SATs week…can you come on the week commencing 
Monday 15th? ...the school pantomime this year is on a Wednesday…Friday assemblies are 
always lively…,’ and so forth.  
 
But for all of their calculations and considerations, their logical planning and intuitive 
thinking, their sense of comprehensible order and pragmatic rationality, for all the best 
strategic insights and skills they could marshal, the headteacher and the school business 
manager could not reveal the whereabouts of all the laughter behaviour at their schools. Nor 
indeed was this ever a realistic expectation. Nevertheless, it was a feat they came very close 
to accomplishing. The single exception to what would have been a perfect display of clinical 
administration came in the shape of The Crescent School’s Year 5 class and its (not so) silent 
reading group. But this in itself is significant. As a last-minute venue, a spur-of-the-moment 
opening, it provided, quite unexpectedly, some of the most interesting and memorable data 
collected during the inquiry. That it was accumulated on account of an unscheduled stop on 
my itinerary suggests it to be a sign, perhaps, of laughter’s recalcitrance, its considerable 
resistance to being managed in any capacity. In a way it was reassuring and a relief to realise 
that, despite the two leaders’ best efforts, and despite a near-flawless display of laughter 
management expertise, schools remain irrevocably complex, contradictory, and incoherent 
(Ball, 2006). 
 
It may seem unforgivably churlish to criticise the two school leaders who, during the entire 
period of fieldwork, gave of their time freely and showed only kindness and unequivocal 
support. But had they invited contributions from other stakeholders involved in the project, 
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other colleagues perhaps, or even a few pupils, it would have made my laughter quest more 
of a collective experience rather than an individual challenge. The effect could have been to 
shift the epistemological focus sufficiently to have allowed more, if not more informative, 
laughter data to emerge. It is a moot point, of course, whether collaboration of any kind 
would have been a steer in the direction of any better or worse research material. But the 
principle of building human networks which has been encouraged at both institutional and 
individual level (Putnam, 2000) continues in two fully inclusive school communities and in 
one fundamental aspect, to rely on a pronouncedly top-down model. It is one that, insofar as 
their management practices are concerned, is exclusive and excluding. The intellectual capital 
possessed in abundance and demonstrated most capably by the headteacher and the school 
business manger risks eroding what stocks of social capital both schools appear to have spent 
considerable time and effort in accumulating. Effective school leadership is impossible 
without the full inclusion and cooperation of all available and committed colleagues and 
learners. To ignore this is to undermine a school’s declared visions and values, and to risk 
reducing their fully inclusive statements to mere platitudes. It would be a travesty if the 
continuing difference between ‘complacent rhetoric and actual practice’ (Tomlinson, 1982, 
p.24) becomes a theme in education destined to haunt future school children for generations.  
 
It’s Better Together 
Willis (1976) believed that the school environment provoked, developed, and gave shape to 
pupil’s laughter. Woods (1984) claimed that it was through laughter that teachers could 
synchronise their public and private spheres. Stengel (2012) entertained the idea that pupils 
and teachers should laugh in mutually helpful ways. The common denominator here is a 
degree of congruence, a correlation between the institutional setting, its main protagonists, 
and their laughter. Plainly, this should come as no surprise since it is a principle that 
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constitutes laughter’s first rule of expression, that of the rarity - if not impossibility - of 
producing solitary laughter. It was conceptualised in Putnam’s declaration that ‘mirth is 
enhanced by companionship’ (2000, p.217), and if there happened to be no available 
companion there should ideally at least be something capable of providing a social cue or 
echo. Juxtaposed, and in contrast, to this correspondence is the discourse of dichotomy, a 
chronically debilitating condition within the primary school sector (Alexander, 2010), 
constantly disrupting and frustrating the progress of policy and practice. These two 
antagonisms proclaim compatibility and cooperation, difference and discord in a to-and-fro 
arrangement that closely describes the institutional dynamics in operation at The Cross and at 
The Crescent schools. Pupil’s laughter behaviour at both sites, on the whole, reflected this 
oscillation. Some like Peter’s, the outlier from Year 5, appeared to be ‘out of sync’, although 
his largely improvised display was probably just an attempt to keep in step with the singular 
rhythm, or arrhythmia, at The Cross School. There was rather more harmony in evidence at 
The Crescent in the figure of Tahir and his running/laughing performance. In a concerted 
attempt to tap into some friendship networks, he resorted to a cleverly disguised routine 
choreographed around a theme of mimicry, a form of conscious imitation in order to be ‘in 
tune’ with the boy’s group he was so eager to join.  
 
But the structures that govern the rhythm and routine of school life, as Peter and Tahir 
discovered, can sometimes lead to dissonant and discrepant behaviour. The unnatural 
atmosphere in the silent reading class may have been enough to trigger a series of laughter 
actions that busily and mischievously issued throughout the room, spreading quickly like a 
winter virus. In many ways it was like the outbreak that began with the girls in the gazebo, 
which only ended when their fast-acting risibility had been passed on to all onlookers, 
possessing them in a contagion of perfectly repeated and coordinated laughing contractions. 
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The compunction to synchronise with someone, something, to find that social echo (Bergson, 
1911/2005) was seen, too, in Hussain’s musical theatrics, which involved the artful and 
graceful matching of his movements to the background piano accompaniment during a game 
at the end of a forgettable  ICT class. And seen, too, in Mrs Bradford’s lesson with those 
unforgettable children learning their times-tables to a rhapsody of hand-clapping and 
rhythmical rote.  
 
In these playground and classroom examples, some of the children’s laughter behaviour 
simply reflected the features underlying their school’s organisational structure. Other 
examples were highly purposive, deliberate, calculated attempts to reconfigure them, finding 
gaps in the institutional framework such was their need to find alternative cues. Some 
children, it is reasoned, may have suspected these features to be out of alignment and took it 
upon themselves to implement change, attempting in effect to rearrange them at will for their 
own convenience. That laughter should occur at all inside inclusive school settings is because 
they are effectively places of contradiction and incongruity. Children’s laughter, therefore, 
can be seen to derive in part from, and as a response to, the messy structures and conditions, 
the organised and the disorganised patterns intrinsic to inclusive school life. If laughter is as 
important to education as many of the arguments presented here suggest, then both of these 
conditions and patterns should, at the very least, be acknowledged. When primary schools are 
routinely described as ‘inclusive’ or ‘fully inclusive’ they are at risk of placing themselves 
out of kilter with prevailing behavioural and communication tendencies. Failing to declare or 
factor-in the often absented ‘exclusive’ school ingredient is, in itself, an act of  segregation 
that makes a mockery of the principle that ‘it’s better together’ (Putnam et al, 2004), a 
precept that applies as much to the operation of institutions as it does to the activity of 
individuals.  
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Ethics 
It might be argued that ethics, as a crucial regulatory system, places itself beyond the 
parameters of any form of scrutiny or discussion, it being a sacrosanct, non-negotiable part of 
the research process. But it is included in this section because throughout the conduct of my 
research a variety of ethical issues have been raised which may merit some elaboration and 
debate. I shall, therefore, outline and review the conduct of my research project, which 
specifically concerns my dealings with staff and students in the role of participant observer. 
In doing this, I shall focus especially on the ways in which ethical concerns came to the fore 
in qualitative, and, particularly, ethnographic enquiries. In ethnographic work, the meaning 
and application of research ethics continues to provoke intense debates. Some claim it to be 
an inviolable part of the empirical process, and that its regulation should be increased as 
newer and ever-more innovative research designs come into being. Others argue that it has 
become an unnecessarily bureaucratic procedure, dominating and distorting the research 
process, and that the institutional industry which has come to direct it needs to be restructured 
if research studies of the future are to flourish.  
 
It is perhaps helpful to note here that it took several attempts before my application for ethical 
review was ratified. Each failed submission was returned by the university’s ethical review 
committee having adjudicated that it did not include enough detail. All aspects of my 
fieldwork were expected to be precisely itemised, right down to the duration of each 
interview and the whereabouts of every observation point. Although many of these details 
only become apparent once an investigation gets under way (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007), 
there remains a fundamental need in institutional ethics approval systems for protocols 
governing how researchers acquit themselves when conducting inquiries involving children 
and adults.  
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This degree of specificity seemed to me to be overly prescriptive since I felt, in the context of 
qualitative research and the notion of ‘emergent design’, that I needed manoeuvring room to 
respond spontaneously to those unplanned moments in the field, of which plenty were 
expected given laughter’s inherent unpredictability (Morreall, 1983) and fieldwork’s 
inveterate messiness (Marcus, 1994). The disjunction between the practical requirements of 
my research and the demands of ethical regulation appeared, however, to create some 
difficult-to-negotiate obstacles. 
 
And yet, as I am keen to argue in this and in other related contexts, rifts that seem contentious 
can, by and large, meet eventually with some degree of conciliation. As with the inclusive-
exclusive relationship, there may be some justification in seeking out an ethical-unethical 
rapprochement, or at least being sensitive to instances whereby the two opposing constructs 
overlap or intersect. Identifying these cross-over points may help one to examine and 
appreciate the difficult - if not impossible - undertaking faced by ethical committee members 
who must decide what constitutes appropriate and inappropriate research behaviour. It has 
been suggested, for example, that ethical review committees continue to operate under the 
influence of a largely positivistic biomedical paradigm (Israel & Hay, 2006). Such a model 
might not readily take into account the fact that, as a rule, qualitative research occurs in 
naturalistic conditions, settings often marked by disorder and ambiguity, where ethnographers 
have little or no control, and where one’s research design is not fixed but in a state of 
continual development (Hammersley, 2009). Any resolve on a researcher’s part to behave 
within agreed ethical guidelines can often be undone by the everyday practicalities of 
working on impulse and ad hoc in an indefinable and sometimes incomprehensible research 
environment.  
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At the end of one particular day given over to classroom observations, I was approached by a 
teacher who asked about my availability to help with the supervision of a group of pupils who 
were invited to attend a sports event (after school hours) at a stadium on the other side of 
town. It was made at very short notice, but her request carried the insinuation that 
implementing the visit depended entirely on my willingness to accept the offer. She was, it 
transpires, struggling to find the necessary quorum of adults prepared or available to act as 
supervisors. Not wishing to be the person held responsible for killing everyone’s joy, nor 
wanting to pass up the chance of getting what was anticipated to be a good amount of good 
data, I readily agreed to offer my services. It was only much later I realised that no allowance 
for such an eventuality had been specified on my AER (application for ethical review) form. 
The document only declared that for the duration of my fieldwork all data would be obtained 
from within the schools’ grounds, specifically their classrooms, corridors, and play areas.  
 
After careful deliberation, I decided against incorporating any of the sports-day material into 
my project. On the occasions when the university’s ethical review committee rejected my 
application it was on account of my reluctance to supply root-and-branch details of data 
collection procedures. Being expected to provide details of the situational conditions in my 
two case-studies before I had even seen them was asking for a prodigious feat of projection 
(Monaghan et al, 2013). Less than a week later, at the same school, and again at very short 
notice, I was asked to accompany a Year 5 class to their parish church. My task was to escort 
them on the short walk across the school car-park, and from there to supervise them as they 
entered the chapel and then attended the service. In this instance, however, there was no need 
for reflection and there was no sense of apprehension. I didn’t hesitate in using the data 
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collected there even though the church, by approximately 50 metres, lay beyond the school’s 
physical boundary. 
 
It’s fair to say that since then my peace of mind has been troubled more than once by this 
decision. In the end, I chose to use the observational data from the church visit simply 
because of the dimensions involved. It all boiled down to where the church and the stadium 
were positioned in relation to the school. The sports arena was situated miles from it. The 
church, on the other hand, was close by, although not actually on its property. To forestall 
suspicion just in case there were any recriminations, I’d rehearsed an exonerating formula 
borrowed from Gestalt theory which declared, ‘the closer things are to one another, the more 
we tend to perceive them as a single entity’ (Zerubavel, 1993, p.16). In all probability such a 
prescription wouldn’t get me off the hook, but to even think of having to make contingencies 
like this demonstrates the lengths some researchers may feel compelled to go in order to try 
and extinguish their own guilt and to cover their own tracks should questions be asked at a 
later date. Indeed, an artful and circumventing mind-set seems to have flourished in respect of 
this issue. Some doctoral researchers, it is suggested, are compelled to adopt a range of tactics 
(McAreavey & Muir, 2011), to take strategic approaches (Hammersley, 2009), in order to 
satisfy the strictures of university scrutineers. It indicates that even before fieldwork has 
begun they have already, in their imagination at least, grown suspicious of any putative 
distinction between ethical and unethical behaviour. 
 
The basic principle behind consent being informed is that participants are kept informed 
about the nature of an investigation. But Hammersley & Traianou (2012) make the point that 
it is precisely the speed at which events can overtake all known scheduling and planning that 
renders the one-off informed consent form unfit for purpose. Participants can become so well 
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informed that their new-found knowledge poses a viable threat to the integrity of an 
investigation. When children, for example, know what kind of material the researcher is 
seeking to obtain it can encourage in them a desire to produce voluntary (reactive) responses. 
It was for this reason that teachers and support staff who formed the adult cohort of my pilot 
study knew at the outset the precise nature of my investigation, and why the pupil participants 
were told only that my brief was to examine ‘aspects of communication’. Many educational 
ethnographers consider that opted-in consent is an excessively contractual instrument, 
weighed down by its implied legal orientation (Fujii, 2012; Crabtree, 2012). Implied consent, 
on the other hand, offers them a far more flexible option (Homan, 2001). Here, a head-
teacher will often act as the pupils’ guardian, ethically granting consent on their behalf.  
 
Getting acquainted with members of the study population is a high-risk strategy since it can 
create the kind of behaviour that ultimately compromises analyses and findings. Well-
intended rapport can move seamlessly into a relational stage that goes beyond what is 
necessary for a project’s completion. But it is not always easy to adopt the stranger-friend 
persona recommended by some ethnographers (e.g. Powdermaker, 1966). Slipping in and out 
of these fragmented roles, being at once socially connected and then disconnected, is difficult 
to achieve, particularly when participants in many school settings tend to be wholly 
supportive of projects, committing to them a genuine benevolence and an unguarded 
camaraderie.    
 
Whenever it becomes possible to maintain one’s emotional distance it becomes   
easier to make some necessary, but potentially hurtful, decisions. When criticisms of 
individual participants appear among one’s findings it will very likely put a strain on existing 
friendships. But just how should researchers respond when a fellow teacher, for example, 
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behaves unprofessionally? Even when adverse interpretations of behaviour or practice are 
justified, it can seem like an act of betrayal to those individuals disparaged. As Dingwall 
(2008) suggests, the production of yet more anodyne research with types of inquiry that re-
inscribe the status quo instead of disrupting and challenging it, is not the kind of prospect 
many people in the research community would wish to envisage or endorse. Therefore 
instances of unprofessional conduct on the part of school teachers should not be ignored. 
Overlooking such behaviour not only weakens the principles underlying the ethnographic 
method, it fails every pupil taught in circumstances most would eschew. Nor should it be 
ignored simply because it may, at the later feedback stage, present an awkwardly 
uncomfortable moment when an individual’s questionable behaviour is brought to light. What 
is often intended to protect the criticised and also the critic in such situations is the principle 
of anonymity.  
 
One way to maintain the integrity of the ethnographic method, of respecting research settings 
and subjects, is to ensure that the identity of each school and every individual is protected 
from both public and critical exposure. Anonymity has become the default position for most 
university-based ethical review committees. Along with the application of confidentiality, 
they form a bridgehead at which an institution’s and an individual’s right to privacy is 
preserved. And yet, researchers who are determined to uphold that right are expected to 
operate within a regulatory framework where that right is undermined at almost every turn. 
Even when identities are thought to have been cloaked and thoroughly coloured, it is 
relatively easy for certain individuals to be identified from among small populations such as a 
primary school. It can be argued that in our well-meaning efforts to become exponents of 
egalitarian research, we are at continuous risk of collecting data in settings bounded by 
ethical impossibilities.  
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The precise moment when feedback should be provided to participants raises some 
interesting administrative and methodological questions. Of the two schools that formed my 
study cohort only one requested that my findings should be made known to them. And, in 
respect of this, no time limit was set. I took this to mean that I could declare my findings 
when the entire project had been concluded, i.e. once my thesis had been checked for fitness 
and appropriately certified post-submission. Furthermore, we may take for granted the idea 
that host sites will always be enthusiastic about the follow-up services researchers provide. 
But there is always the possibility that for whatever reason, be it the constraints of time, the 
passage of time, or questions of relevancy, a host site may feel it is no longer appropriate to 
receive feedback.  
 
Both of my host sites eventually responded to the offer that my findings should be presented 
to them, although they didn’t exactly snap my hand off.  Clearly, this was not a priority issue 
for either school. Their apparent indifference contrasted sharply with my eagerness to get this 
stage in the PhD process completed before a looming deadline expired. However, those 
representing The Crescent School proved in the end to be not only charming hosts but 
generous, too. Once they had an opportunity to read my feedback report my overall efforts 
were commended, and thereafter a much keener interest was shown in the details of what my 
analysed data had contained. But at The Cross School it seemed that the installation of a new 
headteacher effectively severed a well-developed connection that had previously been 
established with the school. The current incumbent certainly did not have the same regard for 
my project as did her predecessor, despite attempts to inform her of its relevance and 
importance. And, I suspect, that her enthusiasm would not have improved by much even had 
I an opportunity to acquaint her with the scope of the venture undertaken, or the many 
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protocols that were passed at the outset, or that my conduct throughout and subsequent to the 
collection and analysis of data showed due consideration to all stakeholders.    
 
Feedback 
The inclusive and exclusive dynamic that has maintained such a high profile in this project 
was evident even at the project’s end stage. Among the final duties I had to perform was 
presenting the research findings to the research participants. This was more than just a 
common courtesy - it was also an important way to obtain respondent validation. And yet, 
when I eventually asked the headteacher at The Cross School for her permission to feed back 
my findings, it was Bergson’s famous phrase, an ‘absence of feeling’, that most accurately 
summed-up her response. Two years had passed from the time I began collecting data at the 
school. Since then, some significant changes within the staff team had occurred. The change 
with the biggest implication concerned the headteacher. Shortly after completing my 
fieldwork, which she had been so active in supporting, and unbeknown to me, she elected to 
leave her position and pursue a career elsewhere. Her replacement turned out to be not so 
accommodating, failing to show any enthusiasm for any part of the research, including its 
findings. 
 
Establishing lines of communication between us proved to be difficult and initially came to 
nothing. But unexpectedly, after 3 months, she managed a reply to one of my letters. 
Somewhat reluctantly she asked me to phone the school in order to arrange a meeting. 
However, when we spoke she changed her mind and suggested instead that I forward to her 
as an e-mail attachment a copy of my report (Appendix: A). This was duly despatched, 
complete with an invitation to comment on all parts of the document, and in particular to 
check that it did not contain any inaccuracies or points of contention. I am still waiting for her 
reply.      
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There was, however, far more encouraging news from The Crescent School. Here, the 
headteacher and the school’s business manager seemed reasonably keen to receive my report 
and keen also to give their responses to it. Prior to our meeting, I had the presence of mind to 
send on ahead to each party a copy of my written document (Appendix: B). I reasoned that 
they could read it before my arrival and therefore our meeting would be more likely to 
generate a group discussion rather than be fixed around a monologue followed by Q & A. 
And so it proved. Time constraints limited to three the number of people attending, but this 
did not detract from the depth and quality of the debate. Of the many issues highlighted in my 
report it seemed that some chimed precisely with concerns the school was currently 
addressing or about to address. General comments I had made, for example, about the state of 
the playground and the performance of playground stewards were met with promising visions 
of re-designed play areas and programmes dedicated to the training of break-time stewards 
and supervisors.  
 
To my surprise and delight the head let it be known that she wished to be included in the 
academic circle devoted to school-based studies on laughter. She made a request for copies of 
articles and any relevant literature. Moreover, she proposed the idea of having designed and 
then displaying a series of posters around the school, informing pupils, staff, and visitors, of 
the different types of laughter and humour behaviour (the inclusive and exclusive forms). It 
was felt that this activity could be linked most effectively to the national curriculum, 
featuring perhaps as a future topic on responsible citizenship as part of PHSE lessons. 
 
The main problem I found with the dissemination stage of my research was the size of gap 
that appeared between the time when fieldwork commenced and when findings were 
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concluded. It meant that the initial interest shown towards the project by those at both host 
sites noticeably waned. This was not unexpected, and a process of continuous feedback may 
have ensured such an event was less likely to happen. It would have been better to have 
maintained regular contact with each school and kept them informed on how my research - 
and how the task of collating data - was progressing. But that said, the really positive aspect 
of feeding back information to participants is that it provided an opportunity to re-connect 
with them. Those who read my report seemed genuinely fascinated to receive an outsider’s 
view of their school. Happily, there was no awkwardness or recriminations, only promises to 
remain involved (in at least some capacity) with those who were good enough to be so 
supportive and cooperative, and to be a continuing part of the school’s evolving future. 
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CONCLUSION 
A new way of thinking about mainstream schooling is proposed. Its inclusive-exclusive 
alignment is inspired by one of our oldest and most important information-processing 
faculties. Based on an elementary Gestalt approach to perception - the figure and ground 
experience envisaged by Bateson (2000) - it makes such an appealing prospect for the 
education sector one might imagine that only an ungainly appellation prevents it from 
becoming the mainline strategy for mainstream teaching and learning. How such schools of 
the future might function, and by what name they might be known, are discussed. 
 
Laughter has proved to be a surprisingly useful tool in assessing the viability of this 
approach. Its ubiquity and ordinariness, its elusiveness and equivocation, reproduces the 
disorderly and contradictory personal and institutional structures and conditions found 
typically within the K1 and K2 Stages. Yet among laughter’s ever-changing practices and 
habits abides an undervalued and underused performativity function. The way it is articulated 
in mainstream schooling, it is suggested, marks a moment when both the well-being of 
individual pupils and their school settings can be realised.  
 
We are, nonetheless, urged to approach laughter with caution (Boston, 1974). It may indeed 
provide some new and unusual insights into the daily happenings of primary school life, but it 
is equally capable of presenting a varied succession of impediments and challenges. Its 
inherent ambiguity ensures misunderstandings will commonly arise. But as will become 
clear, far from judging them as failures or mistakes that might invalidate data, 
misunderstandings can become ethnographically significant. The false antithesis between 
verstehen and missverstehen, to some extent, mirrors the positive and negative points of 
reference often associated with the inclusive-exclusive relationship. The concept of 
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reflexivity can help to reconcile these two opposing binaries, ensuring that to misinterpret or 
misconstrue an event or interaction in the field can in some instances lead to an 
epistemological breakthrough. 
 
Full Inclusion? 
Schools that describe themselves as ‘fully inclusive’ should be expected to defend making 
such a peremptory declaration. Whether it is an expedient claim or one based on good faith, 
the term will usually have some reference to a school’s policy of accommodating pupils 
regardless of their background or ability. But a fully inclusive environment can mean many 
things. It may include a position which instigates a zero tolerance of bullying and its related 
behaviours (e.g. teasing, ridicule, and intimidation). It may also include the implementation 
of equitable management structures and systems, more effective and fairer staff relations, the 
cultivation of a broad ‘team spirit’ ethic, or forging stronger links with the local community 
(Booth & Ainscow, 2000). To be fully inclusive can cover a wide range of personal, 
organisational, and societal dimensions. At all events, it should leave a school open to 
detailed scrutiny to ensure that it indeed fully deserves its meritorious description. And yet, 
instead of opening up, it can in fact effectively close the door on debate, inquiry, and 
analysis. This is because ‘fully inclusive’ is a term many people are reluctant to argue 
against. It is somewhat blindly presumed to be the definitive article, the conclusive 
educational ideal. Arguing against it amounts to a form of heresy, akin to questioning the idea 
of democracy or society. Ultimately, however, it is a troublesome term in two respects. It 
places all of its focus on one specifically inclusive element, virtually ignoring the more 
complex but arguably more dynamically charged exclusive features and structures. In 
addition, it can create in the minds of some inclusionists the belief that a goal has been 
reached, a journey completed, and a job already done. It might inadvertently ensure that a sort 
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of end-state comfort-effect obtains, encouraging campaigners and activists, teachers and 
pupils, to relax and become complacent.  
 
The findings presented here suggest that this should not be the case. No one can afford to rest 
easy, especially when only half of the inclusive-exclusive equation has been estimated. But 
laughter has proved to be a very useful estimation tool. It successfully brings into view the 
often elided and less desirable ‘exclusive’ school elements that some institutions would prefer 
to go unnoticed. Laughter can also operate as an effective ‘performance indicator’ (Johnson, 
2005, p.81), allowing checks to be made on the status and condition of a full range of 
behaviours and practices operating across mainstream settings. Yet, despite these and other 
undoubted abilities, laughter is still capable of presenting the researcher with an array of 
impediments and challenges. In fact, all of the methodological, theoretical, and personal 
resources that were used to lead this investigation managed, at various stages of the 
enterprise, to furnish one’s temperament with suspicion and to shake hitherto unshakable 
beliefs. Entirely befitting an exploration of the inclusive-exclusive model, not only did it 
open one’s eyes to new horizons, it cast doubt upon one’s capacity to see clearly.    
 
Figure and Ground  
All the same, there is nothing new, remarkable, or even radical about proposing an inclusive-
exclusive system of education. We habitually employ an inclusive-exclusive framework to 
help direct and evaluate our ways of thinking. It is the most natural means we have of 
processing and bringing order to our myriad daily experiences. Our perceptual and cognitive 
systems are involved in a continual shift between inclusive and exclusive positions, at once 
enhancing and then inhibiting information (Bateson, 2000). The term used to describe this 
process, ‘figure and ground’ (2000, p.187), concerns the way we privilege certain concepts or 
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inklings by bringing them to the forefront of consciousness (the ‘figure’), if they are deemed 
important enough. Alternatively, they can remain in the distance (the ‘ground’) if they are 
considered to be of less value or relevance. An observer does not perceive some situation at 
once, in all of its detail. Some entities become salient only as a ‘figure’ that stands before a 
more or less diffuse ‘ground’. The key point is that the functions of enhancement and 
inhibition are in a state of constant flux; each element (the figure or ground) receives 
different emphasis of attention at different times depending on an individual’s level of 
knowledge, their personal mood, and the extent that ideology shapes their behaviour. What 
we may include one minute can be excluded the next. It changes moment by moment.  
 
Bateson is only stating that we are natural practitioners of inclusive-exclusive behaviour 
(2000). It is a facet of every bias and instinct within us, part of the human tendency to judge 
and to discriminate, a fundamental part of our deep structure to be, not simply one or the 
other, but by necessity a bit of both. So adept have we become in maintaining a near-
obsessive commitment to insulating mental entities, to organising a rigid perception of the 
borders separating ourselves from others, we are inclined to miss the intricate physical, 
spatial, and temporal relationships that exist between assumed polarities. It is small wonder 
that children find it difficult to appreciate the kind of distinctions adults routinely make. They 
find it difficult fitting their experiences into our conventional categories, which may be one 
of the reasons why so many pupils have difficulty ‘fitting in’ at school.   
  
The figure-ground phenomenon has its origins in psychology. Outside of the discipline its 
influence was felt most keenly where the principles of Gestalt theory could be applied to 
aspects of composition. Music, unsurprisingly, benefited greatly from this. But the most 
significant transition was to the field of art. It challenged some of the fundamental 
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assumptions about how static objects and forms (shapes and colours) could relate to one 
another and create harmonious or discordant effects. It helped bring about a greater 
understanding of the way our visual and cognitive processes operate. Its application to 
scenarios whereby the key elements happen to be human and therefore more dynamic 
seemed, however, less convincing. And yet, the basic grouping principles of Gestalt doctrine, 
the organisation of parts such as proximity, uniformity, connectedness, and segregation, 
bespeak a language common in and applicable to a range of disciplines, not only within the 
arts but in the social sciences. It certainly applies to some aspects of ethnographic fieldwork. 
The starting-point for this study’s informal observations, for example, was largely an 
unorganised affair, with no particular system or structure set in place beyond an expectation 
to accumulate as much laughter data as possible. But once the project began to develop, the 
social dynamics of the ‘group’ emerged as the core unit of focus.  
 
Precedence was given to the grouping arrangements of pupils, i.e. those laughing outside of a 
typical group structure as well as those whose laughter originated within a recognisable peer 
ensemble. These types of actions and interactions did indeed return a steady stream of 
relevant data. But the gestalt approach also had its uses in respect to abstract relations. It 
could be applied where the grouping of not only people but events and situations were 
believed to have some sort of influence on children’s laughter production. The distribution of 
repeated elements of the school day, for example, were noted, such as the way core 
curriculum subjects were separated from non-core topics according to a morning-afternoon, 
formal-informal divide. Decisions implemented by school managers and administrators 
affected the day-to-day running of each school, but they also had a significant ‘figure-ground’ 
impact on the execution of fieldwork. Opening-up their respective schools to any outsider 
was an occasion for the headteacher and the school business manager to present each 
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institution in the best possible light, while at the same time carefully concealing or 
circumventing the less favourable parts. Not unexpectedly they were keen to steer me to 
observe and interview a particularly ‘good Year’, or a particularly competent teacher with an 
engaging or entertaining pedagogic delivery.  
 
Even though the fieldwork schedule was drawn up largely for the convenience of the two 
schools, I was not overly concerned about the dangers of being manoeuvred into or away 
from certain people or areas. I had no specific research requests or stipulations to make 
because I still wasn’t entirely certain what kind of things I was looking for - apart from a 
conviction that KS1 and KS2 would make the best cohorts to study. I was quite happy 
therefore to be guided by those who, to outward appearances at least, gave the impression 
that their knowledge of each research site was professionally thorough. The upshot of being 
party to such businesslike displays  of stewardship, however, was that it became difficult to 
establish any kind of rapport with the main participants of the inquiry since my ‘key 
informants’ during fieldwork (Ball, 1990, p.164) were mainly adults and not pupils. 
 
Perhaps the reason why Peter and Tahir attracted my attention in the first place, and why 
subsequently so much time was spent writing about them, was because to some degree their 
situation out in the playground was not unlike my own. Generally, there were few 
opportunities to make any informal connections with the children. Moments of banter and 
bonhomie did emerge, but most of the exchanges were self-consciously polite and formal 
since they were subject to constant supervision. This was disappointing not least because it 
meant there was no natural means by which the children could act as potential sources of 
useful, perhaps even unofficial, information. On the other hand, this ‘failure’ could in fact be 
construed as a success. For one thing, it provided an opening to see at close quarters the logic 
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and culture of school management practices. Although, at the outset, this was an 
unanticipated aspect for consideration relative to children’s laughter habits, ultimately it 
helped to apply an important extra perspective to the investigation. For instance, it offered an 
opportunity to assess how well these educational leaders knew their respective schools, and 
whether the directions I was given actually lead to the material I was looking for, or just to 
the material they were hoping I would find.  But over and above these issues, it ensured that 
after spending many hours engaged in fieldwork, many more hours converting raw data into 
coherent pieces of information, and even more hours poring over relevant accounts of 
playtime experiences and interpretations in books and journals, I came away from the two 
research sites having a much clearer physical and emotional understanding of what it must 
feel like to be a school user struggling to fit in.     
 
When access to a class or a school event had been successfully negotiated there remained the 
problem of adopting a suitable position, one that provided some advantage to the process of 
finding suitable data. It meant maintaining an acceptable distance so as not to get too close 
during observations and interviews for fear of unduly influencing the participant’s behaviour 
and responses, but not being so far away that I might miss something important – either an 
item of behaviour or a whispered reply. It meant there was a continual shifting in and out, as 
if repeatedly switching figure and ground lenses in response to an ever-changing field of 
attention. In certain classrooms it was more comfortable and strategically useful to reduce my 
profile, to remain in the background in order to gain a broader conspectus of events. 
However, some teachers like Ms Jones at The Cross School seemed reluctant to leave me  
isolated and detached, preferring instead to have me adopt a more inclusive position in her 
classroom community. 
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This inclusive-exclusive alternation was also evident when attempting to analyse and 
organise data. The findings that eventually followed were a carefully selected sample. 
Following Mary Douglas (1999), a considered decision was made to foreground the novel, 
the curious, eccentric, and singular laughter episodes, conferring upon them pride of place, 
while relegating the common, mundane, everyday examples. This was based largely on a fear 
that details of the ordinary, typical laughter habits of school children would not be viewed 
with much enthusiasm among a research community ever alert to instances of ‘originality’. 
There is a pressing need for ethnographers to fight familiarity (Delamont & Atkinson, 1995). 
It takes, as Howard Becker (1971) says, ‘a tremendous effort of will and imagination to stop 
seeing the things that are conventionally ‘there’ to be seen’ (in Hammersley & Atkinson, 
2007, p.82). What in effect was finally brought to the fore was a very small number of 
exceptional cases of laughter behaviour that could not, in all honesty, be described as 
representative of pupil behaviour at either school. 
 
Nonetheless, the figure-ground experience became a recurring feature during fieldwork, and 
grew steadily in influence. But this should not have come as any surprise given that it has 
proved to be a concept some researchers ordinarily associate with an ethnographic 
perspective (Belmonte, 1979). Anthropology’s concern with the ‘other’, with the identities 
and behaviours of so-called ‘primitive’ non-Western subjects, was all but reversed when 
Western ethnographers began to place their own societies and, much later, their own personae 
under the research spotlight. A commitment to an understanding of the reflective-self brought 
the background of the ethnographer into parallel with the lives of their foregrounded 
participants (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). Postmodern developments in qualitative 
inquiry saw the positionality of the researcher and their participants defined according to a 
partnership principle. Managing this reciprocal relationship, however, demands some skilful 
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manoeuvring on the researcher’s part. It is a process that constantly fluctuates, with each 
juxtaposition an involvement but also a detachment, a continual shift in disposition which, if 
not smartly judged, risks leaving the identity of who or what is the actual ‘figure’ (in the 
figure-ground scenario) in doubt. Excessive intrusions into ethnographic texts inevitably lead 
to accusations that researchers lack objectivity.  
 
Figure and ground describes the contrapuntal arrangement that lies at the very heart of 
ethnographic inquiry. It is very much expected of observers to attend to the vigorous, explicit 
behaviour and interactions of participants, but not to overlook the latent, seemingly 
insignificant – sometimes richer – smaller details. Paying heed to those subtle ‘twitches’ and 
‘winks’ (Geertz, 1973, p.7) encourages a continuous process of focusing and re-focusing 
within the visual frame, and become a regular feature of field activity. It had its widest 
application on the school playground, although here it produced only mixed results. The two 
big set-pieces – the pair of formal and informal football matches that all but dominated play-
time at The Crescent School – returned disappointingly little in the way of laughter 
behaviour. Those large and swiftly moving sporting scenes full of energy and movement 
from a mass of pupil-players returned less rewarding evidence because there were too many 
deeds and actions vying for visual attention. In trying to make observations all-inclusive it 
can leave one’s perceptual faculties with simply too much to do. But the small and arguably 
more valuable portrait of Tahir and his laughing-running routine was only delivered when it 
became possible to see beyond the prominent games of football, having developed an ability 
to perform, in gestalt terms, a figure-ground reversal.  
 
Figure and ground is also a way to describe the relationship between the behaviour and 
interactions observed and their contextual frames. The perceived ethnographic wisdom is to 
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ensure that ‘context information is recorded before the thick description per se is begun’ 
(Carspecken, 1996, p.47, first italics added). Details like time and location are carefully 
sketched-in a priori to provide a feel for the setting’s atmosphere, for the environmental or 
physical conditions. Quite often, however, contextual factors remain in the background and 
stay there only until they are summoned by the researcher as an explanatory tool or a 
corrective resource. Ordinarily, context provides a fix on the nature of the activity at hand, it 
being the situational setting that frames a behavioural event. Its clarifying power can help to 
bolster data analysis and bring light onto interpretation. But Alexander (2010) sounds a 
warning to those who might downplay the significance of contextual information, suggesting 
they should not be treated as concepts that provide mere circumstantial evidence, simply 
occupying space behind the all-important figure. It was, for example, when children’s 
behaviour seemed out of tune or out of sync with the broader social circumstances that the 
hitherto dutiful background details grew massively in importance.  
 
Paying careful attention to contextual matters made it possible to draw out some plausible 
interpretations of Peter’s unusual laughter display and the nervous giggling of the children ill-
at-ease during Mr Khan’s silent reading class. These were assumed to be examples of 
discrepant behaviour of the kind that typically warrant methodical examination, that call for a 
degree of critical focus. It was only by analysing the formative events which led to those 
noteworthy actions taking place that it became possible to speculate as to their likely causes. 
But there will always be certain activities that seem deceptively plain and simple to make 
sense of, and that demand the very minimum of information or background details. There 
were no appeals to context, for instance, when it came to providing a relevant and fruitful 
explanation for the laughter produced by the group of girls happily occupied in the 
playground gazebo. Beyond the fact that it was playtime and the girls seemed to be in high 
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spirits there appeared no need to spend time trying to determine likely motives for their heart-
warming behaviour.  
 
Laughter like this can stir the emotions, but it does not always incite the kind of investigative 
spirit necessary to determine its cause or antecedence. The inclination was, in fact, quite the 
opposite. The urge, rather, was to luxuriate in its very pleasing affects, to accept it as an 
instance of happy, inclusive laughter, and remain gladdened by the pupils’ uplifting sound, a 
sound inspired by unbridled contentment. Under these blissful conditions it was easy to lose 
one’s sense of focus, to get distracted, even become slightly mesmerised by laughter’s 
palatableness. Its bewitching effect was such that it induced in me a curious form of inertia, 
temporarily paralysing all attempts to engage any of my rigorous information-processing 
strategies.  
 
Events which can be described as producing negative (exclusive) laughter will tend to affect 
our motivational systems more actively than positive ones. Insofar as fieldwork was 
concerned, intuition dictated that exclusive laughter needed to be addressed, confronted, and 
dealt with. Taylor (1991) proposes the view that aversive events produce complex cognitive 
and affective reactions that good, wholesome, desirable behaviour does not. This is because 
bad events will usually demand a pressing need for prompt settlement or solution; they 
inspire a largely pro-active response (1991). ‘One can thus ignore something good more 
easily than something bad’ (in Baumeister et al, 2001, p.360). This may be the reason why 
the seasonal pantomime at The Crescent School, which provoked unceasing laughter from 
pupils for an hour and-a-quarter, prompted only the occasional entry in my field journal. The 
children’s laughter was, in this particular case, simply too good. 
 
248 
 
Despite a tendency to give greater weight to exclusive laughter events, the final tally of 
laughter episodes that were encountered and examined throughout the period of fieldwork 
proved to be approximately in equal inclusive-exclusive proportion. The overriding concern 
was that a concentration of exclusive laughter material would have invited understandable 
criticism from the host schools. Additionally, such a concentration would have affected any 
viable conclusions drawn out in respect of the research question. Children’s laughter might be 
able to tell us a great many things about inclusive schooling, but it would be a stain upon the 
nature of objectivity if all it could tell was my propensity for a particular type of laughter 
behaviour. But none of this can disguise the fact that exclusive laughter has a singularly 
significant value. It is more informative insofar as it can provide useful information about the 
kind of behaviour and activity that departs from what is understood to be the primary school 
norm. For example, children are expected to be respectful of behavioural codes during their 
time at school. Evidence where this might not be the case, where exclusive or bad laughter is 
seen to occur, can show that school-based norms and rules are being defied, which may 
reveal something about the inner dispositions of the rule-breaking pupils concerned, but can 
also prove insightful on the behaviour of those with responsibility for enforcing those school 
rules and practices.       
 
But of the many examples of inclusive laughter that were witnessed in classrooms and across 
playgrounds, even they could contribute to the potential flaw and distortion of research data. 
Inclusive laughter can lead one to forget about determining the unseen cause of children’s 
vibrant laughter, and to concentrate instead on the highly visible consequences of it. At The 
Cross School the gazebo girls’ risible symphony was spreading so quickly and infecting 
everyone who heard it, it approximated to a playground epidemic. But reciprocal effects of 
this nature can make researchers forget the supposed impartiality of their researcher’s 
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position, especially when they unwittingly get caught up in events, becoming so involved that 
in effect they are no longer merely observing the event, but contributing to it. When incidents 
of this kind occur, one’s level of participation becomes so deep that an inexorable link is 
established to those who are producing the laughter. Like it or not a social bond of sorts is 
formed, of a type Tahhan (2013) describes as a ‘touching at depth’ (p.45). Whether or not I 
was deeply or unduly influenced by this incident, there were subsequent observations when I 
paid perhaps rather too much attention to some of the gazebo girls while in the classroom and 
on the playground - expecting, hoping, they would articulate more of the same, although, as it 
happens, they never did. Perhaps King (1978) was right all along. Researchers should make 
more of a commitment to ensuring their emotions do not betray them or distract them. They 
should maintain a straight face during observational duties, and remain expressionless, 
passionless. 
 
It can make very good sense to effect an ‘anaesthesia of the heart’, as Bergson recommends 
(1911/2005, p.3). Where a human emotion is the subject of inquiry there should indeed be, on 
the researcher’s part, ‘an absence of feeling’ (p.2), particularly if they are keen to project for 
themselves an image of authority and an air of committed efficiency. In such circumstances, 
laughter’s appeal should be ‘to intelligence, pure and simple’ (p.3). This advice might ensure 
that even where a researcher is getting more involved in the research inquiry than they 
anticipated, their involvement is never so deep that its risks becoming dangerously over-
familiar. The advice to ethnographers while in the research setting is to avoid ‘feeling at 
home’ (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p.90). If that sense of being a stranger is ever lost, 
according to their argument, we may also lose our critical and analytical sensibilities (2007). 
Alternatively, we could always ensure that both laughter’s cause and its consequence are 
carefully taken into account. What matters at all times is to acknowledge laughter’s inclusive-
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exclusive capacity. This should allow us to appreciate its twin dimensions. It will make 
inquirers more attentive to the possibility of getting caught off guard, perhaps beguiled, for 
example, by the sound of beautiful, inclusive laughter, or even incapacitated, rendered awe-
struck, as when confronted by instances of bad, exclusive laughter.  
 
Verstehen and Missverstehen 
My attempt to makes some sense of the decision by the head at The Cross School to avoid 
involving herself in my study, in particular the feedback stage, was as accurate as the 
available information would allow. But attempts to understand social experiences and 
behaviour will invariably lead to instances of error, of misunderstanding. In the world of 
qualitative inquiry where validity and reliability remain fundamentally important conditions, 
the expectation is to ensure assertions and interpretations produce a fulsome but trustworthy 
research document. Working within the qualitative tradition researchers will appeal to 
contextual information for a more accurate understanding of social events and institutions. 
Failing, for example, to appreciate the broader social and emotional sensitivities of the two 
girls at The Cross School who faced potential derision for playing netball with equipment 
they believed was intended for the game of basketball, impresses on the mind just how easy 
errors of judgement can occur when engaged in a school-based inquiry. Schools are situated 
in a world where a child’s laughter and a child’s distress are intimately related, where a 
shriek of delight can turn into a scream of terror, where a smile is never far away from being 
a grimace. A regular hazard of so much observational work in schools is the development of 
‘observational strain’, a condition where fatigue brought on by repetitious inspection 
obstructs the visual senses normal functioning.  
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Errors can also arise because of our world-weary habits in processing information. The way 
that we separate entities from their surroundings is what allows us to see them in the first 
place; they have to be set apart so that they can stand out. We categorise and we classify. We 
obey the urge to pigeon-hole a behaviour, a person, or an activity, so that it stands out and we 
can make better sense of it. Without an ability or tendency to erect organisational frames or 
establish categories we would not be able to see very much at all. Our perceptual and 
cognitive faculties function according to a constantly shifting and sifting classificatory 
system, be it objects, events, or people. It is at once a highly sophisticated operation, 
neurologically and biologically speaking, yet at the same time it is operationally primitive 
and naïve. From the observer’s perspective, those things that appear to belong together are 
usually grouped into a single mental category. When we cast items into homogeneous lots it 
is often done for convenience sake, and quite often with little regard for an item’s unseen or 
unknown uniqueness.  
 
One of the consequences of falling slave to this processing schema may have resulted in a 
case of mistaken identity concerning the pupil who, up until now, has been referred to as 
‘Tahir’. This boy’s background was presumed to be Pakistani, a heritage it was believed he 
shared with most of the pupils at his school. According to field-notes they document only that 
a small Asian boy was running and laughing about the playground in a manner that was 
intriguing enough to warrant further scrutiny. There was no reason to question his ethnicity at 
the time, for it seemed to be beyond dispute. But months after fieldwork had been completed, 
and just when the writing-up stage had begun, doubts as to ‘Tahir’s’ initial identification 
began to emerge which meant that it was no longer possible to uphold with any degree of 
confidence. It is entirely possible that this pupil at The Crescent School was in fact a white 
boy - one of the (very) few remaining indigenous British pupils still in attendance at the 
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school. It was simply taken for granted that ‘Tahir’ was Asian - even though his complexion 
was noticeably pale. The error is difficult to justify, especially as it has been well known to 
me that among the inhabitants of the Indus Valley there are populations with complexions 
lighter than Caucasians. The Kalasha, for example, a tribal people who have lived in northern 
Pakistan for a thousand years, are so fair (in skin colour) they are routinely mistaken for 
Europeans.  
 
Unlike Geertz, whose experiential moments occurred during his detailed account of the 
cockfights in Bali (1973), my moment of revelation occurred well away from the research 
site and many months after observations had been completed. Whether it was an example of 
post-field reflection or it came about as a result of some conscious-subconscious orientation 
in the figure-ground manner, Marcus suggests that it can be the ‘diffuse efforts to come to 
terms with the lacks and failures of fieldwork afterwards that provide the richest and the 
‘thickest’ materials’ (2006, p.115, italics added). Not that there were an excess of difficulties 
or frustrations encountered during my research role, although there were constant periods of 
doubt and uncertainty. Okely (1992), in agreeing with Marcus, makes the point that ‘field-
notes may be no more than a trigger for…hitherto subconscious memories’ (p.16). It is 
therefore quite possible that this period of ‘post-fieldwork fieldwork’ (Cohen, 1992, p.339) 
could have provided me with a different angle of vision, an opportunity to reconstruct my 
ethnographic account from the notes that continued to develop long after observations and 
interviews finished, but not notes culled from the field, rather those ‘from that mental note-
book which is never closed’ (1992, p.339).  
 
In an effort to try and reduce laughter’s negativity bias, countless attempts were made to 
neutralise the greater potency of exclusive laughter by re-engaging with the mass of head-
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notes that had been mentally stowed away. The hope was they would help to establish why I 
felt there was such a need to record mainly exclusive laughter data, and determine what it 
was that made me finally decide instead to equalise them, to ensure that inclusive and 
exclusive laughter episodes should be evenly represented throughout the study. It was during 
one of many equalising moments like this that the first doubts about Tahir began to emerge, 
doubts that grew suddenly into a major perturbance. Constantly replaying his playground 
routine in my head, together with the unusually harsh judgement of him by the group 
members he seemed so interested in joining, may have succeeded in suspicioning my initial 
analysis. With the benefit of this hindsight, assumptions about Tahir’s identity were now 
considered a low-risk, non-contentious strategy, a way of dealing with a potentially difficult 
and sensitive issue that would certainly have conferred upon my findings some much needed 
impact, had it been carried through, but may have caused nothing but trouble for the staff and 
pupils at The Crescent School. It therefore may not have been just a simple observational 
error on my part. More likely, it was a subconscious wish for neatness, a desire not to leave 
any messy, awkward ends, but, rather like a meta-analysis in research that achieves a skilful 
synthesis or, in the world of humour and laughter, a successful joke/funny story that delivers 
a conclusive punch-line or satisfying dénouement, there was an irresistible impulse to find an 
orderly means of resolution.  
 
If ‘Tahir’ was truly a white pupil, the playground incident would have raised a problem that 
was unlikely to be confined to the school setting alone. It was an issue bearing much wider 
social and political significance, one that could have been easily exploited by certain parties 
or groups in the broader community intent on using confrontational methods in a manner 
Gittell & Vidal (1998) have previously described. Even though the general public have a 
right to be informed about such matters, this privilege must be weighed carefully against the 
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sensitivity that must (also) be shown to local community relations in an area where they 
achieve, at best, a delicate balance. Putnam has described in general terms the phenomenon 
whereby white families abandon their communities in the face of increased patterns of 
immigration as ‘white flight’ (2000, p.209). Over time, these new settlers can become the 
majority population. The commonsense view is that social capital either gets lost in the 
transition or it is simply replaced, like for like. Putnam, however, sees immigration as a 
national asset, arguing that diversity fosters creativity, economic growth, and inter-ethnic 
tolerance and social solidarity. And if black and white children attend the same schools race 
relations will improve, he says somewhat hopefully (2007). At all events, the emphatic 
decline in white pupil enrolment at The Crescent School remains a sensitive issue. 
 
In my capacity as a teacher I am inclined to be far less forgiving when confronted by 
exclusive behaviour in the playground, particularly if it is thought to contain a racial motive. 
But in my role as a researcher it was an act that I deliberately chose not to acknowledge. Out 
of some sense of loyalty to the school concerned, I feared that by highlighting the 
transgression some form of community backlash would ensue. That said, however, I had no 
such qualms about bringing to light the details of what occurred in the same school during a 
silent reading class. There was no circumspection, no corresponding anxiety on that occasion, 
no fears about upsetting anyone inside or outside the school. This inconsistency is difficult to 
justify, except to say there were nagging doubts (that remain to this day) about ‘Tahir’s’ 
identity, whereas Mr Khan’s actions were beyond all possible doubt. It was inconsistent, too, 
to suggest that Mr Khan had acted rashly when I had committed a very similar act, or at least 
performed an inverted version of it.  
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Whereas he had taken a child from a group to which she naturally belonged, I had placed a 
child into a group where he almost certainly did not belong. Even though ‘Tahir’ made a 
valiant attempt to become a member of a group which at the time was keenly resisting his 
every effort, I managed with very little thought or effort to assign him a less problematic 
categorical identity, one based on a highly selective system of perception and classification. 
But then adults are quite accomplished at employing tactics of control when it comes to 
children (Jenks, 2005). This is so even when intentions are well meant. Children are certainly 
subject to fierce forms of regulation. The whole premise of adult interaction with the child is 
based on a combination of precept and control. It operates through, among other factors, a 
process of ‘hierarchical observation’, says Sheridan (in Jenks, p.82). It operates according to 
a depth of gaze in the child-adult relationship that had it been slightly more democratic, 
trusting, and slightly more reciprocal, it may have led to a decrease in authorial control and 
an increase in authorial humility (Stoller, 1989).   
  
Post-fieldwork Fieldwork 
One of the ways to assuage any feelings of guilt at having been so careless, and also to retain 
a measure of face-saving credibility, is to have the perceived error declared instead a 
‘discovery’. This is how the ethnographic film-maker, Jean Rouch, was able to deal with and 
make sense of an epistemological oversight that had troubled him for many years. After a 
prolonged period of post-fieldwork fieldwork he realised that his initial interpretations had 
been founded on a series of misidentifications. Findings from observations that focused on 
symbolism used by the Songhay people in Niger were gleaned and scrutinised using an 
inappropriate Eurocentric perspective (Stoller, 1989). Essentially, while studying different 
aspects of their world view, he saw in the Songhay’s geographical/transport network a series 
of road systems which intersect, whereas his native informants saw roads which end in forks - 
256 
 
an inconsequential matter on the face of it, but one of foundational importance in Songhay 
cosmology. And so, 30 years after he made his initial error, he was impelled to reassess, to 
reconsider, and only then, after all that time, did he begin to see the delusion of his original 
thesis (Stoller, 1989).  
 
I would like to think that there was something deeply virtuous in not being able to distinguish 
between most of the inclusive and exclusive laughter forms/examples I encountered. 
And, further, to posit whether my inability in these cases can be correlated to my failure to 
distinguish between a white pupil and Tahir, an Asian one. At one level it might look like a 
basic ethnographic oversight. But on another level, there may be something positive and 
ennobling to be said about a failure not to see such differences. It may reveal something more 
profound/substantial about an individual’s innate urge not to habitually separate or feel 
impelled to categorise. To see people as indivisible is surely among the most important steps 
that need to be taken when building an inclusive society. Indeed, perhaps we should be 
finding it more difficult to classify entities, be they social or abstract. If it can become 
possible to genuinely overlook distinctions, to take greater heed of our first order responses, 
regarding them as more accurate accounts of things seen and said, it may help us to 
understand the moderating influence that the process of reflection has on our essentially pure, 
raw, fieldwork experiences.  
 
My own experience of post-fieldwork fieldwork may have prompted a comparably slow 
disclosure, a gradual dawning and realisation concerning the question of Tahir’s identity. I 
managed to convince myself that resistance to accepting what I thought to be his true ethnic 
status was because I did not want to foist problems of a racial nature on to a school already 
feeling the strain across so many different educational, social, and political fronts. Besides, 
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previous experience of dealing with irate sections of a school’s community over disputed 
research findings had left me exceptionally wary about antagonising managers and teachers.  
Small comfort could be had from the knowledge that suppressing the truth for ethical reasons 
retains an instrumental value in naturalistic research (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). 
Moreover, it is claimed that doubts and uncertainties lie at the heart of ethnographic and 
educational inquiry (Frankham & Smears, 2012). Viewing these negatives as positives 
proved not only consoling but seemed an expedient way of invoking and defining my 
personal inclusive-exclusive agenda, the explanatory principle of which is one that 
simultaneously delimits and enhances information, be it habits of thinking or ways of seeing.  
 
Aspects of a researcher’s value orientation or personal agenda can be revealed in fruitful and 
illuminating ways when individual assets such as their ‘identity capital’ are engaged (Côte & 
Levine, 2002, p.141). Not unlike its more famous social variant, identity capital amounts to a 
person’s psychosocial skills and attributes, those personality mechanisms that can be cashed-
in to facilitate acceptance and entry into desirable social groups and settings (2002). Wary of 
being perceived as an outsider or an authority figure, fieldworkers will know that an ability to 
smile and appear pleasant, or being possessed of a flair for making others laugh, will go some 
way towards building that all-important rapport with a group under scrutiny. Substantially, 
then, one’s identity capital covers the range of resources an individual is able to deploy in 
order to define themselves and to be defined by others (2002). The stress placed on this 
reciprocal essence, on interactions and relationships, lies at the concept’s heart and serves to 
remind us that researcher positionality can only be considered with respect to the population 
to be researched. When adopting a hermeneutic position, for instance, one that infers or 
interprets meanings from participants’ actions or articulations, an ethnographer is enjoined to 
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try and assume a performative attitude, to ‘take the position’ of those participants, and to see 
things from their point of view (Carspecken, 1996, p.99).  
 
But it is also important for fieldworkers to appreciate that positionality can be flexible and 
subject to frequent change. Watching Tahir’s attempts on the school playground to gain entry 
among his preferred peer group grouping brought this particular point powerfully home. Not 
only is it liable to change, but the positionality of the researcher is not so far removed from 
that of the participants. Both will at times use artful means to try and describe ‘who they are’ 
or, if necessary, ‘who they are not’. Tactics researchers employ when in the field in order to 
ingratiate themselves, to heighten their respectability, to make them appear sympathetic and 
concerned for participants, may mean that the art of getting pupils, for example, to ‘open up’ 
may be achieved by manufacturing a relaxed and natural ambience, and will depend to some 
extent on performing a variety of ruses and feints, by sometimes subtly masking one’s true 
character or motivation. Outwardly at least, it may look as if the power differential between 
researcher and participant is being maintained if not actually extended. The wily and skilful 
researcher could be conceived as attempting to outwit unsuspecting and gullible youngsters 
by coercing them to perhaps unwittingly reveal details about themselves, and artfully 
extracting reasons to account for their various school-based actions and articulations. But 
children are not above doing this kind of thing themselves. Those like Tahir and Peter have 
shown they possess a great aptitude for such forms of cunning and contrivance. Tahir’s 
performance, in particular, was so skilfully wrought that not only was I taken in by it, but it 
might have contributed indirectly to my fateful attempt at identifying him. His exhibition 
proved so absorbing it may have caused a momentary lapse in my concentration. This led to a 
failure to observe data correctly, which ultimately led to a failure to uphold my own 
inclusive-exclusive anti-discriminatory position.  
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To speak of an ‘inclusive-exclusive’ society or constitution is unlikely to fashion it as a 
particularly appealing prospect. It lacks the emphatic exactness suggested by the neatly 
totalising, confidently declarative, ‘inclusive’ society or ‘fully inclusive’ school. Thus, it is 
not perhaps the kind of social system or ideology many people would voluntarily wish to 
inhabit or espouse, despite it being one that realistically describes a society and disposition 
that manages to accurately reflect its vigorous mix of positive and negative mechanisms. 
Such an achievement, it is argued, should be openly and proudly acknowledged. And it is 
with regard to this mixture of mechanisms that ‘Tahir’s’ questionable identity, or my 
understanding of it, resonates with particular effect. For the duration of playground fieldwork 
these two aspects stood in close proximity to one another. I assumed Tahir was Asian, but 
deep down I suspected he was white. The pretence was maintained, I suggest, to deflect any 
possible criticism that could be directed at the school. But just like Saleem Sinai, the 
mistrustful narrator in Midnight’s Children, I was taking liberties with a known error 
(Rushdie, 2008). And just like any author of a textual incongruity my narrative account, 
perhaps with all due aptness, had left myself open to ridicule.   
 
Nonetheless, this error offered a useful way to reflect on a much larger picture. It provided 
some insight as to how pupils like Tahir are viewed, and perhaps view themselves, as 
fractured individuals, as children embodying a double sense of self. Many like him, for 
example, carry dual nationalities. They maintain strong links with their ancestral homelands 
but enthusiastically embrace selective aspects of British culture. Many boys like Tahir regard 
themselves, and are regarded by others, as outsiders and insiders (Bhatti, 2011). In this sense, 
Tahir approximates to a typical figure among his peers who may feel at any one moment 
inclusive and exclusive, engaged and disengaged. In some respects he is much like ‘Tahir’s’ 
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significant other, the little white boy, whose prejudicial treatment in the school playground 
occurred against a backdrop of the dissolution of white, mainly working-class, communities. 
A large number of families deliberately abandoned their homes on a racial impulse. They left 
behind a scattering of white friends and relations, some of whom were defiantly hanging on; 
others simply didn’t have the financial means to resettle. They also left behind a reduced 
community of children many of whom were suddenly left vulnerable and exposed. In an 
example of history’s eternal recurrence, those children, both on the street and on the 
playground, soon fell prey to the kind of racially motivated behaviour and experiences that 
their modern-day tormentors, and their ancestors, endured and indeed continue to endure. 
 
Laughter’s History and Future  
A common view of human history is to see it as a series of turning-points, a succession of 
ruptures and shifts which singly and collectively help define the growing sophistication and 
advancement of civilised societies. Each discovery and break-through, each juncture and 
watershed, forms the central motor that can highlight the historical significance of select 
intellectual atmospheres and cultural periods. Each distinctive stage or epoch becomes a 
definable and recognisable category into which information and knowledge can be easily 
inserted and just as easily extracted. Their schematic character, however, the way material, 
facts, and information is accumulated and condensed, means ‘there is a risk of neglecting 
continuities’ (Castoriadis, 1997, p.36). Complexes and phenomena which are largely static, 
constant, and reliable rarely catch the historian’s eye. They are apt to settle in the background 
such is the demand and desire to find and highlight distinctive periods of interest, dynamic 
moments of change, upheaval, and creation.  
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Wickberg, for example, states that as a descriptive term the ‘sense of humour’ made its first 
appearance in the 1840s. Before that time, he suggests, there was no ‘sense’ to speak of – 
there was ‘only humour’ (1998, p.16). ‘Humour’ heretofore effectively described a person’s 
physiological condition. Any attempt to relate it to a person’s psychological temperament 
would, at this relatively early understanding of mind and behaviour, amount to an 
anachronism. We are told that the way to understand the sense of humour concept, and 
specifically the important change in the meaning of the term ‘humour’, is to see the past as ‘a 
foreign country’ (Wickberg, 1998, p.18). This is based on a presumption that people having 
individual personalities is a comparatively recent idea. Our early ancestors, for example, 
lacked the ‘enduring characteristics of individuality’ (Billig, 2005, p.12). This sense of 
segregation, of seeking to separate the past, is a familiar strategy used by those who employ 
periodisation as a way to illustrate the progress and rapid change of mankind’s physical, 
social, and psychological evolution.  
 
The categorisation of time is often deployed in order to help accentuate the presumed 
difference between past and present. Charles Jencks, the renowned architect and designer, 
does this. With remarkable precision he identifies 1972 (the 15th of July, to be exact) as the 
day which saw the symbolic death of modernism and the birth of post-modernism (in Harvey, 
1990, p.39). With only slightly less exactness, but with equal conviction, the historian Eric 
Hobsbawm calculated that a seismic change occurred in Western art and culture during the 
1950’s and 1960’s. Again, drawing on the language of segregation/separation, he claims 
these to be fractured times (2013). In a similar vein, the criminologist Jock Young (1999) has 
charted the industrial world’s transition from what he describes as an inclusive society prior 
to the 1960s to an exclusive society during the last third of the 20c. Once again, the 1960’s 
are conceived as being a pivotal period. The era preceding it is pictured as endowed with a 
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strong sense of community, booming economies, falling mortality, a growing standard of 
living, etc. It is a period he clearly laments, and brings to mind the equally mournful Putnam 
(2000) who, like Virgil in his fourth eclogue (Arnold, 1994), pined for a return to the so-
called golden age. 
 
But it is not always helpful to reduce history to neatly partitioned contexts and decisively 
distinguished eras. For many people, historical and contemporary events are regarded 
collaterally. The past will invariably inscribe the present. For example, historical events are 
actuated by the same kinds of contemporary pressures, prejudices and passions. Judging by 
Young’s analysis, the period just before the 1960’s, the one marked by two world wars, was 
somehow more inclusive than the era that came in its wake (1999). He seems to be referring 
to that ‘inclusive period of high modernity which saw the relentless segregation of people 
with learning disabilities in large psychiatric hospitals, of children with physical disabilities 
in large ‘special’ residential institutions…’ (Yar & Penna, 2004, p.545). But, as Yar and 
Penna make clear, it is doubtful whether there ever was such a thing as an inclusive society 
(2004). The suspicion is that Young’s thesis is predicated upon a common fallacy, one that 
sets up a historical dualism between inclusive and exclusive (2004). Whether a society of 
either orientation could ever be capable of giving way to its antithesis, could ever be capable 
of producing an iterative ebb-and-flow effect, is a contestable point. But one thing that seems 
certain is that either way, laughter would remain uniform throughout (Boston, 1974). It must 
be acknowledged that the number of laughter theories and our understanding of laughter may 
over time have improved. But, for the most part, in respect of laughter’s ability down the ages 
to be inclusive and exclusive, ‘nothing much has changed’ (1974, p.14). While the sense of 
humour concept may have undergone a significant transition, laughter has remained an 
anthropological constant (Pfister, 2002), a changeless element of human nature. 
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Even though the course of human history has been marked by laughing with and laughing at 
behaviour, it is not unreasonable to assume that along the way there must have been some 
changes in laughter attitudes. It seems unlikely, for example, that we have become so 
insensible to moral and ethical dimensions over time that our laughter habits have not become 
more discriminating. As if to give this idea greater credence it is customary to introduce the 
well-rehearsed line of argument which usually begins ‘…we no longer go to lunatic asylums 
to laugh at the inmates’ (Boston, 1974, p.15). This refers to the Sunday entertainment that 
was available, at the cost of one penny, to the casual spectator in the early nineteenth-century 
(Foucault, 2009). The argument is certainly true, although what is rarely acknowledged is that 
this practice did not stop because of some evolving moral improvement process on the part of 
society’s collective conscience. This disturbing pastime only ceased when hospital governors 
denounced it as a scandal. It did not stop because members of the public suddenly lost 
interest or no longer found it entertaining. On the contrary, it can be argued that the general 
public’s enthusiasm for such prurient mockery has continued undimmed. If people are still 
prepared to be amused, to find time to laugh, at the death of Lady Diana and to make jokes 
directly after the events of 9/11 (Conroy, 2004), they are in all probability the kind of people 
who would be queuing around the block should the Bethlehem Royal Hospital in south 
London ever consider opening its doors to the public in the manner of its infamous 
predecessor 200 years earlier. 
   
People have laughed at the misfortune of others since the beginning of recorded history. Even 
when society has reached its lowest ebb, even in the very worst set of social or political 
circumstances, laughter continues its singular expression without respite (Billig, 2005). 
Today’s children have maintained that remarkable tradition (Morreall, 1983). Whether or not 
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it is appropriate to think of laughter as a phenomenon capable of being ‘handed down’ as it 
were, it must be acknowledged that there are few communicative activities that rival its 
ability to provide us with information about people’s expressions, their behaviours, emotions, 
or the institutions they inhabit. As we have seen, laughter can be a performance indicator, a 
mood predictor, a sign of individual and institutional well-being, and a symptom of 
breakthrough and breakdown. It is ultimately an ambitious but also an ambiguous signal. So 
that we can begin to make brighter use of laughter’s remarkable properties, its inclusive and 
exclusive capabilities, we need to ensure that our social settings which play host to - and 
often encourage - these behaviours, remain bold enough to acknowledge their own intrinsic 
ambiguities. Until that time, children’s laughter can only tell us part of their story.   
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In compulsory schooling generally, and within the primary sector in particular, laughter is 
considered to be a commodity of some value. For the most part, it is conceived as being a 
force for good. Claims have been consistently made that it can be employed as an effective 
instrument with which to improve pupil motivation and concentration. It can also provide a 
means to sharpen pupils’ focus, and ease through difficult concepts and topics by helping to 
make them appear more accessible, less intimidating. Moreover, laughter can send out a 
positive signal about a school’s sense of community. Somehow its familiar acoustic signature 
seems to indicate that learning is taking place, and even manages to provide a largely 
favourable impression about the quality of relationships pupils enjoy with their peers and 
their teachers. And yet, fundamentally, laughter is two-faced. In its ability to display 
affiliation and friendliness laughter can indeed bring people together, but it can just as easily 
set them apart. Situated against its inclusive, open face, laughter has a dark, exclusive side, as 
pupils at a primary school in Bolton, Lancashire recently found. While their playtime 
laughter was interpreted by school staff as a desirable sign of happiness and contentment, it 
was deemed an anti-social disturbance by families living nearby, who were so 
inconvenienced by it during the spring and summer months they instigated legal proceedings 
against the school for perpetrating an intolerable ‘noise nuisance’.  
 
The purpose of my research has been to identify some of laughter’s functions in a primary 
school setting. These have included not only the deliberate - but also some of the contrived – 
acts and commissions. In addition, I have tried to unpick some of the myths commonly 
associated with laughter. This particular process required an exploration of some of the 
instances of ambiguity which continues to bedevil its interpretation. Instances, for example, 
whereby children’s laughter was not produced spontaneously (as many people suppose) but 
voluntarily, strategically, were given careful attention. Children, of course, laugh when they 
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find something amusing, but they also laugh when something is unfunny. They will laugh in 
situations where they know that it would be to their detriment if they did not laugh, for 
example, when they are told a joke by another pupil as a test of intelligence, a test of 
friendship, or a way to assess (and hopefully preserve) their ‘in-group’ status.  
 
The role of the teacher in pupils’ laughter production is crucial. Since they are, in principle at 
least, the main laughter conduit, their classroom duties in this regard have also been 
considered. Naturally, it is down to the teacher to establish the right kind of atmosphere so 
that children can feel at ease in a pleasant, relaxed learning environment. In this capacity they 
are key figures in helping to set the right laughter tone. But if they should get this wrong, they 
run the risk of becoming risible themselves, of becoming the object of their pupil’s scorn and 
mockery. So, exploring laughter’s inherent inclusive and exclusive dimensions will provide 
an estimate of the kind of impact it might have on primary schools that declare themselves to 
be, for example, actively promoting an inclusive ethos. This will hopefully lead to examining 
in more detail whether exclusive forms of laughter, such as mockery, ridicule, and teasing, 
can ever have a place in an avowedly inclusive learning environment.  
 
I was given permission by the then head teacher to conduct a series of classroom/playground 
observations, and a small number of informal interviews, with children at The Cross Primary 
School. The results of those interviews and observations formed the foundation of my PhD 
thesis as well as the fundamental part of this smaller report summary, a summary which is 
intended for the benefit of school governors, staff, pupils, parents, and other parties of 
interest. 
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It may have been nothing more than a coincidence that my fieldwork began at a time when a 
national report had been published indicating that laughter levels in Britain were in steep 
decline. Evidence appeared to show that we are not laughing as much as our forebears did in 
the 1960s, and this news - if the gloomy reports in the national press were to be believed - 
seemed to trouble and irritate the national consciousness. A range of legitimate, as well as 
anecdotal, reasons were mooted for this downturn, everything from the gloomy economic 
situation to the rise in work and domestic-related pressures. My own view is that since our 
levels of social capital have experienced a similar downturn (social capital describes the 
strength of our family, neighbourhood, and community connections, i.e. how well-connected 
we are) a corresponding diminishment in laughter behaviour would not be unexpected. In 
order for there to be more laughter, so the argument goes, people need to get together more 
often. But this all too simple panacea is not without its problems. The series of school-based 
interviews and observations I conducted show that the task of getting people together is not 
always so easy to achieve. Nonetheless, the behavioural and communication theorists put it 
plainly: laughter is about relationships, for without them there is unlikely to be much 
laughter. Fundamentally, laughter is a social behaviour and we seldom laugh, it is said, when 
alone.  
 
As far as pupils are concerned, the two main laughter arenas in any school are the classroom 
and the playground. The school playground provides a convenient recreational space in 
which they are able to present and cement their friendships. It also provides a suitable 
environment for children to develop physical stamina, encourage motor development, and to 
release nervous energy. The Cross school’s impressive playground system is a product of the 
school rebuilding programme which reached its peak during the middle period of the last 
century. In response to a sharp increase in the birth-rate immediately after the Second World 
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War, new schools were built on the peripheries of towns and cities where more space was 
available. Situated in the west of the city this particular school materialised from one such 
suburban settlement, benefiting from both the revolution in modern design materials and 
progressive ideas in education. Thanks to an ample site that was made available, a network of 
playgrounds could comfortably accommodate pupils from the upper and lower school 
without any need for playtime to be staggered. Plenty of additional space which lay around it 
had been carefully cultivated into facilities of undisguised charm, like the adventure play area 
complete with climbing frames, rope swings, and slides, all dressed in a soft wood mulch to 
minimise injuries. There was also a dedicated nature trail with maze-like low hedging, natural 
pathways, boxes for nesting birds, and logs formed into small piles to replicate the natural 
habitat of a variety of small creatures and insects. Both sites were adjacent to, and 
overlooking, a great swathe of green-belt land where, during fine weather, pupils were 
allowed to play.  
 
One of the largest items of equipment/furniture in the playground occupied one corner of it. 
A wooden gazebo proved to be a popular rendezvous point for pupils, particularly the girls. 
One morning break-time I found myself drawn towards this polygonal structure. At first sight 
it seemed empty, but after slowly walking around it I happened upon the small opening and 
found four girls lying face down on the wooden floor, one on top of the other. It looked as if 
they were attempting to build a column of bodies as one would find in a circus. But what 
attracted my attention was the sound of the girls’ laughter. Each child had been reduced to a 
state of collapsible hilarity. The sound that rang out soon encouraged a crowd of adult and 
pupil onlookers who, curious as to the source and nature of the exhilaration, were soon 
laughing among themselves having been happily and helplessly contaminated. If the tower of 
bodies was not the most elegant sight ever seen, it certainly produced the most attractively 
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natural sound one could ever wish to hear. Their fabulous laughter continued for some 
minutes, more so perhaps out of sheer delight that despite their high humour the girls had 
managed to preserve the integrity of their vertical shape - that somehow none of the upper 
bodies in the human construction had toppled over. Such an innocuous, trivial occurrence 
almost went unnoticed yet was responsible for holding a small playground audience 
spellbound, and encouraged a spread-ability factor for which laughter’s infectiousness - its 
ability to touch others - could and indeed should be of fundamental social importance. 
 
One of laughter’s more remarkable features is its ability to produce a highly contagious 
effect. Its infectious quality can provoke laughter in others, a case of laughter begetting 
laughter, causing a chain reaction capable of quickly touching individuals and entire 
communities, arousing feelings of closeness, inspiring a sense of togetherness, and proving 
almost impossible to resist. Although laughter may be apt at times to spread like a contagion 
(like yawning), quite often it develops from the least consequential detail, sometimes having 
little or no purpose at all. The cascade of giggles issuing from inside the gazebo had no 
obvious stimulus beyond the incongruity of the girls’ precarious physical position. Their 
laughter may have simply been a natural accumulation, with the sole reference point being 
the girls’ immediate and exclusive company, the sheer delight and pleasure of peer group 
association. And yet it also successfully managed to affect a thoroughly inclusive outcome. 
The girls’ laughter was not only located in - or even between - themselves, but concentrated 
in the relationship between them and the small party of onlookers, reverberating around all 
those concerned who were, momentarily at least, indelibly connected. The group of people 
who shared in this playground experience may have gone away slightly richer, more warmly 
disposed towards their fellow beings, and possibly set to gain one day on the strength of their 
having been touched that morning by laughter’s awesome sociality.  
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Among the many adult onlookers intrigued by the playground laughter that morning were 
some playground supervisors. Of the many tasks that are generally allocated to them is an 
expectation to become familiar with those spots and corners, those obvious and not-so-
obvious places where children congregate – sometimes with every innocent intention, but 
sometimes to try and keep out of sight of official scrutiny. At such places many pupils choose 
to gather and talk, to stand around and laugh, or plot and conspire as a mischievous prelude to 
some rough and tumble play. Supervisors tend to be a mix of teaching staff and designated 
playground stewards; most of the stewards are parents who live and have been recruited 
locally. Their range of duties include acting as chaperons to the ‘quiet ones’, those pupils 
with a tendency to cling to adults for companionship, as well as being alert for signs and 
instances of misbehaviour. To that extent, it can be very difficult for them to make accurate 
distinctions between playful and aggressive interactions. Furthermore, it can be very difficult 
for them to distinguish laughing at (exclusive) behaviour from laughing with (inclusive) 
behaviour. They cannot always rely on what they see or hear in certain situations since 
laughter is not always a reliable communication or behavioural indicator. Supervisors will, 
however, usually err on the side of caution. Upon hearing or meeting with ambiguous forms 
of laughter they will judiciously urge children to “play nicely”, even if the children are 
already doing so.  
 
Data collected from the school has helped to identify some of the enduring as well as the 
fleeting dynamics that lie behind the management of pupils’ playground behaviour. Taking 
laughter and play as the key reference points has made it possible to consider the quality of 
their interactions in order to test the rhetoric that ‘every child matters’. The playground 
affords a much clearer view of how physically and socially included children feel within their 
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school community, which may go some way to predicting how they will be disposed to view 
the prospect of making future ties to, and within, the wider adult community. The principle 
has been to fix extra attention on laughter’s disquieting absence, i.e. on pupils who were, for 
whatever reason, unable to show any evidence of interacting with their peers, those offering 
few if any of the typical signs of maintaining acquaintanceships, those who might be lacking 
the wherewithal, the inclination, or the necessary social skills to get the very best out of all 
that the playground and playtime could offer.   
 
The cacophony of noise on the playground, a mixture of screaming, laughing, and shouting, 
meant it was difficult initially to fix on one particular child or group of children so that their 
playtime interactions could be considered in detail. Happily, the vast majority of children 
were playing together, interacting with their friends freely and energetically. Even children 
who showed no inclination to play seemed perfectly content to sit on benches at the edge of 
the playground either chatting or snacking together.   
 
Since the welter of noise on the playground was temporarily off-putting, would a regime of 
silence make observations any easier to manage? Before I began my classroom observations I 
was asked to accompany a group of pupils across the school car-park on one of their regular 
visits to the church situated nearby. Admittedly, it seemed an unlikely venue for too many 
interactions let alone instances of laughter since it was anticipated that firm behavioural 
restrictions would be in force. It was nonetheless interesting to note that before and during the 
service, although there was a good deal of ambient noise inside the sacred building, there was 
very little laughter from the mainly pupil congregation. The occasional snicker/titter could be 
heard, but there was nothing like the amount of laughter activity I was expecting. Instead, all 
emotions appeared to have been carefully controlled. There were few, if any, profane 
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outbursts. The small number of pupils who so much as dared to transgress in any capacity 
were typically fixed with the cold stare of disbelieving outrage by highly affronted members 
of staff. It was enough. No words were necessary.  
 
On the whole, the pupil church-goers seemed to have little interest in wanting to break this 
particular silence, either through laughter or via any other means. And yet, only a few days 
previously I had been in a classroom (at another school) during a silent reading lesson where 
for the entire period all that could be heard were the sounds of pupils attempting to stifle their 
laughter through a series of half-suppressed snorts, giggles, and grunts. Quite often a regime 
of silence can be considered by most people, but particularly by schoolchildren, as presenting 
them with something akin to a challenge. However, these pupils’ self-restraint was 
impressive. This may have been due to there being a greater sense of respect for the premises 
they were in, since it was an environment where silence was naturally to be expected (unlike 
a classroom). It is after all what helps to make religion so revered, lending atmospheric 
weight to its grave and awesome, if not ominous, sense of ecumenical mystery. Although the 
children may not have felt entirely comfortable with this silence, they at least understood its 
solemn significance. Whether they happened to be believers or not, they recognised - if not 
appreciated - the rationale behind it; they could see the point in being carefully respectful and 
reflectively contemplative.  
 
In a school setting, on the other hand, silence has a tendency to do the opposite. It can, for 
example, mean painful associations for some children who may have first-hand experience of 
the ‘silent treatment’, a form of ostracism routinely instigated by their peers, which involves 
deliberately avoiding eye contact and verbal communication, effectively excluding the 
concerned party from their usual peer group association. Historically, silence formed a 
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dominant part of the school curriculum. Indeed, the teaching and learning experience was 
founded on an appreciation for and respect to its maintenance. Until very recently its 
application remained widespread, and included official use as a form of chastisement, a 
formidable feature of Monday morning assembly, and a fundamental part of the behavioural 
code that enjoined children to stop talking when the teacher was teaching. However, with a 
growing interest in and concern for the concept of ‘pupil voice’, silence has become 
something of an anachronism in modern school education. Children are now privileged, to 
some extent, to speak openly, to have their say, to let nothing stand in the way of their right to 
self-expression. Whether many teachers would care to confirm this is, of course, a debatable 
point. But the principle, if not its actual practice, is the key thing, and it’s fair to say that 
generally speaking silence is no longer such a prominent feature of children’s education. 
Today, apart from the obligatory period of national testing when talk is necessarily 
suspended, silence in a primary school setting is pretty much unheard of.  
 
But if laughter was noticeable by its absence on certain parts of the playground, and in the 
local church, it proved to be an abiding presence among many of The Cross’s classrooms. 
Instinctively, I would have thought the situation to be the other way round. As it happened, 
however, classrooms at this school managed to provide the very richest material in my 
laughter quest. The practice of playful instruction has, nationwide, been gaining steadily in 
popularity - just as opportunities for pupil’s free play on the playground have steadily 
diminished. This situation merely reflects the wider view circulating among some educational 
theorists that the main laughter and entertainment hub in any primary school is actually the 
classroom. To that end, the class teacher bears much of the responsibility in helping to create 
the kind of climate conducive not only to learning, but also to meaningful and happy 
classroom interactions. In an educational sector where few men actually feature, one could be 
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forgiven for thinking it might indicate the significant presence of a laughter vacuum. Male 
teachers continue to be viewed as the more natural, instinctive, humour providers. The idea 
that women lack a sense of humour is one that sadly lingers on in the minds of many. 
Fortunately, this was one of the laughter-related myths it became a pleasure to set right. In 
fact, it is by considering the ways in which female teachers actually demonstrate their 
proficiencies in humour production, and as consummate laugh-getters, that no credence can 
be given to such out-dated and clichéd thinking. 
 
Not that their humour production is any better or worse than that of their male colleagues, but 
it was noticeable that female teachers use humour differently. Quite often the difference 
between them was that women were more inclined to deploy humour in ways that sought to 
consolidate teacher-pupil relationships. Their focus was not so much on being able to deliver 
smart one-liner’s, thereby forcing pupils to simply laugh on cue, but on creating the 
conditions most favourable to reciprocation through constructing appropriately engaging, 
integrative opportunities that encouraged a range of pupil contributions. In such an 
environment humour and laughter may emerge in a mutually equitable way, and not as if they 
were specific episodes to be drawn out by force. If male teachers could be criticised at all it is 
because some viewed themselves as though they were solo artists performing on a classroom 
stage. This was not the case with their female colleagues. Most - if not all - of them ignored 
my presence when observing their classes and simply got on with performing their regular 
duties.  
 
Insofar as developing good teacher-pupil interactions in the classroom, great stress has been 
placed on a teacher’s personality, and in particular on their sense of humour. Some have 
argued that an ability to use humour, to engage in light-hearted banter with pupils, can 
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improve learning conditions by improving his/her attitude towards them. How highly a pupil 
chooses to rate their teacher can often depend rather perfunctorily on whether a teacher is 
able ‘to make them laugh’. Yet the importance attributed to a teacher’s sense of humour may 
be overplayed. For one thing, there is no agreement as to what this trait actually constitutes. If 
it is assumed to be only an aspect of an individual’s personality, then this creates a problem. 
A teacher, for example, may have a particular liking for the risky stand-up humour of Sarah 
Silverman, or the very dangerous comedy of Frankie Boyle. But how then does their sense of 
humour relate to pupils who are only amused by the visual slapstick of TVs ‘Dick ‘N’ Dom’? 
Humour and laughter are used best of all, in my opinion, when applied strategically. It 
worked particularly well at Our Lady school when teachers did exactly that, and delivered it 
prudently, in a very precise manner. I sense that many teachers have learned that what is far 
more important than having a sense of humour is having the good sense to know exactly 
when to apply humour, i.e. when to change direction during lessons, when to move from the 
formal to the informal, knowing when to introduce some light-hearted relief at the first sign 
of pupils showing fatigue or restlessness.   
 
Among the classrooms and along the corridors at The Cross School, one particular teacher 
stood out from all of the others. She was considered by some of her pupils to be ‘too strict’. 
Her uncompromising approach to the art of teaching certainly caught one’s attention. She was 
indeed strict, in the sense that she demanded that classroom codes and norms be obeyed and 
respected without question. Away from the classroom, I found her to be not only a 
disciplinarian but someone who cared passionately for the academic well-being of her pupils. 
But any evidence that she had a sense of humour was not immediately apparent. It is possible 
that privately at least she may have had a very competent degree of humour appreciation, and 
that during her public duties she was simply choosing to be more discriminating in terms of 
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her humour performance and  level of humour awareness. All the same, she didn’t seem too 
troubled by it; indeed, there were periods when it looked as though she may have even 
revelled in her no-nonsense notoriety.  
 
Except that this teacher was capable of delivering some sublime pedagogic moments. Every 
so often, without any warning, she would dramatically change tack and alter the entire mood-
structure of the classroom. During one particularly stressful Maths lesson, at a time when 
many in her Year group had been left truly befuddled by the rules pertaining to fractions that 
no amount of depictive pizza portions or imagined slices of chocolate cake could make 
palatable, she introduced the children to a memorable routine aimed at helping them to 
remember their multiplication tables. Pupils were made to stand to attention, face each other 
in pairs, and then at her command begin beating-out the time-honoured times-table rhythm 
according to the format of a traditional hand-clapping game. “Three 7s are 21, four 7s are 
28…”, they chanted to a cross-handed tempo, that all too frequently collapsed as the children 
collapsed with laughter as they tried and usually failed to remember the sequence of each 
numeric table’s string, as well as perform the clapping moves in unison. The meeting of 
words and hand actions proved too difficult for many of the pupils.  
 
It could, however, be said that this teacher, much like the very best comedy performers (and 
the very best teachers), had impeccable timing. She did the minimum of things necessary to 
alleviate the oppressive atmosphere which, although of her own making, were just enough to 
rejuvenate the pupils’ interest, executed at a precise time when she anticipated signs of pupil 
fatigue, waning interest or just sensed a general restlessness brought on by lengthy periods of 
seatwork. She knew very well, for example, that pupils respond not only to the context of 
what they are taught but to the ways in which it is taught. She knew what it meant to the 
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children to experience these adjustments or pieces of relief, however mechanically and 
passionlessly they were applied. They showed nonetheless that she had the wit and the 
wisdom to recognise what was needed and when it should be applied in order to affect a 
small mixture of both formal and informal activities. Perhaps having a sense of humour is not 
nearly as important to teachers as having the gumption or good judgement to know when to 
introduce a change, to bring some light relief to pupils’ learning. It could be said that the 
teacher had the wit, without ever once being witty. Her achievement was based not on having 
an aptitude for humour, or possessing a creative flair for it, nor even an ability to appreciate 
it, but rather on having a wonderful appreciation of what sort of thing humour actually means 
to other people.    
 
Previous appeals for teachers to have at least some understanding of the role played by 
humour in education have been made. It was suggested that those who use or plan on using it 
in their classrooms really ought to know about some of the humour processes involved. When 
applied inappropriately, humour can damage any prospects for building teacher-pupil rapport. 
But when used thoughtfully, status differences can be momentarily forgotten and a form of 
social cohesion is produced through the pleasant experience of laughing together. Given the 
range of identities and behaviours that comprise and enliven today’s mainstream classrooms, 
it is a sign of good practice to try and broaden a teacher’s humour knowledge-base. This 
would allow them the opportunity to absorb and connect with the diversity of classroom 
influences, taking into account, for example, cultural and gender differences, and being 
altogether mindful of related sensitivities associated with laughter production.   
 
If laughter can indicate to us anything about schools, teachers and pupils, we should always 
be mindful of its double-sided nature, its inclusive and exclusive orientation. Laughter builds 
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relationships, and it can also destroy them. Nonetheless, those who have argued that the 
central function of primary schooling is the dissemination and absorption of knowledge may 
be underestimating the importance of providing opportunities for children to laugh and play. 
Laughter in the classroom instead of bored uniformity seems to be an accurate summation of 
a new spirit in teaching and learning. But then, laughter is a learning act in itself – why else 
do pupils and teachers laugh strategically? As we have seen, both parties have learnt how 
useful it can be to apply laughter deliberately, to make specific provision for it, to use it 
artfully, to suppress it, to make laughter appear (and disappear) when and where it is deemed 
necessary. That teachers and pupils at The Cross School were able to demonstrate these 
principles shows how this institution has proved to be such a wonderful resource in helping to 
acquire hitherto unknown data. It is to be commended therefore and should take great pride in 
making such a significant contribution to the ways in which new interpretations of one of our 
most used, but least understood, facets of behaviour and communication have been made. 
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In compulsory schooling generally, and within the primary sector in particular, laughter is 
considered to be a commodity of some value. For the most part, it is conceived as being a 
force for good. Claims have been consistently made that it can be employed as an effective 
instrument with which to improve pupil motivation and concentration. It can also provide a 
means to sharpen pupils’ focus, and ease through difficult concepts and topics by helping to 
make them appear more accessible, less intimidating. Moreover, laughter can send out a 
positive signal about a school’s sense of community. Somehow its familiar acoustic signature 
seems to indicate that learning is taking place, and even manages to provide a largely 
favourable impression about the quality of relationships pupils enjoy with their peers and 
their teachers. And yet, fundamentally, laughter is two-faced. In its ability to display 
affiliation and friendliness laughter can indeed bring people together, but it can just as easily 
set them apart. Situated against its inclusive, open face, laughter has a dark, exclusive side, as 
pupils at a primary school in Bolton, Lancashire recently found. While their playtime 
laughter was interpreted by school staff as a desirable sign of happiness and contentment, it 
was deemed a disturbance by families living nearby, who were so inconvenienced by it 
during the spring and summer months they instigated legal proceedings against the school for 
perpetrating an intolerable ‘noise nuisance’.  
 
The purpose of my research has been to identify some of laughter’s functions in a primary 
school setting. These have included not only the deliberate - but also some of the contrived – 
acts and commissions. In addition, I have tried to unpick some of the myths commonly 
associated with laughter. This particular process required an exploration of some of the 
instances of ambiguity which continues to bedevil its interpretation. Instances, for example, 
whereby children’s laughter was not produced spontaneously (as many people suppose) but 
voluntarily, strategically, were noted. Children, of course, laugh when they find something 
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amusing, but they also laugh when something is unfunny. They will laugh in situations where 
they know that it would be to their detriment if they did not laugh, for example, when they 
are told a joke by another pupil as a test of intelligence, a test of friendship, or a way to assess 
(and hopefully preserve) their ‘in-group’ status.  
 
The role of the teacher in pupils’ laughter production is crucial. Since they are, in principle at 
least, the main laughter conduit, their classroom duties in this regard have also been 
considered. Naturally, it is down to the teacher to establish the right kind of atmosphere so 
that children can feel at ease in a pleasant, relaxed learning environment. In this capacity they 
are key figures in helping to set the right laughter tone. But if they should get this wrong, they 
run the risk of becoming risible themselves, of becoming the object of their pupil’s scorn and 
mockery. So, exploring laughter’s inherent inclusive and exclusive dimensions will provide 
an estimate of the kind of impact it might have on primary schools that declare themselves to 
be, for example, actively promoting an inclusive ethos. This will hopefully lead to examining 
in more detail whether exclusive forms of laughter, such as mockery, ridicule, and teasing, 
can ever have a place in an avowedly inclusive learning environment.  
 
During the summer term of 2011 and the winter term of 2012, I was given permission to 
conduct a series of classroom/playground observations, and a small number of informal 
interviews, with children at The Crescent Primary School. The results of those interviews and 
observations formed the foundation of my PhD thesis as well as the fundamental part of this 
smaller report summary, a summary which is intended for the benefit of school governors, 
staff, pupils, parents, and other parties of interest. 
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It may have been nothing more than a coincidence that my fieldwork began at a time when a 
national report had been published indicating that laughter levels in Britain were in steep 
decline. Evidence appeared to show that we are not laughing as much as our forebears did in 
the 1960s, and this news - if the gloomy reports in the national press were to be believed - 
seemed to trouble and irritate the national consciousness. A range of legitimate, as well as 
anecdotal, reasons were mooted for this downturn, everything from the gloomy economic 
situation to the rise in work and domestic-related pressures. My own view is that since our 
levels of social capital have experienced a similar downturn (social capital describes the 
strength of our family, neighbourhood, and community connections, i.e. how well-connected 
we are) a corresponding diminishment in laughter behaviour would not be unexpected. In 
order for there to be more laughter, so the argument goes, people need to get together more 
often. But this all too simple panacea is not without its problems. My own series of school-
based interviews and observations have shown that the task of getting people together is not 
always so easy to achieve. Nonetheless, the behavioural and communication theorists put it 
plainly: laughter is about relationships, for without them there is unlikely to be much 
laughter. Fundamentally, laughter is a social behaviour and we seldom laugh, it is said, when 
alone.  
 
As far as pupils are concerned, the two main laughter arenas in any school are the classroom 
and the playground. The school playground provides a convenient recreational space in 
which they are able to present and cement their friendships. It also provides a suitable 
environment for children to develop physical stamina, encourage motor development, and to 
release nervous energy. The Crescent school’s old-style playground, a Victorian remnant 
bounded on all sides by walls, railings and other school buildings, forms an elongated L-
shape. One of the most common non-ball games played here was, appropriately enough, the 
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game of ‘tig’. This pastime, popularised in the Victorian era, is a chasing game that has over 
the years amassed many additional (and regional) variants, but remains constant in its ability 
to elicit paroxysms of excitable laughter from its players. The relative paucity of play-related 
equipment available to pupils may be deemed at one level a failing. But it must be 
acknowledged that it did encourage children to engage in more peer-peer interactions. The 
drive in recent years to offer school children a range of playtime resources and activities can 
sometimes cause confusion. An abundance of play-related equipment available to pupils can 
sometimes mean they get spoilt for choice and end up choosing none.  
 
It became clear that children’s play is influenced largely by the environment in which it takes 
place, and not so much by the materials that they have access to. Lately, there has been a 
nationwide effort to provide children with an array of play spaces, such as designated 
quiet/play areas, nature gardens, and an assortment of seating types. But all of these can 
restrict the kind of interactions we have come to expect when trying to build up pupil’s levels 
of social capital. More than that, they can also put a strain on playground space. Such 
innovations, of course, might not even be possible in some inner-city schools. For many such 
institutions the asphalt playground is sacrosanct, since it is an entirely practical space and 
surface given the school’s urban location. Admittedly, the playground looks forbidding when 
idle – a miracle of dullness – and not at all child-friendly. But a great deal of effort has gone 
into making it appear less depressing. For instance, a series of bright, colourful murals 
decorate some of the walls, and a small number of saplings have been introduced to add some 
interest and variation to the stark yards of tarmac. But when operational the playground takes 
on the vibrancy and vitality of a modern plaza. It is an ideal location for a spot of people-
watching since it functions as an efficient rendezvous-point, a site for a small community’s 
coming together that easily transforms into a teeming social system, a dynamic spectacle that 
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(after the initial) assault on the senses offers up areas of regularity, patterns of ordered 
interactions and measured territorial negotiating. It remains, first and foremost, a venue 
where children gather at their usual spots and favourite corners. 
 
Among the many tasks allocated to playground supervisors is an expectation to become 
familiar with these spots and corners. It is at such places that many pupils choose to 
congregate. Many just gather and talk, some tend to stand around and laugh, and there are 
those who plot and conspire as a mischievous prelude to some rough and tumble play. 
Supervisors tend to be a mix of teaching staff and designated playground stewards; most of 
the stewards are parents who live and have been recruited locally. Their range of duties 
include acting as chaperons to the ‘quiet ones’, those pupils with a tendency to cling to adults 
for  companionship, as well as being alert for signs and instances of misbehaviour. To that 
extent, it can be very difficult for them to make accurate distinctions between playful and 
aggressive interactions. Furthermore, it can be very difficult for them to distinguish laughing 
at (exclusive) behaviour from laughing with (inclusive) behaviour. They cannot always rely 
on what they see or hear in certain situations since laughter is not always a reliable 
communication or behavioural indicator. Supervisors will, however, usually err on the side of 
caution. Upon hearing or meeting with ambiguous forms of laughter they will urge children 
to “play nicely”, even if they are already doing so.  
 
Data collected from The Crescent School has helped to identify some of the enduring as well 
as the fleeting dynamics that lie behind the management of pupils’ playground behaviour. 
Taking laughter and play as the key reference points has made it possible to consider the 
quality of their interactions in order to test the rhetoric that ‘every child matters’. The 
playground affords a much clearer view of how physically and socially included children feel 
303 
 
within their school community, which may go some way to predicting how they will be 
disposed to view the prospect of making future ties to, and within, the wider adult 
community. The principle has been to fix extra attention on laughter’s disquieting absence, 
i.e. on pupils who were, for whatever reason, unable to show any evidence of interacting with 
their peers, those offering few if any of the typical signs of maintaining acquaintanceships, 
those who might be lacking the wherewithal, the inclination, or the necessary social skills to 
get the very best out of all that the playground and playtime could offer.   
 
The cacophony of noise on the playground, a mixture of screaming, laughing, and shouting, 
meant it was difficult initially to fix on one particular child or group of children so that their 
playtime interactions could be considered in detail. The pleasing thing however is that the 
vast majority of children were playing together, interacting with their friends freely and 
energetically...or so it appeared. A pupil in Year 3, who I have called ‘Tahir’, seemed to be a 
particularly active member of one playground group consisting of five similar-aged boys. He 
caught my attention because his laughter and running behaviour looked to be unusually 
vigorous. But this display was not quite what it seemed. I came to the conclusion that he had 
very nearly succeeded in executing a most skilful and highly original piece of behavioural 
gamesmanship. Tahir wasn’t a member of this playground group at all. In fact, he had 
deliberately chosen to gate-crash this group’s boundaries, giving every outward impression 
that he was actually a group member. His regular intrusions clearly annoyed the existing 
members of the group. They made it clear that his attentions were not welcome and 
invariably responded by attempting to chase Tahir away. Unfortunately, this activity looked 
to the casual observer as if all of these boys were mixing freely together.  
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I reasoned that Tahir was only trying to gain acceptance into the other group by copying the 
very things they were doing, i.e. running and laughing. Employing copy-cat behaviour is an 
established tactic used by applicants wanting to show they possess some of the necessary 
qualities that may entitle them to membership of a particular group. Tahir may have simply 
believed that being able to demonstrate that he and the other boys had something in common, 
that being in possession of shared interests, would improve his group entry prospects. 
Therefore, his behaviour could be interpreted not so much as a reckless attempt at forcing 
entry, but as a performance tantamount to an audition, a way to show off his best side, his 
most favourable and sympathetic qualities to the others. As a prospective member of the 
group, Tahir was merely demonstrating that he had got what it takes to fit in. But his guile 
and tenacity illustrates the creative lengths some children may feel impelled to go in order to 
achieve a sense of affiliation and belonging.   
 
Nevertheless, having an opportunity to express the kind of qualities it might take to secure 
group access may not always be enough. Negotiating this difficult entry stage usually takes 
more than an exhibition of a person’s obvious eagerness to belong. By their very nature 
playground groups tend to be exclusive, and their structure, their internal workings, can be 
stoutly protected by existing in-group members. Although Tahir may have underestimated the 
exclusive nature of a friendship group, he would have had, however, some awareness and 
understanding of a school’s exclusive tendencies as he ran and laughed his way around the 
playground. For this outside space, this laughter arena, is far less democratic than one might 
imagine. It was noticeable, for example, that one part of the playground was off-limits to 
pupils, this being the section employed as a staff car-park – a regrettable but necessary 
intrusion given the restrictions placed locally on street parking. Exclusive areas on the 
playground are nothing new. There are prescribed regions in most of them. Dedicated play 
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areas, for example, are often fenced off for the protection of infant pupils, and areas of the 
playground located near the school entrance/exit, or close to local properties will usually be 
out-of-bounds. But none are more obvious or widespread as the ones marked out in bright 
colourful lines and circles denoting the parameters of playground football.  
 
When Year 6 pupils played football other playground users had to be very mindful of this 
activity. They had to be very accommodating, too, for there was an unwritten rule that they 
should pointedly give way for fear of intruding into restricted, and indeed hallowed, ground. 
The school’s approach to playground football had a decidedly serious aspect, even to the 
extent that an outside coach was occasionally employed to come into the school and 
supervise games. Each game seemed more like an organised lesson than an informal play 
period, and as such little in the way of laughter could be detected. I was surprised, initially. I 
tried to convince myself that football never used to be like this, and it left me wondering as to 
its possible causes. Not unreasonably, I assumed that behavioural issues lay at the root of it. 
The boys of Year 6 had something of a reputation within the school. Perhaps the rationale for 
taking such a serious view of football was that an organised, highly disciplined, game could 
get the playground players so exhausted as to make them less disruptive when they returned 
to their classrooms. Alternatively, it might be because pupils can earn for themselves a 
measure of respect and admiration if they get recognised as ‘good players’. It may only seem 
like an inconsequential knock-about to some, but playground football can promise all sorts of 
rewards and riches. A good sporting reputation could amount to a qualification of sorts. It 
might not have the same cache as a school award or a national certificate, but it can confer 
upon those with undoubted sporting abilities a measure of local stardom. A skill in any 
capacity - even in football – can secure children the esteem of their peers and even the 
admiring glances from their teachers. One of the few girls who played regularly possessed 
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such an array of fine ball skills that I adjudged them to be far in advance of those held by her 
male counterparts. In fact, so good was her footwork that it regularly caught the eye of 
scrutineers and spectators.     
 
But among the boys at least, it was made clear to me that football was a game that many of 
them played with some reluctance. They declared rather ruefully that cricket, not football, 
was their game of choice. But because of health and safety concerns cricket was no longer a 
playground option. Perhaps this was the real reason that the pupils played football without 
any obvious kind of emotion or enthusiasm.  
 
But if laughter was noticeable by its absence on certain parts of the playground, it proved to 
be an abiding presence among many of The Crescent’s classrooms. Instinctively, I would 
have thought the situation to be the other way round. Conversely, classrooms at this school 
managed to provide the very richest material in my laughter quest. The practice of playful 
instruction has, nationwide, been gaining steadily in popularity - just as opportunities for 
pupil’s free play on the playground have steadily diminished. This situation merely reflects 
the wider view circulating among pedagogic theorists that the main laughter and 
entertainment hub in any primary school is actually the classroom. And it is the class teacher 
who bears much of the responsibility in helping to create the kind of climate conducive not 
only to learning, but also to meaningful and happy classroom interactions. In an educational 
sector where few men actually feature, one could be forgiven for thinking it might indicate 
the significant presence of a laughter vacuum. Male teachers continue to be viewed as the 
more natural, instinctive, humour providers. The idea that women lack a sense of humour is 
one that sadly lingers on in the minds of many. Happily, this was one of the laughter-related 
myths it became a pleasure to set right. In fact, it is by considering the ways in which female 
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teachers actually demonstrate their proficiencies in humour production, and as consummate 
laugh-getters, that no credence can be given to such out-dated and clichéd thinking. 
 
Not that their humour production is any better or worse than that of their male colleagues, but 
it was noticeable that female teachers use humour differently. Quite often the difference 
between them was that women were more inclined to deploy humour in ways that sought to 
consolidate teacher-pupil relationships. Their focus was not so much on being able to deliver 
smart one-liner’s, thereby forcing pupils to simply laugh on cue, but on creating the 
conditions most favourable to reciprocation through constructing appropriately engaging, 
integrative opportunities that encouraged a range of pupil contributions. In such an 
environment humour and laughter may emerge in a mutually equitable way, and not as if they 
were specific episodes to be drawn out by force. If male teachers could be criticised at all it 
was because some viewed themselves as though they were solo artists performing on a 
classroom stage. On more than one occasion I suspected that some of the male staff felt they 
had an obligation to be funny simply on my account. Once they were aware of my particular 
interest in laughter it appeared as though they had a duty or some compulsion to demonstrate 
their wit, their cleverness. This was not the case with their female colleagues. Most - if not all 
- of them ignored my presence when observing their classes and simply got on with 
performing their regular duties.  
 
Insofar as developing good teacher-pupil interactions in the classroom, great stress has been 
placed on a teacher’s personality, and in particular on their sense of humour. Some have 
argued that an ability to use humour, to engage in light-hearted banter with pupils, can 
improve learning conditions by improving his/her attitude towards them. How highly a pupil 
chooses to rate their teacher can often depend rather perfunctorily on whether a teacher is 
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able ‘to make them laugh’. Yet the importance attributed to a teacher’s sense of humour may 
be overplayed. For one thing, there is no agreement as to what this trait actually constitutes. If 
it is assumed to be only an aspect of an individual’s personality, then this creates a problem. 
A teacher, for example, may have a particular liking for the risky stand-up humour of Sarah 
Silverman, or the very dangerous comedy of Frankie Boyle. But how then does their sense of 
humour relate to pupils who are only amused by the visual slapstick of TVs ‘Dick ‘N’ Dom’? 
Humour and laughter are used best of all, in my opinion, when applied strategically. It 
worked particularly well at The Crescent School when teachers did exactly that, and 
delivered it prudently, in a very precise manner. I sense that many teachers have learned that 
what is far more important than having a sense of humour is having the good sense to know 
exactly when to apply humour, i.e. when to change tack during lessons, when to move from 
the formal to the informal, knowing when to introduce some light-hearted relief at the first 
sign of pupils showing fatigue or restlessness.   
 
Again, the idea that laughter is an uncontrollable human reaction can be challenged as a result 
of evidence obtained during fieldwork. The issue of temporality provides a good example. 
Temporality is a dimension that in many educational settings is often taken for granted. But 
time remains a dimension in primary school organisation of major importance. Everything, 
from the duration of individual lessons to the period in the school day when playtimes occur, 
has a specific time-related value. Evidence of temporal patterns in the way that schools 
conduct their everyday business, reflect its bureaucratic nature. But laughter, too, is 
temporally structured. There were, for example, requests for me not to attend the school, in 
respect of my fieldwork, during SATs week. These were made on the understanding that it 
would not be a good time, i.e. that pupils would either be too focused or too stressed for too 
much laughter to be available. Similarly, the school timetable is organised according to a 
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formal-informal split, with the serious, core-curriculum, subjects taught usually in the 
mornings, and the non-core curriculum subjects occurring in the afternoons.  
 
We all seem to be tacitly aware of the way in which the amount of time we allow an event or 
activity to last is symbolically associated with the degree of significance we attach to it. That 
we are willing to spend a lot of time on a given activity is usually indicative of its great 
importance to us, particularly relative to comparable activities. The respective numbers of 
hours per week schoolchildren spend on mathematics and art, for example, clearly reflect the 
considerably greater priority we assign to the former over the latter. But it can work the other 
way, too.  
 
It was the last lesson of the day and Year 4’s class teacher, who had, I was informed, only 
recently qualified, announced to her pupils the topic in hand. It was just her bad luck that in 
this session she was left with the task of making an ICT class, which had as its main theme 
the forthcoming (2012) Olympics, relevant and interesting. After talking briefly to some of 
the pupils it was clear that very few of them were optimistic about her chances. Whereupon 
for the next hour or so the teacher did her level best to try and enliven what many believed to 
be an uninspiring topic. But it was an impossible task. For the duration of the formal study 
period her pupils were unnervingly quiet, unresponsive, offering very little in the way of 
positive contributions. These were unmistakable signals that all was not well. However, with 
15-minutes of the lesson remaining the teacher suddenly and quite dramatically transformed 
the entire mood. The ICT lesson was brought to an end, and the class were brought back to 
life by the teacher’s declaration that the last few minutes would be taken up with an 
impromptu game. From the many games that were available, she chose one called ‘Heads 
Down, Thumbs Up’. The children cheered in delight. 
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As games go, this one seemed to me an odd choice. For one thing, it was unusually 
convoluted. It involved, if I have understood the rules correctly, the teacher selecting seven 
pupils who were prompted to stand at the front of the class. They were then required to move 
around the rest of the class (who remained seated with their heads down on their desks, 
unable to see, with their hands raised and thumbs outstretched) and to squeeze a pupil’s 
thumb of their choosing before returning furtively to the front of the class so as not to reveal 
their identity. It was then the task of those whose thumbs had been squeezed to try and 
identify those classmates thought to be responsible. Given my somewhat unfavourable 
critique of this game, I was surprised to hear that throughout its short duration the children’s 
laughter was unremitting. Even the teacher joined in. Her laughter, I estimated, was a sign of 
her satisfaction that a pronouncedly difficult lesson had been rescued at the death. Nobody 
wants to see children rushing out of their classrooms and into the arms of waiting parents or 
carers with confused or depressed looks on their faces. It was clearly important to the teacher 
and her pupils that the school day should end on a positive note. Even if their combined 
laughter may have been aroused largely out of a sense of relief (at having endured and 
defeated the featureless ICT subject) it was a calculated intervention, applied with absolute 
precision, that achieved a very successful, if unplanned, outcome. 
 
It could be said that in many respects the pupil’s laughter here had been stage-managed, 
carefully and cleverly marshalled by a NQT whose competence and pedagogic savvy belied 
her lack of teaching experience. But children are not above managing their own laughter, 
either. They do it all the time. They have learnt, for example, how to suppress it, and to 
deliver unvoiced nasal grunts and snorts instead of vocal laughter articulations. There is a 
difference between the two types – an acoustic difference, obviously enough, but they also 
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indicate a difference in context and circumstances. For example, non-vocalised (nasal) 
laughter can tell us a great deal about pupils, but it can also reveal information about the 
nature of classroom organisation, and how behavioural codes and norms function within 
them. For it was mainly in the classroom that these nasal forms were heard, serving to 
illustrate the extent to which pupils remain aware of classroom discipline and classroom 
regulations. It was very noticeable that there were no laughter snorts or grunts on the 
playground, since outside there would be no real reason for any pupil to try and hide or 
suppress their laughter. 
 
There were, however, snorts and grunts a-plenty in Mr. Khan’s (name changed) Year 5 silent 
reading class. As a classroom activity, silent reading tends to divide opinion. Some consider 
any opportunity a child has to read for pleasure to be worthwhile: others dismiss it as a waste 
of time unless it is governed correctly. Either way, Mr. Khan had his hands full trying to keep 
the class in order since many of them found every sound, whether it occurred inside or 
outside the classroom, highly amusing. It was as if the silence was presenting the pupils with 
a challenge, and some children were actively trying to break that silence. A squeaky chair, the 
sound of footsteps in the corridor, or an emergency vehicle’s siren heard far off, was enough 
to set the group into spasms of half concealed snorts, giggles, and grunts.  
 
Although a daily reading routine is to be applauded, and is much needed, it is difficult to see 
how unguided, independent reading can be helpful to all pupils, particularly those with low 
reading ability. There seemed to be no element of reading instruction in this class, thus the 
occasion felt more like an opportunity for some of the children to play and have fun. In fact, 
the only interactions the teacher had with his pupils occurred when he was remonstrating with 
them for laughing too much. As such, it became very easy for some pupils to become 
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disengaged – many were simply pretending to be reading. Of those that were actually 
engaged in reading silently it was interesting to note that they were ensconced in literature of 
a humorous nature. Roald Dahl, Jacqueline Wilson, and the Goosebumps series seemed to be 
among these pupil’s favourites. But even with those children who appeared to be 
conscientiously following the teacher’s instructions, it was difficult to tell whether they were 
laughing at humorous material in their books or laughing at the noises, manufactured and 
natural, they could hear in and around the classroom.   
 
If laughter can indicate to us anything about schools, teachers and pupils, we should always 
be mindful of its double-sided nature, its inclusive and exclusive orientation. Laughter builds 
relationships, and it can also destroy them. Nonetheless, those who have argued that the 
central function of primary schooling is the dissemination and absorption of knowledge may 
be underestimating the importance of providing opportunities for children to laugh and play. 
Laughter in the classroom instead of bored uniformity seems to be an accurate summation of 
a new spirit in teaching and learning. But then, laughter is a learning act in itself – why else 
do pupils and teachers laugh strategically? As we have seen, both parties have learnt how 
useful it can be to apply laughter deliberately, to make specific provision for it, to use it 
artfully, to suppress it, to make laughter appear (and disappear) when and where it is deemed 
necessary. That teachers and pupils at The Crescent Primary School were able to demonstrate 
these principles shows how this institution has proved to be such a wonderful resource in 
helping to acquire hitherto unknown data. It is to be commended therefore and should take 
great pride in making such a significant contribution to the ways in which new interpretations 
of one of our most used, but least understood, facets of behaviour and communication have 
been made. 
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ADDENDA 
A new Abstract appears in the preliminary pages.  
A new introduction to the Introduction chapter (pp.1-2). 
Sub-headings appear throughout the document. 
A new opening paragraph (p.22) and a new concluding paragraph (p.98) are included in the 
Literature Review chapter. 
A new introduction to the Methodology chapter (pp.99-100).  
A new introduction to the Playground Findings chapter (pp.147-148). 
A new introduction to the Classroom Findings chapter (pp.174-175). 
A new introduction to the Discussion chapter (pp.203-204). 
A new introduction to the Conclusion chapter (pp.227-228). 
The sub-sections entitled ‘Ethics’ and ‘Feedback’ appear in the Appendix on pp.272-278 and 
pp.279-281 respectively. 
All critical references to the two teachers, identified as Mr Khan and Mrs Bradford, have 
been removed. 
References to the role of women as (classroom) humour producers have been removed. 
Typos: 
p.83  ‘it is been concealed’ replaced with ‘it has been concealed’. 
p.107 ‘principal/principle’- could not be found. 
p.109 ‘principal’ replaced with ‘principle’. 
p.142 did not replace ‘to get a hold on’ with ‘to get a hold of’ 
p.190 ’childrens opportunities replaced with ‘children’s opportunities’ 
p.212 ‘principle feature’ replaced with ‘principal feature’ 
p.216 Sentence with ‘...since they above all people’ rephrased. 
p.245 ‘lead’ replaced with ‘led’ 
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